Indian foreign Policy' 1947-1964 by Isa, Mohammad
INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY' 1947-1964 
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
BY 
MOHAMMAD ISA 
Under the Supervision of 
Prof. S. A. H. Bilgrami 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH 
1990 
K ^ " b ' 
^ l U . U - 2 0 0 2 
^ / tit* 
.1. 73ssz.^i: 
- 4 OCT 1991 
T3852 
S. A. H. B lLGRAMl 
Ph D. 
DOCTORATE DCS SCIENC[:;S PCUiT' 
R e s d . : 29880 
p..AM, fPUELIC ; 6720 
^""^^ ( U N ' V C U S I i-Y 266 
P R O r C S S O R 
Del ART MEN! 01 ['OLITICAL SCIENCE 
\ l K , \ R i l MUSIIM I N!Vl R b i n , ALIGARH 
IMJIA :O:OO] 
Dated: 23.3.1990 
This is to certify that Mr.Mohammad Isa 
has completed his thesis, '• Indian Foreign 
Policy from 1947 to 1954" under my 
supervision. In my opinion the thesis of 
Mr.Mcto^ mmadlsa is satisfactory enough to be 
submitted for examination for the award of 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
Political Science. 
S. 4,Ji*^ BTTgr4ii 
C O N T E N T S 
Page No. 
PREFACE . . . i - i i 
INTRODUCTION . . . 1 - 6 
Chapter - I HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A- The Freedom Movement . . . 7 - 2 5 
B- Format ion and Bas i c 
• P r i n c i p l e s of I n d i a ' s 
F o r e i g n P o l i c y . . . 2 6 - 4 7 
Chapter - I I INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARDS PAKISTAN . . . 4 8 - 7 0 
C h a p t e r - I I I INDIA'S FOREICJJ POLICY 
TOWARDS CHINA . . . 7 1 - 9 0 
C h a p t e r - IV INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWAflDS SRI LANKA . . . 9 1 - 9 6 
Chapter - V INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARDS NEPAL AND BHUTAN . . . 9 7 - 1 3 0 
Chapter -VI INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARDS THE UNITED STATFS 
OF AMERICA . . . 131 - 1 5 4 
Chapter - V I I INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARDS THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS . . . 155 -192 
Chapter-VIII CONCLUSION . . . 193 -202 
BIBLIOGRAPHY — . . . 203 - 212 
APPENDICES — . . . 213 - 2 4 0 
-i-
P R E F A C E 
In the beginning the loBmation of India's foreign 
policy took place against the background of drastic 
changes in international affairs, particularly in the 
sub-continent as newly independent countries like India 
and Pakistan asserted their right to fonnulate their 
domestic and foreign policies without outside interference. 
India's option for non-alignment changed the entire socio-
political, economic and military seemario in the world. 
I t4i ^ r /' / i 
^''•s.c. P\^ modest attempt has-been madp in these pages to 
»• 
^study the various aspects of India's policy of non-alignment 
and its repercussions from 19^7 to 1964. 
The first chapter discusses the problem and consti-
tution of India's ioreign policy. India's relations with 
Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has 
been taken up in the succeeding chajiters. Conclusion 
relates to the chief gains according from Indie's policy 
of non-alignment and its impact on the foreign policies of 
various countries of the world. 
First of all I wish to acknowpdpe most sincerely 
the valuable guidance which I received from Professor 
S.A.H. Bilgrami, Department of PoliMoal Science under whose 
able supervision this thesis has been prepared. 
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I also wish to thank Professor A. P. Sharma for his 
encouragement. I wish to put on record my indebtedness 
to Professor A.S,Beg, Professor S.Hasan Ahmed and Dr. M. A, 
Kishore for their valuable suggestions. 
I express my sincere gratitude to Er. T,H.Nizami and 
Dr. B. Rahmatullah for going through the manuscript of the 
present work making invaluable suggestions for its 
improvement. 
My sincere thanks are due to Vr. Mohammad Qasim, 
Semi-Professional in the Library of the Political Science 
Department who provided me relevent books and helped me in 
getting material from other sourxes. 
I am also thankful to Mr. Mohd. Shafique, who not onlj 
typed my thesis but also gave me brotherly help. 
I N T R O D U C T T O N 
Foreign Policy is the policy laid down by a state foi' 
managing its relations with other Sovereign states in ordei' 
to promote its national objectivps and to safeguard its 
vital interests. Foreign policy is chalked out by the peoj.'! 
at the helms of affairs in a count.-y, after thorough delibe 
tion of all the relevant factors. It is the process, art r 
strategy of making decisions on issues of international 
importance. 
The foreign policy of India after independence is bas 
on the philosophy of its government and leaders. The prese 
foreign policy of India has its roots in the freedom movemg' 
At its very first session under the presidentship of W,C. 
Bannerji in 1885» the Indian National Congress denounced thu 
annexation of Burma by the British and objected to military 
activity going on beyond the natural lines of defence of In^  
No state in the modern world can do without a foreign 
policy or involvement in international affairs. This invol', 
ment must be systematic and based on certain well-defined 
principles. Every state has to work within the limits of i 
strength and the realities of the external environment. A 
state without a foreign policy can be compared to a ship 
without a radar which drifts aimlessly, buffeted by every s 
that it encounters. 
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The first aim of the foreign policy of the country is 
to articulate its external or internal interests. The aim 
is to preserve its independence so that it can take decision^ ' 
on both the internal as well as external affairs, without an'i 
external interference. Its third objective is to preserve 
the existing international system. The last aim of the fore: 
policy of the country is to improve the living standards of 
its people. 
The most important factor determines the foreign polii; 
of a country is the geographical situation. The coastline of 
India is as important from the point ol view of its defence i 
its land boundaries. With the relations between India on thii 
one hand, and China and Pakistan on the other having been 
vitiated, the foreign policy of this country has to be guided 
by consideration of'the defence of its northern borders. 
India is much more close to the Communist world, or to 
put it more precisely, to the principal partners in the 
Communist Block - China and Russia - than she is to the 
corresponding principals in the Western Block. The necessit;| 
of India, therefore, to find a modus vivendi with her neigh-
bours is greater than with those who are at a distance, unle.i 
of course, she is convinced that her neighbours have aggress.: 
intentions towards her. 
Traditions of the National Movfmerit of the country havii 
also influenced its foreign policy, India's foremost leader 
Gandhiji and Nehru saw the evil effect of colonialism and 
imperialism in different countries of Asia and Airica. 
The chief feature of the foreign policy of India is 
non-alignment. A policy of peace and international coopera-
tion, and friendship with different nations of the world are 
the most necessary components of foreipn policy of the 
country. The policy of non-alignment was conceived by Nehru. 
His main object was to steer cleer of the two power blocs-
one led by the USA and the other by USSR. Such a policy was 
suited to the national interest of the country. India could 
not join hands with either power bloc because she needed 
speedy economic development. This could be achieved with the 
help of big powers only when India pursued a policy of 
friendship with all the countries of the world. In the early 
years i.e. between 19^7-50, this policy was not very clearly 
enunciated. It was despised with suspicion by the communist 
bloc as well as the American bloc. It was after 1950, and 
especially after the death of Stalin in 1953, this policy 
became more clear. In fact, by this time many of the 
coxintries including Yugoslavia and UAR had accepted this 
policy and it had become a commonly accepted nation in the 
world politics. This was so done because many countries 
achieved their independence after a lonp, struggle for freedom 
and wanted to maintain their freedom ?-ind did not wish to be 
subserviant to any foreign power. >irhru a] so wanted to make 
it more emphatic and clear., Several conferences of non-aligne 
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nations were held and they gave a clear-cut idea of non-
alignment. Nehru remarked as early as in ^^USl " Where 
freedom is menaced or Justice threatened or where aggression 
takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral" . 
Non-alignment involves rejection of military pacts and 
alliances to save the world from a horror of a possible third 
World War. 
In adopting a policy of peace and international coopera-
tion and friendship with different nations of the world, India 
is mainly concerned with the establishment of lasting world 
peace. She has, therefore, to establish friendly relations 
with all the countries of the world and she is opposed to 
those countries that indulge in colonialism or racialism. 
This is an important aspect of the foreign policy of India. 
It was this desire that made India join the Bandung Conference 
and to help the evolve the principle of Panchshetl and to 
participate actively in the conferences of the non-aligned 
powers. 
India opposed the policy of racial sef'^ r-e/^ ation and 
exploitation of one class by another. She believes in 
providing equal opportunities to all tho people of the world, 
irrespective of whether they belong to one race or another. 
She has opposed to discrimination on the bases of colour, 
class or sex. Opposition to racial discrimination is linked 
with the history of India's freedom stru,'^ p:le. Mahatma Gandhi 
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was the prime mover of such a struggle in South Africa. 
Even today she is opposed to the policy of Apartheid in 
South Africa. Similarly, she does not think that discri-
mination in the USA on the basis of colour between the whites 
and the coloured people, is at all justified. India is one 
of the staunch supporters of UNO and its activities. UNO 
has not been helplxil to India in her affairs. Kashmir proble-m 
is alive only because of UNO and its block Politics. Similarity 
when Pakistan invaded India in 1965, UNO did not treat Pakistan' 
as aggressor, which disappointed India very much. 
In spite of all this, India has all alon,'': b.^ lleved 
that UNO should be an effective instrument for bringing about 
stable world peace and for ending exploitation and human 
sufferings throughout the world. 
With her faith in co-existence ~ the basic tenets of 
Panchsheel - India believes that the countries with different 
social and political systems can co-exist on the basis of 
certain agreed principles. Today the principle of co-existenci? 
is accepted even by Russia and other great powt-rs. It was 
Nehru who laid down these principles. The principles of 
Panchsheel were based on the nation of co-existence. These 
principles of Panchsheel were inspired by the philosophy of 
Budhism and comprised the following five tenets: (a) Mutual 
respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty! 
(b) Non-aggression; (c) Non-interference in each other's 
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internal affairs (d) Equality and mutual advantage and 
(e) peaceful co-existence and economic cooperation. 
After independence, The Indian governme:it, took a 
lot of interest in raising the standard of living of the 
Indian people. This could be possible only through 
industrialization and this could only be achieved with 
foreign collaboration. This was an important factor in 
shaping the foreign policy of India. 
India's policy towards her neighbours has always been 
of friendship and cooperation but response from some of 
these countries has not been equally cordial, Nehru said, 
" We have more economic and trade relations with some 
countries; we have also some special ties with some of our 
close neighbour and with commonwealth countries. What we 
try to avoid, however, is being unfriendly to any country 
unless that country chooses actively to pursue a hostile 
policy towards us" . 
Chapter •- I 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A - The Freedom Movement 
B - Formation and Basic Principles 
of India's Foreign Policy 
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(A) FREEDOM MOVEMENT 
The roots of foreign policy of India may be found in 
the various resolutions passed by the Indian National 
Congress during its struggle for freedom from the British 
rule and the speeches and writings of the first Prime 
Minister of India, Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru. The impact of 
the British rule also led to growth and development of certain 
democratic and liberal ideas and institutions whicl- in their 
turn influenced the pattern of India's Foreign Policy. 
When India got independence its economy was in poor shape. 
This was a result of British rule because the British Govern-
ment had an anti-industrial policy and did not like to develop 
industry in India. But after independence, the Indian, the 
Indian government, became interested in raising the standard 
of living of the Indian people. This could be possible only 
through industrialization and this industrialization could 
only be achieved with foreign collaboration. This pre-requisitc' 
contributed to the making of the foreign policy of India. 
The main points regarding India's foreign policy as 
formulated by its leaders before India's independence, were 
as follows : 
1. Preservation of India's Sovereign Independence? 
2, Persuance of an independent foreign policy avoiding 
alignment with power blocs; 
1. Foreign Policy of India, Lok Sabha Secretariate,New Delhi,p.1, 
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3. Acceptance of the principle of freedom for 
dependent people and opposition to imperialism, 
colonialism and racialism? 
4. Cooperntion with all peace-loving Nations and the 
United Nations to promote international peace 
and prosperity; 
5. Reduction of world tension? and 
6. Refashioning of a more equitable structure of 
international economic order and cooperation on 
the basis of Justice and fair play. 
These principles operated powerfully on the minds of 
India's leaders and through them on the minds of Indian 
people at the time when India got its independence. 
In 1885, the Indian leaders became politically cons-
cious .regarding the policies of the British Government. 
They gathered at Bombay and established an association called 
the Indian National Congress. Members of this association 
were seventy two is the begining. The Indian National 
Congress at its first meeting in Bombay declared its loyality 
to the British Government. W.C. Banerji presided over the 
meeting and declared: " I ask whether in the most glorious 
days of Hindu rule, you could imagine the possibility of a 
meeting of this kind. It is under the civilized rule of the 
Queen and people of England that we meet here together, hin-
dered by none, freely allowed to speak our minds without the 
least fear or hesitation. Such a thing is possible under 
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British rule, and under British rule only". (December 25 to 
31, 1885). 
In 1892, the Indian National Congress passed a reso-
lution which declared: 
" That having regard to the fact that the 
abnormal increase in the annual Military 
Expenditure of the E^ npire since 1885-'86 
is principally owing to the military acti-
vity going on beyond the natural lines of 
the defences of the country, in pursuance 
of the Imperial policy of Great Britain 
in its relations with some of the Gveat 
Powers of Europe, this Congress is of 
opinion that, in hare justice to India,an 
equitable portion of that expenditure 
should be borne by the British Treasury, 
and that the revenues of India should be 
3 
proportionately relieved of that burden" 
India and Africa had close cooperation in trade and 
commerce. The African continent covered a large mass land 
and sea, from Egypt, Libya and Algeria on one side to Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Mauritius on the other . This important 
2. Vinod Bhatia: Indian National Congress and Soviet Union, 
Panchsheel, New Delhi, 1985, pp.^-b. 
See also; 
Wall-bank, Walter; A Short history of India and Pakistan, 
Chicago 195T, p.gF^  
3. Kundra, S.C., Indian Foreign Policy, 19^7-195^,Bombay 1955, 
p.34, Allahabad 1892, Resolution VII quoted in N.V. 
Raj Kumar's The Background of Indian Foreign Policy-
p.33. New Delhi, 1952. 
4. V.P. Dutt: India's Foreign Policy. New Delhi 1984, p. 3^9. 
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strategic position led thousand of Indian people to move to 
south and east African countries from India. But they were 
harassed and exploited by the South African Government by all 
possible means. This large-scale exploitation was greatly 
resented by the Indian leaders who turned their minds to the 
solution of this serious problem. 
Many colonial powers governed the countries of the 
African continent particularly Britain, France and Belgium* 
These big colonial powers were exploiting Indians as much as 
they could. In 189^ the Indian National Congress openly 
spoke of the exploitation of Indians carried on by these big 
powers. It took a firm decision regarding the formulation 
of a sound policy for saving Indians from this exploitation. 
The Congress passed many resolutions from 1894 onAfards with 
the aim of safeguarding the interest of Indians against explol 
tation by imperial powers. 
It is true that before the African countries acquired 
independence from their colonial masters- the British, the 
French and the Belgiams- India supported their freedom of 
movements in time with India's policy of supporting the freedci 
of dependent countries. In fact, India gave its powerfiil morali 
support to the African peoples against racial discrimination, 
more especially against the racial politics of South Africa 
and Southern Rhodesia. 
As early as 1919, Gandhiji was described as " Gandhi 
the Great of the whole of Africa" . In later years, he was 
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vlsited by many African leaders who sought inspiration and 
guidance in their own struggle for self-determination. 
Jawahar Lai Nehru spoke movingly of African freedom y^nd 
the growth of the African personality in the Asian Relations 
Conference in March 23, 19'^ 7, " We in Asia have a special 
responsibility to the people of Africa. We must help them 
5 
to take their rightful place in the human family" . 
A competent study published in 1951 noted that on the 
eve of India's independence, the number of people of Indian 
Origin in South Africa was 282,40? and in East Africa around. 
18^,100 . The people of Indian Origin abroad were free to 
decide whether they would adopt the nationality of the country 
they had settled in or continue to remain Indian nationals. 
If they choose the former alternative, India would have no 
political concern with them; if they choose the latter alter-
native, they could claim only favoured alien treatment and 
no special privileges. 
India was in an advantageous position to seize the 
opportunity and help in the economic development of Africa, 
and in the process, provide an expending market for its own 
expanding industries. Thus, India has vital geopolitical and 
economical interests in Africa. 
5. Asian Relations: Asian Relations Organizations, New Delhi, 
19^8, p.26. 
6. Kondapi, C: Indians Overseas 1838-1949, New Delhi, 1951, 
p. 527. 
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During the years 1895, 1897, 1898, 1899 and 1902 at 
the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress similar 
7 
resolutions were adopted'. In 1897, a resolution was passed 
on the North-West frontier policy which stated: 
" That this Congress expresses its deep and 
earnest conviction that the present frontier 
policy of the Government of India is injurious 
to the best interests of the British Empire 
in general, and this country in particular, 
as it involves frequent Military expeditions 
beyond the present limits of the British 
Indian Empire and causes great loss of 
valuable lives and public money? and therefore 
entreats the British Nation to put a stop to 
this aggressive policy and to lay down that 
if such expeditions are found necessary, they 
being for Imperial purposes, the major portion 
of their expenses should be defrayed by the 
o 
British Exchequer" . 
At the end of the First World War, the Indian National 
Congress congratulated the various countries, " on the 
successful termination of the war which was waged for the 
q 
liberty and freedom of all the peoples of the world" 
-»•» ^ , . . Ill I . I , r i I I III 
7. Kundra, S.C.: Indian Foreign Policy. 19^7-195^, Bombay, 195<5 
pp. 34-^5. 
8. op.cit p. 241 
See also- Resolution, Congress Working Committee,Wardher 
Q. 13 Aug. 19^6. 
9. Delhi, 1918, Resolution 7, p.40. 
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The Indian National Congress urged the British India 
Government " to settle the Turkish question in accordance 
with the just and legitimate sentiments of Indian Musalmans" 
Congress also passed various resolutions of sympathy for 
countries which were fighting against imperialisn and esta-
blished contract, with the leaders of nations which were 
raising their voices against imperialism. United States of 
America and Soviet Union were supporting the effects to 
terminate imperialism. The Ahmadabad Congress in 1921 again 
supported the Khilafat Movement-, 
In 1921 All India Congress Committee passed its first 
resolution exclusively on foreign policy and decalredi 
1. that the present Government of India in no way 
represent Indian opinion and that their policy 
has been traditionally guided by considerations 
more of holding India in subjection than of pro-
tecting her borders; 
2. that India as self-governing country can have 
nothing to fear from the neighbouring states 
or any state as her people have no designs upon 
them ... and 
3. that the people of India regard most treaties 
entered into the Imperial Government by neigh-
bouring states as mainly designed by the latter 
to perpetuate the exploitation of India by the 
Imperial Power, and would therefore urge the 
States having no ill-will against the people of 
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India and having no desire to injure her 
interests, to refrain from entering into any 
treaty with the Imperial Power" '^. 
It is important to note that from 1885 to 1947 agree-
ment between Muslim leaders and the Congress materialized 
only twice - in the Lucknow Pact of 1916 and for the Khilafat/ 
11 Non-cooperation movement of 1920-4 . During the period, in 
1921, the All India National Congress passed the most impor-
tant resolution on foreign policy and openly "declared to 
1P 
support the Khilafat Movement . 
This was a landmark in the history of India's foreign 
policy. It was a significant declaration on the part of 
Nationalist India regarding its interest in the field of 
foreign policy. Another important resolution was passed at 
the Congress session in Madras, in 1927 in which the Indian 
National Congress protested against the use of Indian troops 
in China, Mesopotamia and Persia and deplored the extensive 
war preparations which the British Government was carrying 
on in India •*, The Congress session also demanded the 
10. Khundara, op.cit. pp.35-37 
Delhi, All India Congress Committee,1921, Resolution VI, 
(background of India's foreign policies), p.44. 
11. Sharma J.S.,India's struggle for freedom, Delhi 1964. 
p.179, Resolution, C.W.C. Ahmadabad, 1921 
12. D,A.Low, The^IndianNationai Congress. Oxford Univ.Press, 
Delbt 1967, p.191 
13. Raj Kumar, '>.V. , The background of India's foreign policy. 
New Delhi, pp.44-48. 
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withdrawal of Indian troops, police consulate guards from 
Mesopotamia and Persia and from all British colonies and 
foreign countries, wheresoever they may be as well as all 
attempts to separate Burmas from India . 
Leaders of Indian National Congress were against any 
form of western domination over Asian and African countries. 
Jawahar Lai Nehru visited several countries like Belgium, 
Switzerland, Amsterdam, Britain, France, Sri Lanka, Soviet 
15 Union and Poland in 1927. When he visited Spain in 1938, 
he declared that the foreign policy of India should be in 
favour of those countries which had been exploited by 
colonial powers. He added: 
" The reaction of the Spanish War on me indi-
cates how, in my mind, the problem of India 
was tied up with other world problems. More 
and more I come to thirK that these seperate 
problems, political or economic, in China, 
Abyssinia, Spain, Central Europe, India or 
elsewhere, wer-e facets of one and the same 
world problem . There could be no final 
solution or any one of them till this basic 
problem was solved. And in all probability 
there would be upheavel and disaster before 
the final solution was reached" . 
14, Jagdish ^aran Sharma, India's struggle for Freedom, 
volume 2.>f;, Delhi, 1964, p. 179. 
15« Ralhan, 0.P.: Jawahar Lai Nehru Abroad, Uppal Publishing 
House, New Delhi, 19S3, pp.2-6, 16. 
16. Nehru, J., An Autobiography, New York 1942, p.601 
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Attack on Manchuria by Japan and on Abyssinia by Italy 
were condemned by Indian leaders and they expressed their 
opposition against these invasion through demonstration. 
Such demonstrations were also held in favour of the Spanish 
17 
republic of Spain and China , when she was attacked by 
Japan and asked the Indian people to boycott Japanese good. 
The Indian National Congress repeatedly expressed itself 
against imperialism, Fascism and Nazism. It also strongly 
criticised the failure of the Great Powers and the League 
of the Nations to take a step against invasion of Ethopia. 
Another significant pronouncement about the foreign 
policy of India was made at the Haripura session in 1938. At 
this session a historic resolution was passed against 
imperialism, Fascism and Nazism and in favour of a just world 
order, discrement and collective seciirity. The resolution 
declared: 
" The people of India desire to live in peace 
and friendship with their neighbours and with 
all others countries, and for this purpose 
wish to remove all causes of conflict between 
them striving for their own freedom and inde-
pendence as a nation, they desire to respect 
the freedom of others and to build upitheir 
strength on the basis of international coopera-
tion and good will. Such cooperation must be 
founded on a world order and a free India will 
gladly associate itself with such an order and 
stand ior disarmament and collective security. 
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But world cooperation is impossible of 
achievement so long as the root of 
international conflict remain and one 
nation dominates over another and 
imperialism hold, sway. In order, therefore, 
to establish world peace on an enduring basis, 
imperialism and the exploitation of one people 
•i Q 
by another must end 
The Indian National Congress supported the exploited 
nations and refused to support and cooperate with the 
British. This is what Nehru said in his speech on December K 
19^1, referring to the attitude of the congr-ess towards the 
British during the World War II : 
When the Congress offered its cooperation, it 
received insult from Britain. Today the British 
are plunged in misfortune. Our sympathies are 
with them - not only our sympathy but also our 
reverence. Britain is fighting for her very 
freedom today. India has been fighting for 
19 freedom for century . 
Nehru did not express any support towards Japanese 
imperialism because Japan belongs Asian continent and had 
once defeated an European imperialist nation: Russia. On 
April 7» 19^2, he decalred in his speech: 
18. J.'^ . Sharraa, op.cit. , p.181; and also C.W.C. Resol.193a, 
Haripura. 
19. Before and After Independence; A c o l l e c t i o n of the Most 
Important and i o u l - s t i r r i n g Speeches d e l i v e r e d by 
Jawahar la l Nehru 1922-50, ed. J . S . Bri.crht, New De lh i , 1950, 
pp.207-208. 
-18-
I consider it my duty to oppose any foreign 
invasion of India. How can I remain mere 
spectr r of events or be silent. The news 
of Japanese bombin?^  of coastal towns of India 
must stir the hearts of Indians. The Japanese 
assertion that they are coming to India to set 
us free is absurd and wholly false. That was 
20 
clear from Japan's misdeeds in China and Korea 
He commented on Russia's non-aggression pact with the 
Nazis and subsequent events in these words; 
As the war progressed, new problems arose, or 
the old problems took new shapes, and the old 
alignments seemed to change, the old standards 
to fade away. The Russo-German pact, the 
Soviet's invasion of Finland, the friendly 
approach of Russia towards Japan: Were there 
any principles and standards of conduct in 
this world, or was it all sheer opportunism" ? 
At the end of World War II Indian leaders wanted to 
get help for the independence of India. They covld not 
receive help from U.S.A. After this, Indian leaders 
examined the position of Russia which signed on non-
aggression pact with the Nazis. These circumstances affected 
the thinking of Indian leaders in this search foj n IdealistJi 
foreign policy for the country. In 19*^ 6, Jawaharlal Nehru 
expressed his deep disappoint distress at the conduct of the 
20. Jawaharlal Nehru, Before & After Independence, op.cit., 
p.219 
21. Jawaharlal Nehru: An Autobi ography(Re priat- The Bodley 
Head, London, 19537 t>,W9, 
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great powers in Iran which was a " continuation of the old 
contest for possession of oil by rival powerS*. He expressed 
his views on this matter on March 15, 19A6 in the following 
terms. 
On the one hand there appears to be Russian aggression? 
on the other, the desire of Britain not only to hold on to 
oil, but also to preserve the so-called life-lines of the 
22 
Empire. Rival Iranian groups are exploited by either party . 
Talking about the situation after the War Nehru said 
as follows! 
Much will inevitably depend on American and 
Soviet Policy, and on the degree of coordination 
or conflict between the two and Britain. Everybody 
talks loudly about the necessity for the Big three 
to pull together... Yet rifts and differences peep 
out at every stage, even during the course of the 
war. Whatever the future may hold, it is clear 
that the economy of the U.S.A., after the war, 
will be powerfully expansionist... Will this 
lead to some kind of new imperialism? It would 
yet be another tragedy if it did so for America 
has the power and opportunity to set the pace for 
the future. The future policy of the Soviet Union 
is yet shrouded in mystery, but there have been 
some revealing glimpses of it already It aims at 
having as many friendly and dependent o" semi-
dependent countries near its borders as possible... 
It relies more on building its own strength on an 
unassailable basis. So, presumably, do other 
22. Ibid, p. 358 
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nations also, in so far as they can. That is 
not a hopeful prelude to wor'ld cooperation. 
Between the Soviet Union and other countries there 
is not the same struggle for export markets as 
between Britain and the U.S.A. But the differences 
are deeper ... and mutual suspicious have not 
been allayed even by joint effort in the war. If 
these differences grow, the U.S.A. and Britain 
will tend to each other's company and support as 
against the U.3.S.R. group of nations. 
Where do the hundreds of millions of Asia and 
Africa come in this picture?... For them, inevitably, 
the test of each move or happening is this. Does 
it help towards our liberation? Does it end the 
domination of one country over another? Will it 
enable us to live freely the life of our choice 
in cooperation with others? Does it bring equality 
and equal opportunity for nations as well as 
groups within each nation? Does it hold forth the 
promise of an early liquidation of poverty and 
illiteracy and bring better living condition? ... 
Large parts of Asia and Africa consist of an 
awakened, discontented, seething humanity, no 
longer prepared to tolerate existing conditions. 
Conditions and problems differ greatly in various 
countries of Asia, but throughout this vast area, 
in China and in India, in South-east Asia, in 
Western Asia, and the Arab world run-common threads 
of sentiment and invisible links which hold them 
2^ 
together. ^ 
23. Jawaharlal Nehru- DISCOVERY OF INDIA, Meridian Books 
Limited, 8, Garrick street, London, W. *-.2, 19^6, pp-A70-47'l 
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One of the question of the most Immediate 
concern to us is the question of racial 
discrimination in South Africa and the treat-
ment of people of Indian descent there. 
The question concerns not Indian nationals 
but people of Indian descent who are ^ outh 
African nationals. There is no Indian national 
there. Our interest in the problem is not 
only because we are against racial discrimination, 
but because there is a long history behind this, 
going back to 50 or 60 years or more. We have 
been intimately involved in the issue before 
and after independence. 
There are many conflict which divide the 
world and this question of racial conflict in 
South Africa is grave as any other issue. There 
are racial conflicts elsewhere in the world. In 
India we have no racial conflict in that particular 
sense, but something akin to it when we suppress 
the people because they are called " untouchables" 
or " depressed classes" . We are fighting it. 
Again, for instance, there are racial conflicts 
in the United States of America. But there is a 
difference. In the United States of America 
efforts have been made with growing success to 
ease the racial problem,. I do not say they have 
solved it, but the Government have tried to solve 
it, with the help of public opinion, and there is 
progress in a certain direction; so also elsewhere. 
In South Africa, on the other hand, it is the deliberate, 
acknowledged and loudly-proclaimed policy of the Government 
itself to maintain this segregation and racial discrimination. 
-22-
This makes the South African case unique in the world. It 
is a policy with which obviously no person and no country 
which believes in the United Nations Charter can ever 
compromise because it uproots almost everything the modern 
world stands for an considers worth-while, whether it is 
the United Nations Charter or whether it is our ideas of 
24 democracy of human dignity 
A number of other pronouncements about the foreign 
policy of India were made during the independence struggle 
and they formed the basis of the foreign policy of free 
India. The follower were the aims and objectives of Indian 
Foreign Policy which were put in a systematic and lucid 
form by Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of India's foreign 
policy, both inside and outside the Parliament! 
In a speech of September 7, 1946 he declared! 
We hope to develope close and direct contacts 
with other nations and to cooperate with them 
in the furtherance of world peace and freedom. 
Vv'e propose, as far as possible, to keep away 
from the power politics of groups aligned against 
one another, which have led in the past to 
world wars and which may again lead to disaster 
on an even vaster scale. We believe that 'peace 
and freedom are Indivisible and the denial of 
freedom any where must endanger freedom elsewhere 
and lead to conflict and war. 
24, Jawaharlal Nehru; India's Fcr-eign Policy Selected Speeches 




We hope that an independent India will 
have friendly and cooperative relations 
with England and the countries of the 
25 British Commonwealth . 
About the unity of Asian Countries, Jawaharlal Nehru 
said: 
We are of Asia end peoples of Asia are 
nearer and closer to us than others. 
India is so situated that she is the 
pivot of western, Southern and South-East 
Asia, In the past her culture flowed to 
all these countries and they came to her 
in many ways. Those contacts are being 
renewed and the future is bound to see 
closer union between India and South-
East Asia on the one side, and Afghanistan, 
2fi 
Iran and the Arab world on the other . 
These principles of India's foreign policy were 
reiterated by Jawaharlal Nehru in various forms on different 
occasions. Certain supplementary principles were also 
enunciated. For example, in a speech on April 24, 1955 he 
said: " We want to be friends with the ""est and friends with 
27 the East and friends with everybody . 
25. Jawaharlal Nehru. Speeches, VOI.T, New Delhi,1983, p.2-3. 
26. Ibid, p. 3 
27. Ibid. Vol.Ill, p.290 
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The preservation of peace constituted the central 
aim of Indian leaders. It was this which led India to 
follow the path of non-violence & non-aggression in foreign 
policy. As regards the policy of non-violence Jawaharlal 
Nehru received inspirations from the teachings of Gautam 
Budha and Mahavira. Jawaharlal Nehru wrotel 
" The idea of non-violence, already present 
in the Vedas and Upanishads, were emphasized 
28 
by Budhism and even more so by Ja in i s ra" 
Again he s a i d : 
•• Why was it that Budhism resulted in the growth 
of other-worldliness in India far more than 
in some other countries where it has flourished 
for long periods — in China, Japan and Burma? 
I do not know, but I imagine that the national 
background of each country was strong enough 
to mould the religion according to its shape... 
India was also influenced by Jainism which was 
the most otherworldly and life-negating of all 
29 those doctrines and philosophies" . 
The teachings of Jainism and Budhism greatly impressed 
the peoples of India. This was the reason why India 
followed the policy of non-alignment, non-violence and peace. 
Jawaharlal Nehru added: 
" The emphasis of Jainism and Budlhism on non-
violence led to the tilling of soil being 
considered a lowly occupation, for it often 
resulted in the destruction of animal life** . 
28. J.Nehru: Discovery of India, op.cit. p.139. 
29. J.Nehru, Op.cit. p. 140. 
30. J.Nehru, op.cit. , p.l4l 
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This does not mean passivity of mind or action, lack 
of faith, and conviction. It does not mean submission to 
evil. It is a positive and dynamic approach to problems 
such as that of confrontation. India believes that each 
country has not only the right to freedom but to decide 
its ovm policy and way of life. She believes in non-aggre-
ssion and non-interference by one country in the affairs of 
another and growth of tolerance between them and the efficacy 
of peaceful co-existence. 
During the period of struggle for Independence Mahatma 
Gandhi strove hard against imperialism, injustice, colonialism 
and racialism in many parts of Africa. The Indian National 
Congress took a keen interest in the struggle as acused 
31 imperialism in various countries of Asia and Africa . 
Jawaharlal Nehru also criticised the colonial policy 
of brutal regression, undisguised racialism, " settler 
imperialism" , and devious methods of divide and rule in 
Africa^^. 
31. V.P. Dutt, op.cit., p.3^9 
32. Ibid., p. 349 
-26-
B. FORMATION AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INDIA*"; FOREIGN POLICY 
Generally the ideology and philosophy of its people 
greatly affect the nature of foreign policy. The geogra-
phical situation, economic and industrial condition, 
educational levels, political goals, historic experience, 
military strength, national character, domestic m.Llliu^ -, 
international raiUlne, political institutions and personalities 
of decision makers and other circumstances of a country also 
influence foreign policy. India has an important strategic 
position on the globe dueto its location, size, topegraphy 
population, state boundary, climate, hydrotography, soil 
etc. All are significant in influencing India's foreign 
policy. But two out of these are most significant and are 
responsible for regulating India's foreign policy. 
1. The Himalayan Frontier - Common borders with Pakistan 
and China 
2. The Indian Ocean - Frontier. 
Pakistan, after partition occupied some area of 
Kashmir, and China has also occupied some areas of Ladakh. 
The possession of the disputed areas has been a cause of 
conflict and confrontation between India on the one hand 
Pakistan, and China on the other-^ "'. 
33. Bandyopadhyaya, J., The Making of India's foreign 
policy. New Delhi 198A pp.3^-55. 
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India has a long boundry with its neighbours, viz., 
China, Nepal, Afghanistan and Burma. The northern part of 
Kashmir is joined to Afghanistan and is only a few miles 
away from the boundary of the Soviet Union. Pakistan and 
India.have a common border. With the annexation of Tibet 
by China, distance between the borders of the two countries 
has virtually ended. 
The relations of India with Pakistan and China having 
gone worse, the foreign policy of this country has to be 
guided by the defence of its northern borders, while taking 
about this Prime Minister Nehru said in Parliament on March 17i 
1950; 
" We are in a strategic part of Asia, set in 
the centre of the Indian ocean, with 
intimate connection of tbe past and of the 
present with western Asia, with South-East 
Asia and with Far Eastern Asia. We could 
not ignore it, even if we would and we do 
not want to ignore it. " 
India could not ignore the fact that the navies of the 
western bloc dominated the Indian Ocean and most of the 
other water surface of the world-"^  . 
34. Prasanta ^en Gupta, Parliamentary Liebates, New Delhi, 
17 March 1950, V0I.TII no. 3, pp.l6$6-i6^. 
35. India Quarterly, Vol.XLIII, nos.3.'VA New Delhi, 
July-December, 1987, pp.198-199. 
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It is for the reason that India has not been in 
favour of merely regional nuclear free zones. Instead, 
India has demanded that the Indian Ocean as a whole be 
declared a peace zone or a nuclear free zone . 
The Indian Ocean is very important factor for India's 
national interests because the total area of the Indian Ocean 
is 74.92 million square kilometers which approximately, is 
equal to the total area of Africa and Asia. The main consti-
tuent parts of the ocean are the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Bay 
of Bengal, Andaman Seas, Persian Gulf, Mozambique Channel and 
the Great Australian Bight^ . India is so situated that it 
is protected by the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the 
Arabian Sea in the east, south and west and the Himalayas in 
the north. Its land frontiers make the acquaintence of 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Nepal, Afghanistan and Burma-^  . 
The Gulf carries the World's largest deposits of 
petroleum on which the wheels of the industrial civilisation 
of Europe are very largely dependent. Powerful international 
capitalist interests have long term extensive interests in 
the Gulf oil industry. These interests and the crucial 
importance of petroleum have made the Gulf region perhaps the 
most sensitive Third World stake for the United States for 
36. V. P. Dutt, op.cit. p.366. 
37* Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, Lok Sabha Secretarial, 
Nfew Delhi, 1987, p.1. 
38. Prakash Chandra, International Relation, New Delhi,1983* 
pp.124. 
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retainlng its global power and security. 
The African portion of the Indian Ocean littoral 
extends from the Horn to the Cape. It is inhabited by a 
cluster of states having various degrees of instability. 
Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique are Marxist - ruled? states 
which are facing counter revolutionary insurgents backed 
by the United States and the West European powers, or by 
neighbours who are allies of these powers. Between Ethopia 
and Somalia there is almost a perpetual state of undeclared 
warfare. And finally,•there is South Africa; the time bomb 
that will explode one day with unpredictable ferocity. 
Compared with other oceanic geopolitical regions, the 
Indian Ocean area is distinguished by a much greater multi-
plicity of imbalances and conflicts. The Atlantic region 
claims a stable strategic and political balance written in 
the nuclear language of deterrence. The Atlantic Pact and 
the Warsaw Pact blocs match each other in nuclear and con-
ventional armouries: The EEC and CMEA are the world's two 
most integrated international communities'^ . 
Compared with the pacific, Atlantic and Mediterranean 
regions, the Indian Ocean region in more conflict-prove, 
fragmented and exposed to greater power imbalances. The 
situation, however, is not altogether bleak. Organisation 
39. Prasanta Sen Gupta, India Quarterly, Vol.XLIII, Nos.3&^, 
New Delhi, July-December 1987, p.;?63. 
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of regional cooperation like ASEAN, SAARC and GCC keep 
tensions and conflicts under control, the first more than 
the second and the third. The Indian Ocean region, however, 
has remained politically and strategically unstable so far. 
The super power naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean continued 
40 feeding,and beJng fed by regional conflicts and instabilities . 
India and other countries usually took a serious views 
of increasing naval confrontation between the two Super 
Powers in the Indian Ocean. They treated this as a threat 
to the safety of the region. The non-aligned countries met 
at Lusaka in 1970 and urged for the conversion of the Indian 
Ocean into a zone of peace. At its twenty-sixth session in 
1971, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring 
the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, which was reiterated by its 
41 
several times afterwards . 
Thus, the Indian Ocean occupies an important strategic 
place in India's foreign policy postures. India has been 
guided by certain ideals, which have determined her foreign 
policy. The following are the distinctive features of India's 
foreign policy: 
40. Bhola Chatterjee a 'SUNDAY'. Volume 12, Issue of 30 Dec-
5 Jan. 1985, p.6i; and also Indian Ocean as a zone of 
peace, Lok Sabha Secretariat, p.10. 




India was one of the founding fathers of the movement 
of non-alignment, which means detachment from military bloc, 
and the principle of solving all international disputes 
LP 
through cooperation and mutual understanding . 
In September 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru mentioned that 
India would promote an active concern in World Affairs, 
following an independent policy compatible with her own 
national interests. Nehru felt that India could play an 
important role in the stretch from Australia and Newzealand 
to East Africa, because some countries of Asia and Africa 
to have retain independence. Furthermore, India could show 
an influential stand on International issues ^, 
Nehru avoided by Joining military alliances in order 
to remain outside the sphere of the influence of the great 
powers. Nehru explained his policy as follows: 
•' Our general policy is to avoid entangle-
ment in power politics, and not to join any 
group of powers as against any group. The 
two leading groups that are the Russian Bloc 
and Anglo-American Bloc. We must be 
44 friendly to both and yet not join either" . 
42. A.P.Ranaj The imperatives of Non-alignment, Manipal, 
197b, P.ZT: 
43» Gopal, SarvrapaHi .3 Jawaharlal Nehru, A Biography, Delhi, 
1979, p. 43. 
44. Tanvir Sultan: Indo-US Relations, New Delhi, 1982, p. 14. 
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The policy of non-alignment means a policy of peace -
a policy based not on the inevitability of war but on the 
conviction that war can be avoided. If you are mentally 
convinced that war is bound to come, Nehru told the Indian 
Parliament: 
" You naturally accustom yourself to the 
idea and perhaps unconsciously even work for 
it. On the other hand, if you want to work 
for the avoidance of war, you must believe 
that it can be avoided" . 
Joining military alliances meant postures of war which had 
Ufs 
to be discouraged. Opposing the policy of alignment, 
Nehru said: 
" We propose, as far as possible, to keep 
away from the power politics of groups 
aligned against one another which have 
led in the past to world war and which 
may again lead to disasters on an even 
vaster scale." 
Thus, India tried to keep out of the entanglements 
of cold war diplomacy and followed its own independent path. 
Another reason for adopting the policy of non-alignment 
by India was due to geo-political considerations. She had 
two leading Communist powers near her borders - China and 
Soviet Union^®. 
45. M.G.Gupta, Indian foreign policy, Agra, 1985, p.93 
46. Ibid, p.93 
47. The Statesman Sept.8, 1946, p.5 
48. A.P.Rana, p. 49, Michael Brechar, India and World pacities 
Oxford University press,' 1968, p.^. 
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It must be noted that non-alignment does not mean 
that friendly cooperation is not possible with other 
countries. Further, non-alignment also does not mean 
neutrality. Neutrality as a policy has little neaning, 
except in times of war. To clarify the position, Jawaharlal 
Nehru said: 
" I submit that this is my approach to foreign 
policy. You may call it neutral or whatever 
else you like, but T, for my part, fail to 
see how this approach is neutral. If you 
think there is a war on today, we are neutral. 
If you think there is a cold war today, we 
are certainly neutral. ^e are not going to 
participate in a cold war, which I think, is 
worse than shooting war in many ways. A 
shooting war is, of course, very disastrous 
but a cold war is worse in the sense that 
it is more degrading. It does not matter 
who is right and who is wrong, but we shall 
certainly not join in the exhibition of 
mutual abuse." 
Thus, it would be wrong to consider the foreign 
policy of India as one of neutrality because a country 
which adopts such a policy has no positive opinions on 
issues which divide the blocs. India, on the other hand, 
has been speaking clearly and with conviction on various 
international issues. For examples, she considered the 
march of North Korean troops into South Korea as aggression. 
49.(Nehru, Op.cit, Vol.11, p. 310) June 1?, 1952. 
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She condemned the British and French invasion of Suez as 
naked aggression. She condemned, though after considerable 
50 delay, Soviet inference in Hungray, and she was very 
51 
critical of the bombardment in Vietnam by U.S.A. 
India succeeded in its efforts to convene an inter-
national conference in 1955. Ultimately, the Bandung 
52 Conference was held from April 18 to 24, 1955 which was 
attended by 29 countries of Asia and Africa. Three prominent 
leaders - Tito, Naseer and i'^ ehru also participated in the 
53 
conference . In this conference, the principle of co-
54 existence was approved by all the members-^ . 
The countries which founded the non-alignment were 
India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia and Egypt. India has been 
closely associated with the policy of non-alignment. She 
succeeded her efforts to convene the first conference of 
55 
non-aligned nations in SeptsaibfeEr 1961. The summit 
conference of NAM is held every three years. Addressing 
50. A.Pi"^  Rana, Op.cit. , p. 55 
51. K.I.Misra, Studies of Indian Foreign Policy, Delhi,1967, 
IA; Subrata Banerjee* Non-Alignment foday, challenges & 
prospects, New Delhi, 1985, p.2. 
52. Times of India, April 19, 1955, p.1, Times of India, 
April 25, 1953, p.1 
53. India Quarterly, Vol.XLIII, nos.5&4,July-Dec.1989,p.268. 
54. G.N. ^rivastava; Seventh N.A. Summit ,1985, p.26. 
55. Non-Aligned World, Vol.6, No.28, May 14, 1985. 
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this conference Nehru said; 
" We call ourselves the conference of 
non-aligned countries. Now the word 
non-aligned may be differently interpreted, 
but basically it was used and coined, 
almost with the meaning: non-aligned with 
the great power blocs of the world. Non-
aligned has a negative meaning but if 
you give it a positive connotation it 
means nations which object to this 
turning-up for war purposes, military-
blocs, military alliances and the like. 
Therefore, we keep away from this and we 
want to throw our weight such as it is 
in favour of peace. The second summit 
of NAM was held on October 5-10, 196^ at 
Cario^ "^ . 
The non-alignment movement played an effective role in 
reducing world tension and in maintaining world-peace. 
India's non-involvement with any military bloc did not stop 
for her right to criticise or condemn any act of aggression, 
repression or injustice. 
At present there are 102 members of the non-aligned 
C O 
movement . The question of disarmament, both nuclear or 
otherwise, which have global implications could not be left 
to the mercy of public opinion whether it be in the Soviet 
Union or in the Western countries. 
56. Non-Aligned Movement, Lok Sabha Secretariat,19B6, p.B 
57. Non-Aligned Movement, Lok Sabha Secretariat, p.9 
58' The Hindustan Times, September 3. 1989, I page; and see 
wv World Focus, Vol.10, No.2, Feb. 1989, p.22 
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The non-aligned movement is working for the promotion 
of World-peace, disarmament, security stability and economic 
59 development of backward countries of the world-'^  . 
The 9th summit conference of Non-aligned was held from 
4-7 September 1989 in Belgrade, it pleged to stire for a 
world of peace, freedom, injustice and prosprity and gave 
to itself a six point agenda for action to eliminate causes 
and horrors of war, establish just international economic 
relation, give freedom to people under colonial or alien 
domination, protect the environment, promote human rights 
and strengthen the role and effectiveness of the United 
Nations. 
The non-aligned nations supported the four native paris 
initiative for an international economic summit to ensure 
higher growth rates for all. 
The summit also endorsed the Prime Minister of India, 
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi^ 's move for a'planet protection fund*(PPF) 
and asked the international community to set aside financial 
resources for environmental cooperation and facilitate across 
for developing countries to environmently safe technologies . 
59. G.N. Srivastava, op.cit, p. 61 
60. The Hindustan Times, 7 Sept.1989 p.7 
-57-
(2) OPPOSITION TO II^ PERTALISM AND COLONIALISM 
Another feature of India's foreign policy is that it 
has opposed to imperialism and colonialism . It was only-
after the first world war that the Indian leaders started 
to oppose imperialism everywhere not merely because of the 
financial burdens which had been imposed on India, but 
because imperialism was now regarded as an evil in itself 
everywhere in the world. Since then year after year the 
congress passed resolution against imperialism in general 
as well as its specific manifestations in different parts of 
the world. In 1928 the congress observed that " the struggle 
of the Indian people for freedom is a part of the general 
world struggle against imperialism and its manifestations" . 
In 1938 it declared that " world cooperation is impossible 
of achievement so long as the root of international conflict 
remains and one nation dominates over another and imperialism 
holds way. In order, therefore, to establish world peace 
on an enduring basis, imperialism and the exploitation of 
one people by another must end. 
The government of India has been consistently champion-
ing the cause of the exploited nations against the colonial 
and imperial power. In a speech before the UN General 
Assembly on November 3, 19^8. Nehru said; " We in Asia, who 
51. K.P. Mlsra, Op.cit, pp.125, 162. 
62. J.S.Sharma, Oo.cit, Vol.11, pp.179-181. 
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have ourselves suffered all these evils of colonialsim and 
of imperial domination have committed ourselves inevitably 
to the freedom of every other colonial country. There are 
neighbouring countries of ours in Asia with whom we are 
intimately allied. We look at them with S5nnpathy; We look 
at their struggle with sympathy. Any Power, great or small, 
which in that way prevents the attainment of the freedom of 
those peoples does an ill turn to world peace. Great 
countries like India who have passed out of that colonial 
stage do not conceive it possible that other countries should 
63 
remain under the yoke of colonial role . 
It may be observed that India has not merely been 
raisings slogans against colonialism and imperialism. But 
she followed this policy in practice. For example, when the 
Dutch tried to re-establish their hold over Indonesia, India 
convened a meeting of Foreign Ministers at New Delhi in 1949 
and made an appeal against the move of the Dutch to the 
Security Council. As a result, the independence of Indonesia 
was ultimately recognised. India has always sympathised 
with the countries which are still under colonial domination. 
The political emancipation of subject and colonial peoples 
has received India's consistant support. As Nehru said; 
63« Nehru, Op.cit, VoJ.I, p. 318' 
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" Let us by all means put an end to what 
remains of colonialism in Asia, in 
54 Africa and wherever else it exists . 
Likewise, India supported the demand 
for the independence of Libya and opposed 
the moves of South Africa to incorporate 
the territories of South West Africa into 
her Union. She also advocated the cause 
65 
of Tunesia and Algeria ^. 
(3) OPPOSITION TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
The Indian government has also been opposed to the 
policy of racial discrimination . Nehru said; 
" We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of 
racialism wheresoever and in whatever form 
it may be practised. We seek no dominion 
over others and we claim no privileged 
position over other peoples. But we do 
claim equal and honourable treatment for 
our people wherever they may go, and we 
cannot accept any discrimination against 
them^"^" . 
India has not only condemned the policy of racial 
discrimination but also supported the cause of the black 
people in the United States and the black majority in Africa 
64. A.P. Rana, O p . c i t , pp .2?7-229. 
65 . V.Nikhanin, " I n d i a ' s r o l e i n World A f f a i r s " , I n t e r n a t i o n a I 
Affa i rs Moscow, No.1 January 1958, pp .59-60 . 
66. K.P.Karnma Karan: India i n World A f f a i r s , Aug. 1947-Jan. 
T950, C a l c u t t a , 1952, p .30 
67. Nehru, O p . c i t , V o l . 1 , p . 3 
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i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e s aga ins t t h e supremacy of t h e white 
m i n o r i t y . Ind ia has been a s t rong advocate of t h e p o l i c y 
of r a c i a l e q u a l i t y . I t was mainly due t o the e f f o r t s of 
I nd i a t h a t UN General Assembly condemned t h e Union of South 
68 Afr ica for i t s p o l i c y of a p a r t h e i d . 
(4) COOPERATION AND CO-EXISTENCE 
Cooperat ion and Co-exis tence have been ano ther impor tan t 
p r i n c i p l e , of I n d i a ' s fo re ign p o l i c y . The idea of d i f f e r e n t 
systems e x i s t i n g s i d e by s ide without c o n f l i c t not neHi t o 
I n d i a . This p o l i c y of c o - e x i s t e n c e was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the 
panchsheel or f i ve p r i n c i p l e s of peacefu l c o - e x i s t e n c e i n the 
agreement between China and Ind ia which was signed on 29 Apr i l 
1954. The f ive p r i n c i p l e s a r e : (1) Mutual r e s p e c t for each 
o t h e r ' s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and Sovere ign ty , (2) Mutual 
non-aggress ion , (3) Mutual n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n each o t h e r ' s 
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , (4) Equa l i ty and mutual b e n e f i t and (5) 
69 peacefu l co - ex i s t ence and economic coope ra t ion . Commenting 
on the s i g n i f i c a n c e of panchshee l , Nehru sa id j 
68. K.P. Misra, O p . c i t , pp .62-63 
69. Foreign P o l i c y of I n d i a , Lok Sabha S e c r e t a r i a t , p . 5 
(Nehru, O p . c i t . Vol. I l l , p . 308) i>ept.17, 1955. J and see 
G i r i l a l J a i n , Punchsheel and After ; A Reappra i sa l of 
S ino- Ind ian Re la t ions in the con tex t of T ibe t an 
I n s u r r i c t i o n (London Asia pub l i sh ing House 1960). 
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" This idea of panchsheel l ays down the 
very impor tant t r u t h t h a t each people 
must u l t i m a t e l y fend for i t s e l f . I am 
not t h i n k i n g in terms of m i l i t a r y fending , 
bu t in terras of s t r i v i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , 
mora l ly , s p i r i t u a l l y and in terms of 
opening out a l l our windows t o i dea s from 
o t h e r s , and l e a r n i n g from t h e exper ience 
of o t h e r s . Each country should look upon 
such endeavour on t h e p a r t of t h e o t h e r 
with sympathy and f r i e n d l y unders tand ing 
70 
and without any i n t e r f e r e n c e or impos i t ion 
(5) FAITH IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
Ind ia has g r e a t f a i t h i n the United Nations and s t ands 
for t h e s e t t l e m e n t of a l l d i s p u t e s under i t s aeg i s through 
peaceful means, Ind ia has been a s s o c i a t e d with t h e l&iited 
Nations s ince i t s i n c e p t i o n . She i s one of t h e f i f t y - o n e 
o r i g i n a l members who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e d r a f t i n g of the 
c h a r t e r of San-Franc isco i n ^9k3. On October 30, 1945, 
Ind ia became i t s member. 
As e a r l y as 1946 Nehru unequivoca l ly dec la red I n d i a ' s 
f a i t h i n and suppor t t o the United Nat ions . He dec la red : 
•• Towards the United Nations I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e 
i s t h a t of whole h e a r t e d coopera t ion and 
unreserved adherence i n both s p i r i t and l e t t e r 
t o t h e e h a r t e r governing i t . To t h a t end I n d i a 
could p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y i n i t s v a r i o u s 
70. Nehru, I n d i a ' s fo re ign p o l i c y , p ,100 
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activities and endeavour to play that 
role in its councils to which her 
geographical position, population and 
contribution towards peaceful progress 
entitles her" '^\ 
For uncommitted Nations U.N. is a great source of 
7? inspiration' ~. India has •• urged the United Nations to 
develop into a truly international institution of world 
wide prestige" for the achievement of the ideals of 
human rights, economic development, freedom of dependent 
people and end of racial discrimination. In the very 
first session of the General Assembly in 1946, India 
played a leading role in raising the question of racial 
discrimination against the people of Indian origin in 
South Africa. Since then she has been relentlessly 
opposing the aparthied policy. 
India opposed the establishment of organisations for 
collective self-defence even if it is within the framework 
of the United Nations Charter as it leads to consolidation 
of power blocs. She thus tried to do away with cold war 
politics.'^ 
71. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Indian Annual Register, July-
December, 1946, pp.252-53 
(Calcutta: N. N.Mitra, 1947) 
72. Jafar Raza Bilgrami, India and United Nations, Indian 
Journal of Political Science, Vol.XXVI, No.2, Ap.-Jan. 
1965. 
73. Jafar Raza Bilgrami, India and the United Nations, p.30 
(New York Mahhattan publishing House 1957;. 
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India is desirous to eliminate want, disease and 
illiteracy that affect the greater pact of the world. 
Hence she voted for the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights approved by the United Nations on Decernbei- 10, 
1948.7^ 
For this reason, the government of India took the 
Kashmir issue to the UN -^, The role of India in Korea and 
Congo are outstanding examples of Indians cooperation with 
7ft 
the United Nation . However, within the United Nations, 
India has refused blindly to follow either of the two power 
blocs and has determined her stand on the various world 
issues keeping in view the interest of world peace. When 
India summoned a conference of the Asian countries in New 
Delhi An January 1949, allegations were levelled against 
her that she was trying to ignore the United Nations. Nehru 
at that time said: 
•• We meet to supplement the efforts of the 
Security Council, not to supplant that 
body. We meet in no spirit of hostility 
to any nation or group of nations, but in 
an endeavour to promote peace through the 
extension of freedom. 
Ih, The Text of the Declaration, Year Book of the United 
Nations 1947-48, pp.575-76 (U.N.: Uept. of Public 
Information 1950). 
75* Misra, Kashmir and India's foreign policy(Allahabad), 
1979, pp.5i-52. ^^ -^ ^ ^ 
76. Secretary General of the United Nations, 1946-53 
77. Nehru, Op.cit., Vol.1, p. 327, The Statesman, Jan.21,1949, 
p.7. 
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From time to time India has been, helping the UN to 
implement its decisions. She sent personnel for the 
observation group in Lebanan to ensure that there was no 
infiltration by soldiers or supply of arms or other materials 
across the Lebanese border. Similarly, India contributed a 
contingent during the Congolese conflict. 
(6) SUPPORT TO THE ASIAN CAUSES 
Although India has been following a policy of friendship 
towards all the nations of the world, she has evinced a special 
interest in developing the closest possible ties with other 
Asian nations which share her point of view . India has not 
only tried sincerely to solve the problems facing the Asian 
countries but has also brought them together through various 
conferences. The beginning in this direction was made by 
conference 
holding an Asian relation/which was held at Delhi from March 
23 to April 2, igA?."^ ^ 
Even the Bandung conference of the Afro-Asian countries 
was held in Asia from April 18 to 24, 1955^*^ Professor Palmer 
and Perkins describe the Bandung conference as the most 
s ign i f ican t In ternat ional conference ever held in Asia and 
78. J.S.Sharma, Op.cit, Vol.11, p.184; C.W.c.Resol,1928-29, 
Calcutta. 
79» Asia, Asian Relation Conference, Souvener Book p.8, 
Issued by the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 
1947, p.78. 
80. Nasenko, Jawaharlal and I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy , New Delhi 
p.184. 
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the first conference of its kind in history. India has 
sometimes been accused of aiming at the leadership of 
South Asia but she has always disclaimed any such ambition. 
(7) SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS DIVIDED COUITORIES 
As India had to face the bitter consequences of the 
partition of the country, so she has sympathy for other 
divided countries. She opposed the partition of Palestine 
and suggested a union of the Arabs and the Jews, Although 
India expressed her sympathy forthe miserable condition of 
Jews in Europe, especially in Germany. But she criticised 
for the establishment of a separate Jewish state in Palestine. 
On the occasion, Mahatma Gandhi maintained his feelings in 
this words " Why should they not like other people of the 
earth make that country their home where they were bom and 
where th^y earn their levelihood.... this cry for the National 
Home 6ffired a colourable justification for the Gorman 
expulsion of Jews-palestine belongs to the Arabs rtn the sense 
that England belongs to the English and i'rance to the French" " 
India also opposed the devision of Korea and Vietnam. 
82 She vehemently opposed the partition of Germany 
81. A. Appardorae and M.S.Rajan, Indians Foreign Policy and 
Relation, New Delhi, 1985, p. 376. 
82. J.S, Sharma, O.cit. p. 196 
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(8) TIES WITH THE COMMON-WEALTH 
India has been an active member and supporter of the 
Common Wealth , India joined the common wealth because she 
wanted to get certain economic benefits as a result of her 
association with this august body himself. As Nehru said: 
" We Join the common wealth obviously because we think it 
is beneficial to us and to certain causes in the world that 
84 
we wish to advance . Again he said that " our association 
with the common wealth in remarkable in that it does not 
bind us down in any way whatsoever and, if T may repeat it 
has not done so during the last two or three years either. 
It has given us certain advantages without our having to 
accept any liabeleties in return.... I know that some hon. 
members do not like the idea of our being in the common-
wealth. Their dislike is regretable and I cannot help it. 
Since we are concerned only with the advantages our country 
gains. Now Beylon and South Africa are both members of the 
common wealth and we may well be asked why we put up with 
what is happening in these countries. If any hon.member 
want us to withdraw from the common wealth on principle, my 
answer would be that what they object to is precisely the 
reason why we should remain in the common wealth. I shall 
explain what I mean. By doing so, we have better chances of 
being able to influence the larger policies of the common 
wealth means a meeting once or twice a year and occasional 
consultations and references. Surely, that is not too great 
83. K.P. Misra, Op.cit. , p.80 
84. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, Sept., 
1046- April 1961, p.1^1, 
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a price to pay for the advantages we get. If the common-
wealth had to right to interfere with any constituent 
country, then I should certainly cease to be in the common-
wealth" ®? 
The immediate considerations which prompted India to 
retain her membership of the common-wealth were the lack of 
an alternative to domenion status which included membership 
of the commonwealth; the link would help to retain the loyalty 
of the British dominated civil and defence services and 
facilitate negotiations with rulers of princely states for 
integration with the rest of India. It was further to 
India's advantage to retain an international connection - a 
window on the world which automatically come her way - at a 
time vrtien she was Just launched on the world scene and her 
foreign policy and diplomacy were only beginning to shape . 
However, India's membership of common-wealth bas come 
a lot of controversy from the very beginning. During the 
Indo-pak conflict of 1965» when Great Britain sympathesied 
with Pakistan, a demand was made by many persons that India 
should quiet the common wealth. But the government turned dowi' 
this demand by pointing out that the organisation was not 
British but mainly Afro-Asian, §ince a majority of the memberw 
of the common wealth belonged to Asia and Africa. 
85* J.Nehru, Op.cit. p.61 
86. S.C.Gangal, India and common wealth, Agra;Shiva Lai and 
Co., 1970, pp.24-?5r 
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INDIAlS FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN 
India's policy towards neighbouring countries has 
always been that of friendship and regional cooperation. 
However, response from different countries has varied. 
The word Pakistan had first been put forward in 1933 
as a religious concept by Indian Muslims undergraduates at 
Cambridge . Indian leaders never agreed with the two 
nation theory but accepted the partition of the country 
on the principle of the right of self determination. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India made it 
clear that it is quite impossible to divide it on the 
basis of separating religious groups on one side or the 
other. So it was also clearly understood that those 
communities which would became the minority on this side or 
that must have the fullest protection and fullest security 
of their lives, otherwise, the whole structure which we had 
2 built up collapse . 
Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947-"^  as a 
result of the fulfilment of the demand of the All India 
Muslim League as a homeland for Muslims. It came into being 
because Britain wanted to create this state before leaving 
1. Russell Brines; The Indo-Pakistani conflict, London, 
1968, p.28 
2. Parliamentry Debates, 17 March 1950, Vol.Ill, no.3, 
New Delhi, p.1700. 
3* B.G. Verghees; Our neighbour, Pakistan, Bombay 1965,p.54. 
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the Indian subcontinent . Mr. Mohammad All Jinnah, the 
President of the Muslim League, decided to give a practical 
shape to this theoretical demand taking full advantage of 
the British policy of 'Divide and Rule'. It had a beginning 
in the form of the demand for separate electorate and which 
was conceded by the British Government. 
The partition of the country and the problem arising 
in its wake embittered relations between India and Pakistan. 
In Pakistan there was a general feeling that India had not 
reconciled herself to the partition of the country and would 
do her best to undo it. Other factors which contributed to 
bitterness between the two countries were: (i) the canal 
water dispute, (ii) the Kashmir issue, and (ill) Pakistan's 
association with Western military alliances. ^  
The canal water dispute remained unresolved. Though 
India herself needs water badly in the spirit of reconcilia-
tion and on humanitarian grounds, she has been prepared to 
provide water to Pakistan* This supply was continued for a 
long time, but Pakistan failed to renew the agreement before 
or after its expiry on March 31, 1948. . Under these circu-
mstances, India approached Pakistan and an agreement was 
signed on May 4, 1948 , which worked for more than two years 
4. Pervival, spear,* India; A modern History,p. 327»London 1972. 
5. S.S.Bindra, Indo-Pak relations, New Delhi, 1981, p.19,24,32, 
6. K.C.Saxena; Pakistan, her relations with India(1947-66) 
New Delhi, 1966, p.1 
7. S.S.Bindra, India and her neighbours. New Delhi, 1985,p.46. 
-50-
but on August 23, 1950, Pakistan suddenly repudiated it 
unilaterally, declaring that it had been signed 'under 
duress'. 
Regarding payment of cash to Pakistan, Jawaharlal 
Nehru saidl 
" The Government's decision in regard to 
the payment of the cash balances to 
Pakistan.has been taken sfter the most 
careful thought and after consultation 
with Gandhiji. '• ^ 
India agreed to allocate Rs.75 crore to Pakistan out 
of the cash balance to help the latter to make a start. 
Pakistan waged an undeclared war against India in Kashmir, 
failing which the payment of Rs.55 crores to her was withheld 
(Rs.20 crores had already been paid), pending a settlement 
over Kashmir. Mahatma Gandhi began his fast on January 13» 
1948 and appealed to the nation to remove ill-will and 
prejudice which had poisoned the relations between India and 
q 
Pakistan. So, as Nehru said: 
J 
" The Government of India decided to pay 
the amount due, namely Rs. 55 crore, to 
Pakistan immediately as a gesture of 
goodwill to that state and as her 
contribution to the non-violent and 
10 
noble effort made by Gandhiji. " 
8. Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches, Vol.1, New Delhi, 1S'83, p. 172; 
The Statesman, Jan.15, 1948, p. 1 
9. Bindra, ob.cit. p. 20 
10. The Statesman, Jan. 15, 1948, p.1 
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Kashrair has been a bone of contention between the two 
countries since independence. Under the Independence Act 
of 19^7, Kashmir was given the options to Join either 
India or Pakistan or to have an independent status. The 
Maharaja of Kashmir decided not to accede to either 
country. Pakistan, however, was not happy with this decision 
and started applying pressure on Kashmir to gain its accession. 
When economic pressure failed, Pakistan allowed armed tribals 
to invade Kashmir. These tribesmen were assisted by regular 
troops of the Pakistan army. In October 1947, failing to 
11 
check the raiders, the Maharaja asked for India's assistance. 
The Governement of India refused to give any assistance unless 
12 Kashmir acceded to India. It was only after the Maharaja 
15 had signed the instrument of accession , that Indian forces 
were sent to Kashmir to check the intrusion of the tribals 
from Pakistan. In this connection, Jawaharlel Nehru said: 
We received urgent messages for aid not 
only from the Maharaja's government but 
from representatives of the people, notably 
from that great leader of Kashmir, Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah, the President of the 
National Congress. Both the Kashmir 
government an6 the Nat't'onal Conterence 
pressed us to accept the accession and to 
11. Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhrj, Pakistan and World Society, 
Karachi, 1987, p.37. 
12. Misra, Kashmir and India's foreign policy, Allahabad, 
1979, pp. 52-65. 
13« Amitava Mukherjee, India's policy towards Pakistan, 
New Delhi, 1983, p.TTT 
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send troops by air, but we made a 
condition that the accession would have 
to be considered by the people of Kashmir 
later when peace and order were established. 
We were anxious not to finalise anything 
in a moment of crisis and without the 
fullest opportunity being given to the 
14 people of Kashmir to have their say." 
In the beginning, Pakistan followed an independent 
foreign policy. It did not join any blocs and embarked 
on developing friendship with Muslims countries, a policy 
that continued to be followed by Pakistan. Pakistan sought 
15 this friendship in the name of religious affinity and Islam. 
At this time the Soviet Union was willing to provide help to 
Pakistan. India in those days could not depend on Soviet 
support except where Soviet and Indian interests coincided. 
Emphasis on religion in the official policy of Pakistan, the 
collapse of democracy and the rise of a succession of 
dictatorial military regimes there contributed, in no small 
measure, to inimical relations between India and Pakistan. 
In this situation towards the end of 1947 Jawaharlal Nehru 
told the constituent Assembly of India on 4th December,1947: 
14, Nehru, o^.cit. Vol.1, p.158, 
15. Gupta, Sisir; Kashmir, A study in India - Pakistan 
Relations, New Delhi, 19bfo, pp.413-^13? 
end also W.C.Smith, Islam in ilfidern History, p.271, 
fliw^'York, i?B7: 
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" Vtfhatever policy you may lay down, the art 
of conducting the foreign affairs of a 
country lies in finding out what is most 
advantageous to the country. We may talk 
about peace and freedom and earnestly mean 
what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, 
a government functions forthe good of the 
country it governs and no government dare 
do anything which in the short or long run 
is manifestly to the disadvantage of that 
country. " 
The Indian Army drove back the raiders. On January 1, 
17 1948 ' India took her case to the United Nations, complaining 
against Pakistan for aiding and abetting in the raid on 
Kashmir. 
The Indian complaints against Pakistan were as follows: 
(1) The invaders were allowed transit cross Pakistan territory 
(2) They were allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of 
operations (3) They included Pakistani nationals; (4) They 
got much of their military equipment, transportation facilitiesi 
and supplies from Pakistan and (5) Pakistan officer were 
18 training guiding, and otherwise actively helping them. 
Pakistan on its side, tried to raise the question of Junagarh 
and Hyderabad during the discussion in the Security Council. 
Bypassing the plea of India to declare Pakistan an aggressor, 
Security Council decided to send a mission to the subcontinent 
to get the fighting stopped and to create favourable condition 
16. Nehru speeches, Vol.1, ofa.cit.. p.206 
17. A.Appadorai & M.S.Ra,-)anT Indi"a's Foreigin Policy and 
Relations, New Delhi, 1985, p.82. 
18. Alan Campbell-Johns on- Mission with M ountbatt en. London, 19r?1 
Ch.XIX n.1, p.229. 
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for holding a plebiscite. Pakistan was successful in her 
efforts in the Security Council and the Indian appeal was 
not accepted by the Security Council because of American 
support for Pakistan. In this context, Nehru said on 
February 1948; " Instead of discussing and deciding on our 
reference in a straightforward manner, the nations of the 
19 
world sitting in that body got lost in power politics. " 
Pakistan took to the stand that the Maharaja of Kashmir had 
specifically promised a plebiscite. According to the letter 
" as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and 
its soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the State's 
accession should be settled by a reference to the ^people. " 
This, according to the Government of India, did not imply 
plebiscite. The Commission, in its third interim report 
submitted to the Security Council on 5 December 19^9, said 
that While the situation in the state has changed, the 
Resolutions remain unchanged" - was at the root of the trouble 
The Security Council failed to resolve the conflict between 
India and Pakistan over Kashmir. 
The Security Council appointed a Commission to arrange 
for ceasfire in Kashmir. The Commission proposed ceasfire, 
demilitarization and plebiscite. In February 1950 Sir Owen 
Dixon, an Australian, was appointed as a mediator. But soon 
19. The Statesman, February 16, 19A8, p.1 
20. SCOR, S/2967, para 57, SCOR(Suppl.No. 1) 8 yr.1953, p.1A 
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he admitted his failure and resigned. He was followed by 
Frank D.Grahm of U.S.A. who also could not achieve much 
21 
success. India insisted on 'vacation of aggression' by 
Pakistan as a pre-condition for holding of plebiscite, which 
22 
was not accepted by Pakistan. In 1951 Kashmir elected 
its constituent Assembly, which confirmed accession of the 
state to India on February 6, 1954. -^  It declared Kashmir 
as a self governing state within the Republic of India. 
Thus the Indian government tried to solve the problem of 
accession of Kashmir to India by confirmation through the 
constituent assembly of Kashmir. On this issue, Prime 
Minister Nehru said on September 17, 19531 
" Certainly, so far as we are concerned, 
it is desirable for us from a strategic 
point of view. But however that may be, 
we can not impose our desire or wish in 
this matter. Therefore, we have put it 
aside and right from the beginning we 
have laid stress on this that the people 
2k 
of Kashmir should decide this question. " 
21. Bindra, op.cit., p.25 
22. Dr.Dunga Das Basu, Commentory o"^the gonstitution of 
India, quotediin Birdwood, pp.179-80. 
23. The Hindustan Times, Feb. 7,195'?', p. 1 
24. Parliamentary Debates, New Delhi, 17th Sept.1953, 
Vol.VIII no. 34,col. 3995. 
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'^In 1954^^ Pakistan Joined the SEATO and in 1955^ 
she joined the Baghdad pact which was renamed as CENTO 
and she recommend military assistance under these pacts. 
The failure of the French to hold out against the 
Communist forces of Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China and the 
stalemate on the Korean issue prompted U.S.A. to take steps 
for the defence of other countries against communism in 
south-east Asia. It took a lead in this regard and convened 
a meeting at Manila, to which eight western and Asian 
governments sent their representatives. They concluded a 
pact on September 8, 195^ » the signatories of which were 
U.S.A., U.K., France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Thailand and the Philippines. It may be noted that out of 
the eight states located in south-east Asia only Thailand 
and the Philippines Joined this pact. 
U.S.A. adopted the policy of forming military alliances 
in the West Asia, First she arranges for an alliance between 
Turkey, a member of N. A.T.O. and Pakistan, which was receiving 
military and economic aid from U.S.A. This alliance was 
concluded in April, 195^* 
25. M.S.Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-56, Bombay, 1964, 
p.4l3» and also A.H.Bilgrami; feritain the commonwealth 
and the European Union Issue, France, 1961, p.105. 
26. George F.Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin & Stalin, 
London, 1961, pp.165-6 
27. Soviet foreign policy. Volume III, 1945-80, Moscow,1980, 
p.144. 
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The next step was a treaty between Turkey and Iraq 
signed in 1955 at Baghdad. Soon Britain and Pakistan also 
Joined the Baghdad Pact, and they were followed by Iran. 
Thus, there were five members of the pact. Iraq, however, 
later on withdrew due to revolution in the country and the 
Baghdad Pact came to be known as C.E.N.T.O. and shifted 
its headquarters to Ankara. U.S.A. was not a member of 
this pact, although she had been participating in the 
session of its military committee as observer. 
"^ In 1956 Jawaharlal Nehru appealed to Pakistan for 
accepting a no-war pact, an offer had been made earlier by 
23 India, on December 22, 1949 to the Pakistan High Commissioner. 
Nehru said* 
" I do think that if both Pakistan and we 
are agreed that on no account should we 
go to war with each other but should 
settle our problems peacefully? they 
may not be settled for some time, but 
it is better to have a problem pending 
than to go to war for it. Therefore, 
it would be very desirable and helpful 
to have a no~war declaration." 
This offer was not accepted by Pakistan. 
India made slight changes in her stand on Kashmir. 
In March 1956, Nehru said that the first essential step 
was for Pakistani troops to withdraw but they are still there. 
28. Saxena, ojj.cit. , p. 11 
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Hence all talk of plebiscit was completely beside the point. 
Secondly, India could not ignore the constitutional 
developments and economic progress in Kashmir. Thirdly, 
plebiscite would mean " uprooting of things that have become 
fixed - legally, constituionally and practically." This 
obviously meant that Indie was not keen to hold a plebiscite 
29 in Kashmir. 
On November 19, 1956 the Kashmir Constituent Assembly 
adopted a constitution forthe state which was modelled on 
the Indian Constitution.^ Pakistan was not at all happy 
with all these developments and requested the Security Council 
to solve the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The 
Council met to discuss the problem of Kashmir at the request 
of Pakistan in January 1957 and it passed resolutions. 
1. At a meeting of a joint committee of the Indian 
Pakistani representatives, convened by the United 
Nations Commission in March 19^9, It had been 
agreed that both India and Pakistan would submit 
their plans for the withdrawal of forces to the 
committee. Pakistan did submit a plan but India 
did not. 
Quoting from the report of the United Nations 
Commission, V.K.Krishna Menon pointed out that Noon's 
statement was inaccurate as •• the Indian delegation 
informed the meeting that it was unable to respond 
29. Russell, ot?.cit. , p. 98 
30. The Hindustan Times, Nov.20, 1956, p.1 
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to the Pakistani delegation by presenting a 
similarly comprehensive plan" and on March 28 
the U.N. Commission received the Government of 
India's own views. 
2. Pakistan had accepted the proposal made by the 
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan 
that the differences arising from the interpreta-
tion of the August 13 and January 5 resolutions 
be referred to arbitration by Admiral Nimitz. 
India rejected it. 
Menon's reply to this allegation was cogent 
and based on records. He saidi " It is true we 
did not agree to arbitrate, but we were asked to 
arbitrate on questions which were not amenable 
to arbitration" , viz, the question of the dispo-
sition of the Azad forces, and the determining 
of the quantum of forces to be kept by India after 
the bulk of its forces had been withdrawn. On the 
first, the Commission had given an assurance to 
India that there would be a large scale disbanding 
and disarming of the Azad forces; on the second, 
the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces 
was to be agreed between the Government of India 
and the. Commission; arbitration was not relevant 
to the issue. 
3. Pakistan had accepted the McNaughton Proposals: 
India had not. It is true that India had not 
accepted the proposals, Memon argued, but only 
because McfJaughton had, wrongly, equated India and 
Pakistan - a position which India would not accept, 
as there could not be equality between the victim 
of aggression and the aggressor. 
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4. Pakistan had accepted the demilitarization 
proposals formulated by Sir Owen DixonJ India 
had rejected them. 
This was a summary of the position, Menon 
contended; Dixon had also said that when Pakistan 
crossed the boundary, it had violated international 
law, secondly, India had been prepared to examine 
his proposals for compartmental plebiscite, 
Pakistan had rejected them. 
5,6,7. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers had made 
Alternative proposals, the troops of Pakistan and 
India in Kashmir should be replaced by troops from 
New Zealand and Australia, or by a joint force of 
Indian and Pakistani troops, or by troops raised 
locally by the Plebiscite Administrator - all these 
proposals had been accepted by Pakistan. 
Citing extensively from the minutes of the 
informal conversations with the Prime Ministers of 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,, New Zealand, 
Ceylon and Pakistan- taken down by Prime Minister 
Nehru in London, Menon said that there was no formal 
consideration &f the question by the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers. He quoted Nehru to the effect 
that " in the course of the conversations, no 
reference was made either by Mr.Liaquat Ali Khan 
or by me(i.e. Nehru) to the propsal about a 
Commonwealth force being sent. " 
8,9.Both India and Pakistan had agreed to arbitration 
all points arising from the interpretation of the 
resolutions of 13 August 19AS and 5 January 19A9. 
Menon said that there was no need to repeat 
what he had previously stated on the inappropriate-
ness of arbitration. 
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10. Each one of the proposals made by Dr. FrarJi^  P. 
Graham on the subject of demilltrarization was 
accepted by Pakistan and rejected by India. 
The facts were exactly the reverse, argued 
Menon. First, India accepted the proposal that 
demilitatization should be a single and continuous 
process. Second, India had accepted the principles 
suggested by Graham as a basis for demilitarization, 
" India considered that the principles contained 
the germs of a settlement, but despite several 
efforts to evolve asuitable draft in terms of the 
language used in the Commission's resolution no 
understanding could be reached with the Pakistan 
Government." 
11. Pakistan had accepted, and India had rejected the 
resolution of the i^ ecurity Council passed at its 
meeting on 23 December 1952, urging the Governments 
of India and Pakistan to enter into immediate 
negotiations under the auspices of the United 
Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in 
order to reach agreement on the specific number 
of forces to remain on each side of the ceasefire 
31 line at the end of the period of demilitarization.-^ 
Menon agreed that India had rejected the resolution. 
In fairness, he argued, the reasons must also be stated. 
India's right and duty to maintain the security of the State 
had been acknowledged by the United Nations Commission; it 
was only normal to suggest that the Government of India must 
be the judge of what forces were required for the security of 
• stat 
31. SCOR, Yr. 4, Special Supplement, No.7, doc.S/l430 paras 
169 and 220; italics ours. 
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" It will, therefore, be seen," concluded Menon, 
" that out of these eleven statements made, 
every one of them is incorrect. In the 
majority of them the position is exactly the 
reverse. And if arguing a case before this 
body has any value on the decisions it makes' 
or any impact on the Governments represented 
here, I beg to submit that this refutation, 
with chapter and verse from the documents 
•52 
must be regarded as an important item. " -"• 
Nehru criticized the resolution and said on 4 April, 1958, 
" Any consideration of this problem which ignore 
certain basic issues and which endeavours to 
put us on the same level as Pakistan- that is 
the aggressor and the aggressed count on the 
same level- is not aggreable to us and will 
not be accepted by us. ^  
Nehru visited Karachi on 19 September 1960-^  , to 
resolve the problem of Indus waters. After some discussions, 
^5 
a treaty regarding the issue was signed between the two 
countries through the V/orld Bank. On this occassion, Nehru 
expressed his gratification in these v/ords; 
32. A. Appadoria and M.S.RaJan, op.cit.p. 90. 
33. The Hindustan Times. April 5, 1958, p.1 
34. OoPo Ralhan, ob.cit.. p. 334 
35« M.G, Gupta, India's foreign policy, theory and practice, 
Agra, 1955, p.140. 
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" This is indeed a unique occassion and 
a memorable day, memorable in many ways, 
memorable certainly in the fact that a 
very difficult and complicated problem 
vi/hich has troubled India and Pakistan 
for many years has been satisfactorily 
solved .... This settlement is memorable 
because it will bring assurance of relief 
to large numbers of people - farmers and 
others-in Pakistan and India .... These 
waters have flowed down for ages past, 
the greater part going to the sea without 
being utilized. This is a happy occassion 
for all of us.^^ 
Nehru expressing his gratitude to the World Bank for its 
role in the matter he said; 
" I should like to express my deep gratitude 
to the International Bank and to all those 
who have laboured within Pakistan, in India 
and in the other friendly countries, and to 
all who have come to our assistance in this 
matter and generously made contributions 
towards solving this problem." "^  
Under this treaty, waters of the Indus, the Jhelum 
and the Chenab were allotted to Pakistan and those of 
Sutlej, Ravi and Beas were given to India. Pakistan had 
to receive contribution from India and other countries for 
the construction of canals for link purposes. 
35. Nehru speeches. Vol.IV, op.cit., pp.292, 293. 
37. Nehru speeches. Vol.TV, on.clt. . p.293 
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After a long gap, the Security Council again took 
up the issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan in its 
sessions from February to June 1962, However, the Council 
could not solve the problem. The Council again held 
discussions on the dispute over Kashmir in February and May, 
1964, but could not reach at any decision because its 
members differed on the issue. On April 15, 1964 addressing 
the Lok Sabha, Nehru expressed his views about India's policy 
towards Pakistan. He said: 
" With the coming in of China as more or less 
an ally of Pakistan, Pakistan has become even 
more aggressive. I do not know what secret 
understanding they have come to with each 
other, but such understanding, if any, cannot 
be of advantage to India. It is extraordinary 
that even in these circumstances some of the 
Western powers are inclined towards Pakistan 
and help it in regard to Kashmir. The Kashmir 
issue would have been solved long ago but for 
Western help to Pakistan. " -^^ 
Again, on May 22, 1964 at a press conference, Nehru 
said: 
•• Sheikh Abdullah is going to Pakistan the day 
after tomorrow, I think, he will have some 
exploratory talks there. It is best that 
these talks take place without any inhibition. 
As I said in Bombay, he looks upon the Kashmir 
38. A.Appadorai & M.S.Rajan, op.clt., p.93 
39. Nehru speeches, Vol.V, op.cit., p.215 
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issue not as one by itself but as one 
between India and Pakistan. He thinks that 
it is important that India and Pakistan 
should come nearer to each other and that 
automatically the Kashmir issue will than 
be partly solved." 
"^ On April 9, 1965, following the Kutch dispute, 
Pakistan sent organized groups of infiltrators across the 
ceasefire line, and later mounted large-scale attack in 
the Chhamb-Jaurian Sector area, violating the international 
41 border, thereby threatening the communication line between 
Kashmir and the rest of India. Indian troops went into 
action and foiled the Pakistani designs. /~ On September 2, 
1965 the U.N.Secretary General U.Thant issued an appeal 
for ceasefire. Two days later the C&uncil met and called 
upon the two countries to withdraw their forces to the old 
ceasefire line. This appeal was again repeated on September 9. 
The Council authorised the Secretary General to visit the 
two countries and bring about a peaceful settlement. As a 
result of his efforts India agreed to an unconditional 
ceasefire but Pakistan wanted a 'purposeful ceasefire based 
on an " honourable settlement of the Kashmir problem. •' 
40. Nehru speeches, Vol.V. ob.cit. . p.220 
41. V.P, Dutt, otJ.cit. , p. 141 
42. Saxena, op.cit., p.22 
43. H.R.Gupta, India Pakistan War 1965, Vol.11, Delhi,1968, 
pp.226-227. 
44. Bindra, op.cit. , p. 37 
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At that time Ayub Khan was the President of Pakistan. 
The Soviet Union perceived that under his leadership Pakistan 
was leaning towards China and therefore the U.S.S.R. made 
efforts to win her over, -^  The setback suffered by Pakistan 
at this time compelled her to develop friendly relations 
with the Soviet Union who extended her hand of fri^mdship to 
Pakistan and gave a lot of economic help including some 
military help. 
Subsequently, the dispute was resolved through the 
efforts of the Soviet Union which arranged a meeting between 
the leaders of the two countries at Tashkent. After a virtual 
breakdown of the Tashkent talks on the night of 9 January,1966, 
the Prime Minister of India, Shri Lai Bahadur Shastri, and the 
President of Pakistan Mr. Ayub Khan, reached an agreement on 
10 January, 1966,"^  reaffirming their obligations under the 
United Nations Charter not to have recourse to force but to 
settle their disputes through oeaceful means, without 
prejudice to their basic oositions on Kashmir. 
The major points included in the declaration are as 
follows: 
1. By reaffirming their obligations under the U.N.Charter 
not to have recourse to force both India and Pakistan 
45. Bindra, op.cit.. p. 60 
46. Russell, op.cit., p.140 
47. The Hindustan Times, 11 Jan.1966, p.1 
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publiclty committed themselves to abondonlng war as 
a means of settling their' differences. 
2. Both the countries pledged to turn hate propaganda 
into promotion of friendship, understanding and amity 
between the two countries and would take measures to 
settle all other differences across a conference table. 
3. Both sides agreed to implement the Security Council 
resolution of '•?0 September 1965, asking thera to withdraw 
their troops to the positions they held before the 
conflict. 
4. It opened a way out of the terrible impasse created by 
the war in September 1965, by opening various avenues 
such as restoration of diplomatic missions, economic 
and trade relations and repatriation of the prisoners 
of war. 
5. Both countries recognised that the continued tension 
between the two countries was not in the interest of 
the people. 
6. It offered opportunities to the U.S. policy makers to 
remove much of the cobweb that had embedded in their 
minds over the yeaifs. It also helped them in building 
up understanding with India on the issue of Chines 
expansionism. 
7. It has been described as a powerful nail in the China's 
coffin of expansionism. 
-63-
8. It made a deep impression upon Asia and Africa. In 
the opinion of a number of Asian and African leaders 
what had been achieved in Tashkent was a blow against 
the plans and intrigues of the imperialists who had 
all along been following the despicable formula of 
divide and rule. 
The Tashkent i-eclaration was also a land mark in the 
history of Indo-Pak relations. Though the Kashmir issue was 
not settled, the declaration opened up the possibility of 
maintaining peace in the subcontinent. 
After the Tashkent Declaration the relations between 
the two countries showed a sifiin of improvement. After this 
some procedural agreement was signed on August 1, 1966 in 
the consideration of Farakka barrage dispute. 
The Tashkent Declaration, which had been signed after 
the aggression of 1965 is more or less a defunct document. 
Its spirit has not been adhered to by Pakistan, although 
India has been trying her best to follow the Tashkent spirit. 
The Tashkent Declaration was like a no war pact because 
both India and Pakistan had agreed not to use force in 
settling the disputes between them but Pakistan never 
discharged the obligation in the declaration. Pakistan has 
48. ^.S.Bindra, op. cit. , pp.70-71. 
49. Asian Recorder, 9-15 April, 1966, pp.7018-19. 
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always been harbouring the belief that in her search for 
security through military alliances and pact, she would 
be able to create such a situation as would make India 
50 
realise that she could not sustain status quo in Kashmir. 
On the other hand, India also secured military and economic 
help from the U.S.A. for raising it as a bulwark of 
51 iemocracy against Communist China. 
Likewise, Pakistan was also engaged in all out efforts 
52 
;o improve its armed strength.-^  The Tashkent Declaration 
/as not appreciated by some political parties in Pakistan. 
.ike the Jamraat-i-Islami, the Council Muslim League and 
he Nizam-e-Islam Party. They felt that the only solution 
5^ f the Kashmir dispute was war. 
The then foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr.Z,A.Bhutto, 
: 1 response to criticism, said on 9 February 1966, that 
K )shmir was not a party issue and that it was necessary to 
p irsue the path of meaningful dialogue rather than to move 
i I different directions.^^ 
5* . Asian Recorder. 27 Aug.- 2 Sept., 1966, p.7254. 
5' . V.p, Dutt, op.cit. , p. 144 
5< . Asian Recorder, 27 Aug.- 2 Sept.1966, p.7254 
5: Asian Recorder, 9-15 April,1966, p.7018-19 
5A V.P. Dutt; op.cit. , p. 142. 
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All these actions and reactions between the two 
countries show that tensions arose after signing the 
Tashkent ^declaration. To remove their tensions Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi proposed on 15 August, 1968, a 'no war pact' to 
Pakistan, which was rejected by President Ayub Khan on 
the ground that to talk of a no war pact without 
settling the Kashmir dispute has only an attempt to 
55 hoodwink the world.^^ 
55. Dawn. Editorial, 19 August, 196S, M.G.Gupta, op.cit., 
p. 14i». 
Chapter - III 
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA 
-q'^-
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA 
Besides the ancient days, Sino-Indian relations date 
back in modern times to the colonial period whem two 
countries were sti-uggling against imperialism . Jawaharlal 
Nehru met Gen.Chiang Kai-shek personally to express India's 
solidarity with Chinese national cause, 
When in 1938 China became a victim of Japanese 
aggression, the Indian National Congress sympathised with 
her and advisecl Vu9 people of India to refrain from 
purchasing Japanese goods. The Congress decided to send a 
2 
medical mission to China . At that time, the political 
conditions of EAJrope were very bad. Jawaharlal Nehru, v^o 
was aware of this did not want to leave India at a moment of 
crisis.^ But,in spite of this, he visited China on 22 August 
1939 and met Oeneraliissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in whom he found 
the determination to fight for the freedom of China. Nehru 
said; 
" I lou/id, to ray joy, that my desire that 
China and India should draw closer to each 
othpr wfis fully reciprocated by China's 
leaaerv/, and more especially by that great 
man v-no has become the symbol of China's 
1. Sharma, Vol.IT, p.180, C.W.C.Resol,1933, Haripura 
2. Jx,N«&hru, A-. A iiobiography. New York, 19A2, p. 501. 
3* Nehru, on. < i.! . . u.60 
4. Rafhan, Jaw--,hrrial Nehru Abroad. New Delhi,'983, pp.27-30. 
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5 
unity and her determination to be free. " 
Often those two leaders had to sit in an air-raid 
shelter when the Japanese planes were bombing a city. They 
discussed the past ?ind the present of their two countries 
and the prospects of their cooperation in the future . Thus 
the people of India gave whole-hearted support to the freedom 
struggle of Chilna. 
After Inoia became free, one of the first countries 
with which she established diplomatic relations was the 
Nationalist government of China in 1948 and appointed K.M. 
Panikkar firai Indian Ambassador to China. But when the 
Nationalist Government was overthrown by the Communists in 
19^9, India was aii.onp; the fir-st countries to recognise the 
new government. '' In this context on 30 December 19A9, 
Jawaharlal Nehru said: 
" Ever since the Chinese Flevolution, we 
noiurally had to think of what the new 
Ci,.fic< '.^as likely to be ... We knew that 
a .'. irf.ri/- China is nornrally an expansionist 
China .... Taken with the fact of China's 
Sv. ..('v'r.al inherent tendency to be expansive 
v-i.t, n -•'he is strong, we realized the danger 
t'> hioia ... As the years have gone by, 
t .5 fact has become more and more apparent 
5. Nehru, op-^AS:' P'^08 
6. Sudhakar K WL, India and China, New Delhi, 1967, p.9 
7. A.Appadora , ."'.-j.Kajan, India's foreign policy and 
relations", New Delhi,19857 p. 115. 
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and obvious. If any person imagines that 
we have followed our China policy without 
realizing the consequences, he is mistaken. 
If he thinks that we have followed it 
because of fear of China, he is doubly 
mistaken. " 
But, in spite of this, the Indian leaders thought in 
the beginning that Indian cooperation with the new regime 
of China would be helpful in maintaining peace and freedom 
in the region. However, they were greatly shocked when the 
Q 
Chinese army entered Tibbet in 1950.^ Still, India voted 
against a resolution in the U.N.General Assembly in February 
1951 describing the People's Republic of China as an 
" aggressor" in Korea. Again, India refused to participate 
in the conference which was held at San Francisco in September 
1951 to sign a peace agreement with Japan on the ground that 
China was not participating it. India realized that attending 
an important conference on the Far East, from which China 
was excluded, would not be proper. In 1953. India submitted 
a resolution in the U.M,General Assembly on the questions of 
the prisoners of War. Nehru made it clear that the resolution 
was intended to accommodate the viewpoint of China, as for 
as possible, on that question. Indie pleaded for the 
restitution of Formosa, the off-shore Chinese island, to the 
China.^^ 
S. Khilnani, Realities of Indian fo'-eign policy, p.35, 
first published 198^, New Delhi. 
9. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1951-5?.London,pp.11182-83 
10. The Statesman, 8 September, 1958, D . U and also Asian 
Recorder 1955, p. 139-
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India concluded an agreement with China on April 29, 
11 1954 by v^ich she recognised Chinese Suzerainty over 
Tibet speaking on the application of the principles of 
Panchsheel in this context Nehru said on May 15, 19541 
These principles indicate the policy that 
we pursue in regard to these matters not 
only with China but with any neighbouring 
country, or for that matter any other 
country. What is more, it is a statement 
of wholesome principles, and I imagine that 
if these principles were adopted In the 
relations of various countries with one 
another, a great deal of thp trouble of 
the present day world would probably 
disappear.... It is a matter of importance 
to us, of course, as well as, I am sure, to 
China that these countries, which have now 
almost about,1,800 miles of frontier, should 
live in terms of peace and friendliness and 
should respect each other's sovereignty and 
integrity, should agree not to interfere 
with each other in any way and not commit 
aggression on each other. By this agreement, 
we ensure peace to a very large extent in a 
certain area of Asja. I would earnestly 
wish that this area of peace could be spread 
over the rest of Asia, and indeed over the 
1? 
rest of the V,/orld. 
11. C.P. Bhambhri, op. cit. ,p. 12, The forei^ qi policy of India, 
1987, New Delhi; and also 
India's foreign policy. The political quarterly, Oct-
Dec.1962, vol.38, no. 4, p. 400 
12. Jawaharlal Nehru speeches, Vol.Ill, 1953-1957, New Delhi, 
1958, pp.262-263, May 15, 1954. 
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India and China concluded the famous panchsheel 
agreement on May 29, 195A by which they agreed on following 
13 principles : 
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial 
integrity and sovereignty* 
2. Mutual non-aggression; 
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs; 
A» Equality and mutual benefit; and 
5. Peaceful co-existence. 
Speaking on India's foreign policy Nehru said on 
30 September 1954t 
" Leaving these three big countries, the 
United states of America, the Soviet 
Union and China, aside for the movement, 
look at the World. There are many advanced, 
highly cultured countries. But if you peep 
into the future and if nothing goes wrong-
wars and the like- the obvious fourth 
14 
country in the world is India. " 
Chinese Prime Minister, Chou-En-lai visited India in 
June 1954. He spoke in favour of cooperation between the two 
13. KJP.Misra, Studies in Indian Foreign Policy,New Delhi, 
Vikas, 1969, pp.33-34 
14. Jawaharlal Nehru, India foreign policy selected speeches, 
September 1946 - April 1961, New Delhi, 1961, p.305. 
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countries. Later in the same year the Prime Minister of 
15 India, Jawaharlal Nehru again went to China for promoting 
closer cooperation between the two countries, from 19 to 28 
October 1954. 
India and China came closer to each other. In the 
Communist Bandung Conference China was also invited and which 
1 f> 
was held from 18 to 2h April 1955 in Indonesia . On Sept.17, 
1955, addressing the Lok Sabha Nehru said: 
'• These ideas ofppeaceful co-existance there 
is nothing new about these ideas, but 
nevertheless it was a new application of an 
old idea, an application to a particular 
context were initially mentioned and promul-
gated, not only have they spread in the 
world and influenced more and more countries, 
but they have progressively acquired a 
greater depth and meaning.... I think we 
take some credit for spreading this conception 
of a peaceful settlement, and above all, of 
non-interference of each country should carve 
out its own destiny without interfering with 
others is an important conception, though 
17 there is nothing new about it. " 
16. (Nasenko,Yuri ).Jawaharlal Nehru and India's foreign policy, 
New Delhi, 1977, p. 184? and see CP^i-itzgerald. China and 
south Kast Asia, since 19^5, Delhi, 1975, p.81. 
17. Lok Sabha, September 17, 1955, p.14198. 
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China continued to follow a policy of friendship with 
India. Chinese Prime Minister Chao-En-lai visited India 
on 2 December 1956 and emphasised close cooperation between 
the two countries which he said, would be helpful in 
maintaining world peace and security. China also supported 
Goa's merger with India and strongly condemned the US-
sponsored resolution on Kashmir in the Security Council in 
19 January 1957 . People of either of two countries were allowed 
to visit each other's relip-ious places in China and India. 
They were permitted to travel through the Shipki La Pass, the 
Mana pass, the Niti Pass, the Kungri Bingri Pass, the Dharma 
20 Pass and the Lipu Lekh Pass. Nehru sent a letter to Prime 
Minister Chou En-lai on 14 December 1958 in an effort to 
solve the Boundary issue. After that, various letters were 
exchanged between them in connection with the dispute between 
21 the two countries. From 1955, the Chinese started rebelling 
Tibet. Tibetan leaders became rebelion against the Chinese 
government. Nehru said that he had little doubt that the 
22 great majority of Tibetans sytnpathized with it. In March 1959 
Tibetan suspects that the Chinese government had a secret 
plan to remove Dalai Lama from Tibet because the Chinese 
government felt that there was a danger to China's security 
19. The Hindustan Times. January 30, 1957, p.1 
20. A.AppodorSl & M.S.RaJan, op. c i t. , p.118 
21. Ibid, p.126 
22. Nehru speeches, op.cit, p. 3'+? 
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from h i s p re sence . Lala i Lama f led from Tibe t and came to 
Ind ia on 31 March 1959. Nehru was very keen t o give help 
t o Tibe tans and t h e i r Dalai Lama, He sa id on Apr i l 2 ? , 1959. 
Dalai Lama and h i s p a r t y reached Mussor ie , where the 
Governrnent had made arrangements for t h e i r s t a y . . . They 
sought asylum, and we agreed . . . . We could not l eave these 
refugees t o t h e i r own resoui 'ces . Apart from the humani tar ian 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s invo lved , t h e r e was a l s o the law and order 
problem t o be cons idered . 
I n d i a ' s fo re ign po l i cy towards China came under g r e a t e r 
s t r a i n to some e x t e n t wVien China occupied Longju and some 
other Indian t e r r i t o r y in Ladakh in 1959. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , 
Nehru expressed h i s views on 28 August 1959 in Lok Sabha thus*. 
The House w i l l a p p r e c i a t e t h a t these a reas 
are e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y remote, almost i n a c c e s s i b l e , 
and even i f they can be approached, i t t a k e s 
weeks to march and ge t t h e r e . . . A reconnaissance 
Par ty was sent t h e r e . I cannot exac t ly say when, 
but I th ink i t was a l i t t l e over a year ogo, 
sometime l a s t year . In f a c t two p a r t i e s were 
s e n t ; one of them did not r e t u r n and the other 
r e t u r n e d . . . . '«Ve v/aited for two or t h r e e weeks, 
and when i t did not r e t u r n , we suspected t h a t 
i t might have been apprehended or cap tured by 
Chinese au th i c r i t i e s on the border . So we 
addressed t h e Chinese a u t h o r i t i e s . This was more 
23 . Min i s t ry of Externa l Affa i rs Report(ND) 1959-60,p. 31. 
24. Nehru speeches . Vol.IV, o p . c i t . , p . 185 , 
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than a year ago; We addressed them about a month 
after the incident and they said some of our 
people had violated their border and gone into 
their territory, and they had been apprehended, 
but because of their relations with us, etc, 
they were going to release them, and they did 
release them afterwards, that is, after they 
25 
had been with them for about a month or so. 
Frequent border violations were made by China and 
26 
on October 21, 1959, nine Indian soldiers were killed. 
At the same time, an uprising took place in Tibet which 
was promptly suppressed by China. There was deep 
indignation in India at the harsh measures of China. In 
these circumstances Nehru said on September 10, 1959. 
Very probably the Tibetan developments have 
angered and soured the mind of the Government 
of China. Perhaps they have reacted strongly 
to what we have done, for example to the 
asylum we have given to the Dalai Lama. We 
have tried to steer a middle way. We respect 
2R the Dalai Lama. 
To reduced tension between India and China, the Prime 
Ministers of both the countries met in New Delhi from 20 to 
25 April 1960.^ The Prime Minister Nehru in a speech after 
25. Nehru speeches, Vol.IV, op.r.it., pp.19^-195, 
26. Not.es, memorandum & letters ex-changed and Agreement 
between India & China,(NMLTCI,1959, p.22. 
27. V.P.Putt. opoCit., p.-^on, 
28. Nehru, Vol.IV, op.cit., p.211, 
29» Girga Kumar? V.K.Arora: Documents on Indian Affairs,I960, 
Bombay, 1965, pp.52^-25. 
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holdlng the meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister said: 
Our whole argument was based on the Chinese 
forces having come into our territory *.. 
The Chinese position was basically different, 
historically, actually, practically... I do 
not imagine that this process will clarify 
the situation and make it easy of solution. 
Nehru made it clear that India could not rule out further 
conflict or some kind of peaceful talks in future. 
Official teams of the two countries also visited each 
other. But no agreement could be reached and the border 
incursions continued. Aftpr this Nehru said, in Lok Sabha 
on April 1, 1951; 
The House knows well enough how recent 
developments have created a wide gulf in the 
relations between India and China. We have 
felt strongly about it, and the House has 
also felt strongly about it. Nevertheless, 
we have tried to avoid, in so far as we can, 
taking any steps which may create unbridgeable 
chasms between the two countries, we have to 
look, at this moment of history, not only to 
the present but to the future* and the future 
of India and China who are neighbours to each 
other and have vast populations, is of the 
highest importance to themselves and to the 
world. So we have tried to stear a middle 
course between our strong resentment and the 
steps we actually take in this context. We 
30. Jawaharlal "^ ehru soepcbp?:, Vol. IV, New Delhi, 1964, 
pp.218-220, 
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t r y not to allow ourse lves merely in anger 
to do something v^ich may c r e a t e f u r t h e r 
problems and d i f f i c u l t i e s . Broadly, our 
a t t i t u d e has been t o s t r e n g t h e n ourse lves 
t o p repare for any cont ingency and not i n 
t h e s l i g h t e s t t o give in on any mat te r 
which we cons ide r impor tan t . 
The Indian government wrote a l e t t e r t o t h e Chinese 
government dated 14 May 1952 u rg ing i t t o r e c o n s i d e r t h e 
offer-:made by Nehru to Premier Chou En- la i on 16 November 
1959 which i n t e r a l i a proposed as an in te r im measure, t h a t 
in t h e Ladakh reg ion , India should withdraw i t s pe r sonne l 
t o t h e west of the l i n e shown in the 1956 Chinese map and 
t h e government of China should withdraw i t s to t h e e a s t of 
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l boundary shown in Ind ian o f f i c i a l maps,-^> 
Thus Ind ian government t r i e d i t s b e s t t o so lve t h e d i s p u t e 
by peaceful means. 
I nd i a submit ted a proposal t o t h e Chinese government 
t o t h e e f f ec t t h a t t h e s t a t u s quo on t h e border , as on 8 
September 1962, should be return.pd, and t h e r e a f t e r , t h e two 
c o u n t r i e s should s t a r t d i s c u s s i o n s . 
U l t i m a t e l y , on October 20, 1962 China mounted a f u l l 
f ledged a t t a c k on Ind ia across the N. E. F. A. and Ladakh border 
with I n d i a , which, on i t s p a r t , ordered i t s forces t o f ree 
t h e N.E, F. A. of Chinese i n t r u d e r s . 
31. Nehru speeches , Vol.IV, o p . c i t . , p .22 
32. A.Appadorai & M.S.Rajan, o p . c i t . , p . 137 , NMLC,VI-p.43 and 
see a l s o Hind Cyan Mala Chinese Betrayal of I n d i a . N . D e l h i , 
1962. 
33. The New York Times, O c t . ^ 1 , 1962, The Hindustan Times, 
O c t . 2 l , 1962, p . 1 
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In his broadcast from All India Radio, Delhi, on 
October 22, 1962 Nehru said; 
We have followed a policy of non-alignment 
and sought friendship of all nations, I 
believe in that policy fully and we shall 
continue to follow it, ^e are not going 
to give up our basic principles because of 
the present difficulty. Even this difficulty 
will be more effectively met by our continuing 
that policy. -^  
At this critical moment. Government of India requested the 
USA and Great Britain on 26 October 1962 for immediate help 
to meet the Chinese aggression. The first consignment of 
US arms reached India on 3rd November, although, the formal 
pact between the two countries was signed on I4th November 
1962. On November 19, again India requested the United 
States for providing air support to her. -^ Thus a war 
between India and China took place, which ended in a military 
dabacle for India. However, China made a unilateral 
declaration of withdrawal on November ?1, 1962, During the 
war India received considerable military aid from the Western 
powers. Soviet Union also supported India and helped her 
•56 
with MIG planes. 
3^» The Hindustan Times, Oct,?^, 1962, p.6 
35, Kuldeep Nayar, 
Between the lines, Bombav 1969, pp.168-169. 
56, M,G, Gupta, 0Tb,clt. , p. 12?. 
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After the Chinese aggression Nehru said on December 10, 
1962, 
On the 2lst November the Chinese Government 
issued a statement making a unilateral 
announcement of ceasefire as from the midnight 
of the 2lst-22nd November and a withdrawal of 
their forces from the 1st December. On the 
23rd we asked for some clarifications and 
received a reply on the 26th November. On 
the 30th we sought further clarifications. 
On the 22nd November, the Government of 
Sri Lanka announced that they had called a 
conference of six non-aligned countries at 
Colombo. The date for this was subsequently 
changed and it is due to begin or rather has 
37 begun in Colombo today.-
The Sino-Indian war of 1962 prompted Afro-Asian 
countries to mediate and to try and bring about a peaceful 
solution of the Sino-Indian border dispute. A conference 
from 10th to 12 December, 1962 was held at Colomb«D, which 
was attended by six nations - Indonesia, Cambodia, Burma, 
UAR, Ghana and Sri Lanka, The conference virtually accepting 
India's view point submitted proposals urging both India and 
China to resume talks for solving the border dispute. India 
accepted the proposals, but China did not i^spond favourably. 
Making a speech on the eve of this conference Nehru said: 
37« Nehru speeches, Vol.TV, ^ Pocit., p.249. 
38. V.P.butt, China's foreign policy, opoCJta» ps224. 
-84-
Anxious for peace, we suggested t h i s minimum 
condition which might lead to a peaceful 
approach. They have rejected our p r o p o s a l . . . 
The Colombo conference which i s meeting today 
i s considering what recommendations honourable 
to both s i de s - they might make in order to 
resolve the differences between India and 
China. We recognize t h e i r friendly feel ings 
and t h e i r well-meant attempts to solve or a t 
any r a t e t o lessen t h i s c r i s i s . I t r u s t , 
however, tha t they wil l appreciate tha t there 
can be no compromise with aggression and an 
expanding imperialism and tha t the gains of 
aggression must be given up before both the 
•59 p a r t i e s t r y t o resolve t h e i r disputes. 
The withdrawal of Chinese forces proposed by the Colombo 
conference was to be 20 kilometers as suggested by Prime 
Minister Chou-En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru. Prime Minister 
Chou-En-lai ' in his l e t t e r of 28th November 1962 proposed the 
withdrawal from the l ine of rea l control between the two sides 
as of 7 November 1959, as defined in Maps I I I and IV circulated 
by the government of China, while the mi l i t a ry posts under 
the forces of the government of India was to remain upto the 
l ine mentioned above, there was to be a demil i tar ized zone of 
20 kilometers which was to be administered by c i v i l i a n posts 
of e i t h e r s ide . These were the proposals of the Colombj&o 
Conference. The pos i t ion , the number of posts and t h e i r 
composition were to be mutually agreed upon between India and 
China. 
39. Nehru speeches, Vol.IV, o p . c i t . , pp.2^^2-254. 
40. Chinese Aggression in war >ir"' peace. Le t te rs of the 
Prime Minister of India. Delhi, 1962, p .42. 
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The conf l ic t of 1962 was of great s ignif icance for 
Chlnabbecause she got a large chunk of Ladakh t e r r i t o r y 
which provided her the much needed link between Sinkiang 
and southern China, which in India , resul ted in doubts 
being expressed about the efficacy of Ind ia ' s policy of 
non-alignment. 
On 2 March 1963, the Chinese government wrote a l e t t e r 
to India announcing the completion of t h e i r withdrawal from 
the area seized before t h e i r ceasefire declarat ion of 21 
November 1962 and assorted tha t the Chinese forces had 
withdrawn 20 kilometers behind the Chinese version of the 
• l ine of actual c o n t r o l ' , as of 7 November 1959. At the 
same time China announced the s e t t i n g up of 26 ' c i v i l p o s t s ' 
on her side of the so-called l ine of actual cont ro l . Actually 
Al s ix of them were se t up in Indian t e r r i t o r y of Ladakh. 
On 3 March 1963» Premier Chou En-lai sent a l e t t e r to 
the Prime Minister of India informing him of the Chinese 
government's act ion. On 5 March 1963 Nehru expressed his 
views to Chinese government urging i t to act according to 
the Colombo proposals . In th i s l e t t e r he said: 
I am prepared, when the time comes, provided 
there i s approval of Parliament, even to 
refer the basic dispute of the claims on the 
f ron t i e r to the In te rna t iona l Court of Jus t i ce 
at the Hague. 
41. A.Appadarai & M.S.RaJan, o p . c i t . , p.146. 
42. NMLIC IX, p p . 5 - 7 . 
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On April 3. 1963, Indian government wrote a letter to 
its Chinese counterpart indicating five steps which could 
solve the problem between the two countries. The main points 
of the letter were as follows: 
(i) The government of China should accept, without 
reservations, the Colombo proposals, just as the 
government of India had done; 
(ii) The acceptance by both sides of the Colombo proposals 
should be followed by a meeting of their officials 
to arrive at a settlement of various matters left 
by the Colombo Powers for direct agreement between 
the parties and to decide the details regarding the 
implementation of the Colombo proposals on the 
ground; 
(iii) The officials of both sides concerned should then 
take action to implement these proposals on the 
ground so that agreed ceasefire arrangements are 
established on the ground? 
(iv) Thereafter, in the improved atmosphere, India and 
China should take up the question of their differences 
on the boundary question and try to reach a mutually 
acceptable settlement in one or more than one stage. 
If a settlement v/as reached, this could b(; implemented 
in detail on the ground, 
(v) If a settlement was not reached in these direct 
talks and discussions between the two parties, both 
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sides could consider measures to settle the 
differences peacefully in accordance with 
international practices followed in sush cases. 
Both India and China could agree to make a 
reference, on the differences regarding the 
boimdary, to the International Court of Justice 
at the Hague and agree to abide by the Court's 
decision. If this method of peaceful settlement 
was for any reason,not acceptable to the government 
of China, both partips could agree to some sort of 
international arbitration by a person or a group of 
persons, nominated in the manner agreed to by both 
governments, who could go into the question objectively 
and impartially and give their awanJ which would be 
binding to both governments. -^ 
On 9 October 1963, Chinese government in its response 
to the above-mentioned letter stated that she was not ready 
for further discussion on Colombo proposals. She rejected 
the Indian proposal that the disputes of the two countries 
should be placed before the International Court of Justice. 
On 16 October 1963, India sent another letter to the Chinese 
government, expecting that las+ly wiser counsel would prevail 
kk 
and the Chinese government would take to the ways of peace. 
45. NMLIC, IX, pp. 3^-35. 
44. Ministry of External Affairs Report(MEAR) 1963-64, p.38. 
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On April 13. 196A, addressing the Lok Sabha Nehru said: 
In regard to China, we have made it clear 
that if the Colombo proposals are accepted by 
China, we shall be prepared to discuss with 
them our disputes.... In this matter, I should 
like to make clear one development wfjich took place 
these some time ago. This was referred to by 
Mrs. Bandaranaike in one of her recent letters 
to US. We were asked whether if the Chinese 
vacated all theii- posts in the demilitarized 
area in Ladakh. We would consider this as 
fulfilment of the Colombo proposals. In the 
Colombo proposals, it was stated that in the 
demilitarized area of Ladakh, both parties 
should have, by agreement, an equal number of 
45 posts. 
In 1954, the External Affairs Minister of India, 
Mr. Swaran Singh made it clear that his country was anxious to 
take up negotiations if China would only agree to making a 
token gesture and withdrawing from the seven posts which she 
46 had built in Ladakh in violation of the Colombo proposals. 
Giving his reaction to the Indian proposals Chou En-lai 
said as follows while addressing the third National People's 
Congress held at '^•ec:):mf. from 21 December 1964 to 4 January 
1965: 
45« Nehru speeches, qpj..cjj.. . " .V, p.'-'IJ, 
46. On 25 September I'JoM-Lok Sabha Debates, III series. 
Vol.XXXIV, Cal.3785. 
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We v/iil not witb.draw from a single one of 
these posts, and at the same time, the 
Indian government has to be reminded that 
90,000 kilometers of territory, over which 
China has never relinquished its sovereignty... 
We can wait, 
India had great doubts about Chinese motives and designs. 
She came to the conclusion that China was eager to extend its 
dominations in Asia. The Prime Minister of India Lai Bahadur 
Shastri said in Parliament! 
To justify its aggressive attitude, China is 
pretnding to be a guardian of Asian countries, 
who, according to China, are being bullied by 
India, The basic objective of China is to 
claim for itself a position of dominance in 
Asia, which no self-respecting nation in Asia 
is prepared to recognise.... We reject the 
Chinese claim to tell us anything about what 
we should do or should not do about Kashmir, 
48 
which is an integral part of India. 
In spite of the policy of non-alignment, India started 
getting economic and military aid from USA and USSR to 
strengthen its position in the face of the Chinese postures 
of domination in Asia. 
Lai Bahadur Shastri could not succeed in improving Indian 
relations with China. However, the foreign policy of India 
47. Peeking Review, Vol.VIII, No.1, pp.18-19. 
48. V.p. Dutt, op.cit. , pp.211-21?. 
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remained fundamentally the same, with slight modifications. 
However, Shastri continued to reiterate the ideas of Nehru, 
like non-alignment, world peace and co-existence in 1964-65. 
During the tenure of Indira Gandhi India's relations 
with China continued to be strained and deteriorated in 1967 
when two secretaries of the Indian Embassy at Peking were 
subjected to mob violence and one of them was denounced by 
the Chinese as a spy. . This naturally led to repurcussions 
in India. The government of India retaliated by expelling a 
Chinese diplomat. Demonstrators in Delhi broke through a 
police cordon and attacked the Chinese staff. 
In spite of the sharp differences between the two 
countries, India continued her traditional policy of supporting 
China's case for admission to the United Nations. 
She also tried to keep the door open for negotiations 
to settle the outstanding border dispute. 
49. V.p. Dutt, op.clt. . pp,?r'^-^]V 
50. V.P. Dutt, on.c'' t, , p.? 10 
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SRI LANKA 
India's ties with Sri Lanka are deeply rooted in history. 
Jawaharlal Nehru visited Sri Lanka twice before India's 
independence. He first went there in 1931 and then in 1939« 
This reflects close Indian ties with Sri Lanka. In 19^6, 
Indian National Congress gave serious attention to the solution 
of the problem of the Tamils of It.dian origin in Sri Lanka and 
expressed its views in the following words: 
Our working committee have viewed with anxious 
concern the development of the situation in 
Ceylone relating to the rights and security 
and welfare of Indians in Ceylone and more 
particularly of labour in the rubber and tea 
estates, resulting in a general hartal of Indian 
workers which has already lasted over three 
weeks. The Committee sympathise with the demands 
of Indians for fair treatment and rights of 
citizenship and franchise and deeply regret that 
any such conflict should arise between the Indian 
residents of Ceylone and the Ceylone Government. 
Ceylone and India are and must inevitably 
desire and endeavour of all concerned to find a 
way for settling all disputes in a Just and 
equitable manner, honourable to both India and 
Ceylone and conducive to enlarging the freedom 
of the people. The Committee, while appreciating 
the sacrifices of the estate workers in their 
1. V.P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, ojp, cit. , p.223. 
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heroic struggle, are of opinion that the 
present strike, which is subtantially 
political in its motive, though it is related 
to economic problems affecting Indian labour 
as a >*iole, should be discontinued, with a 
view to creating an atmosphere favourable to 
conciliation, and therefore advise the Ceylone 
Indian Congress to cell it off. The Committee 
assure the Ceylone Indian Congress of its full 
sympathy for the cause of Indians in Ceylone 
and to that end and for taking necessary steps 
to obtain redress for their grievances appoint 
the following committee for investigation of 
the matters in dispute. 
The committee will consists of the 
President (Jawaharlal Nehru) Shri C. Rajagopalachari, 
2 
Shri Aryanayakam and Shri Ramachandran. 
The foreign policy of India towards Sri Lanka has been 
complex since independence. Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya said in 
an interview with the representative of Ceylone Daily News: 
India and Ceylone must have common strategy and 
common defence resources. It cannot be that 
Ceylone is in friendship with a group with which 
India is not in friendship."^ 
Since independence the problem of the stateless Tamils 
4 
of Indian origin in Sri Lanka has proved to be an irritant. 
2. J.S.Sharma, India's struggle for freedom, Vol.11, ojj.cit. , 
PP.221--2. 
3. Sri Lanka Daily News,23 April, 19^9. 
U, V.P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, ojb.cit. , p.22^. 
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Sri Lanka tried to get membership of the Commonwealth to 
balance its power with India. Prime Minister Nehru 
personally sent special message to the Sri Lanka government 
and publicly repudiated the suggestion that India had designs 
to interfere with the island's sovereignty and assured Sri 
Lanka of India's goodwill and peaceful intensions towards her. 
The large population of Tamilians in Sri l,anka was 
divided almost equally into two main groups. 
1. The Ceylonese Tamils and 
2, The Indian Tamils 
The Ceylonese Tamils had been residing in the island for 
many centuries. They were availaing themselves of all the 
rights in the commercial, professional, academic and political 
fields as well as in government services. The Indian Tamils 
were descendants of migrants brought to Ceylone. These 
migrants had gone there during the British period. These 
people were employed as plantation workers in Ceylone, In 
this way the position of Indian Tamils were naturally weaker 
as compared with the Ceylone Tamils, particularly from econo-
mical and political points of view, the Ceylone Taniils were 
strong because they had been living there for several centiiriea 
and were citizens of Sri Lanka, On the countrary, the Indians 
Tamils could not get citizenship because they were weak 
5. Kodikarn U. Shelton, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka; A Third 
World Prrspective, Delhi, 1982, p,24. 
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politically and financially. But the important point in 
this regard is that this class organised a labour Union that 
yielded considerable influence. 
The Government of India felt that Indian Tamils in Sri 
Lanka should get citizenship and that it was the r( sponsi-
bility of the Government of Sri Lanka to get them assimilated 
with the rest of her people. 
Sri Lanka adopted some legislative measures denying 
citizenship or voting rights to the majority of Indian Tamils. 
Nehru visited Sri Lanka on January 1^, 1950. He was welcomed 
by the people of the country and he gave them the assurance 
that they had no cause to fear that India would swallow up 
e^yione.^ 
In the years 1953 and 1954 top level meetings were held 
to solve the problems of Indian Tamils. Finally, an agreement 
was signed on January 18, 1954 between Sri Lanka and India to 
expedite the registration of Indian Tamils for citizenship in 
the light of the 1949 India and Pakistan residents(Citizenship) 
Act. But this agreement could not be implemented because 
there emerged another question of a third category of persons 
who were citizens neither of Sri Lanka nor of India, but were 
•stateless* and this issue could not be resolved. 
6. O.P. Ralhan, Jawaharlal Nehru Abroad, Delhi 1983» p.71. 
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Right from the time of India's independence, the problem 
of stateless Tamils of Indian origin in Sri Lanka has proved 
to be an Irritant. This, coupled with the moral support of 
India to the demand for parity of the Tamilian with the Sinhali'' 
as regarded the civic and political rights raised by the Tamils 
United Liberation Front (TULF), an organisation representing 
the Tamils of the northern and eastern Tamil majority provinces, 
created tension between the governments of India and Sri Lanka 
in the early sixties. 
The problem was created by the Sri Lankan government 
itself which disenfranchised the original immigrants from 
South India soon after the island's independence, making them 
stateless. Government of India's efforts to find a political 
solution to this problem were constantly stymied by Sinhalese 
intransigence. However, a breakthrough came with the agreement 
reached on 30 October 1964 between the then Prime Ministers of 
India Lai Bahadur Shastri and Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike his 
Sri Lanakan counterpart. However, the Tamil problem continued 
since then to plague India-Sri Lanka relations. Under the 
pact, India had agreed to confer citizenship on 525,000 statelesi 
Tamilian together with their children and to rehabilitate them 
in India while Sri Lanka was to absorb 300,000 Tamilians along-
with their offspring as its nationals. The agreement thus 
covered 825,000 families out of an estimated 975,000. The fate 
7. The Hindustan Times, 31 Oct. 1964, p.1 
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of the remaining 150,000 was to be decided at a later stage. 
8 A time frame of 15 years was fixed for completing the process. 
A census which was held in 1966 confirmed the number of 
stateless persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka mentioned in 
Sirimavo - Shastri Agreement. 
On 6 December 1966 the Ceylone Prime Minister introduced 
a bill for the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement 
in the House of Representatives, After some discussion, the 
bill was passed and became a law on November 17, 1967. 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi went to ^ ri Lanka on 18-22 September 1967 
"to ratify the Indo-Ceylone Agreement. Some other bilateral 
matters were also discussed during the visit. In the end of 
her visit, a joint communique was issued confirming the 
implementation of the agreement of 1964. 
The Joint committee formed to carry out the Sri Lanka 
Agreement met in Colombo on March 4, 1968 to review the 
progress of its implementation. It reported that already a 
number of persons had been conferred citizenship and yet 
another group had been issued Indian Passports and that the 
process had begun without creating any heart-burning on either 
slde.^ 
8. V.P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, ot). cit. , p.225. 
9. Asian Recorder 7-13 October 1968, p.8559. 
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N E P A L 
Nepal i s an important neighbour of India. The two 
countries have very strong and old t i e s with one another. 
Nepal's s t r a t eg i c locat ion has made i t buffer between China 
and India. Her locat ion i s most s t r a t e g i c so t h a t China, 
America, Japan and even iioviet Union are anxious t o win her 
to t h e i r s ide . After India became f ree , she had done as much 
as she could to help Nepal in her development and other 
a c t i v i t i e s , I nd i a ' s policy towards Nepal has been jeared to 
securing a reciprocal fr iendship, bel ieving tha t sush a 
re la t ionsh ip would be beneficial to both India and i\[epal. 
However India has not always been successful in t h i s regard, 
V.P, Dutt correct ly says that the two countries have been bound 
together by h i s to ry , geography, kinship^ r e l i g ion , f a i t h , 
cu l tu ra l legacy and l i n g u i s t i c aff ini ty." According to Ramakant 
geography has played an important ro le in evolving and shaping 
the l i f e of the people of the Himalayan region, so tha t he adds 
while there are wide differences between the people l i v ing in 
one par t and another, there are a lso ce r t a in problems common to 
the en t i r e region, and these have given r i s e to cer ta in s imi la r 
a t t i t u d e s , ^ 
1. Shriman, Narayan: India and Nepal, Bombay, 1970, p .68 . 
2. V.P, Dutt, I nd i a ' s Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1984, p.185. 
3. Ramakant; Nepal, China and India, Delhi, 1976, p .1 
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British India signed a treaty with Nepal on 21 December 
1923. This shows that even before independence India and Nepal 
were close to each other. After India got its independence, 
she signed a treaty of peace and friendship with Nepal on July 
31, 1950. This treaty provided for everlasting peace and 
friendship between the two countries, both of which agreed to 
acknowledge and respect complete sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence of each other. It was also agreed 
that the two governments would inform each other should any 
serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighboxoring 
state cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting 
between them. Both countries would thus continue tc> have 
diplomatic contacts. In this context Jawaharlal Nehru said in 
Lok Sabha on December 6, 1950s 
Regardless of our feelings about Nepal, we 
were interested in our own country's security, 
in our own country's border. ,Mow we have had 
from immemorial times, a magnifleant frontier 
that is to say, the Himalayas. It is not 
quite so difficult as it used to be, still it 
is difficult, very difficult.... The principle 
barrier to India ties on the other side of 
Nepal and were not going to tolerate any person 
coming over that barrier. Therefore, much as 
we appreciate the independence of Nepal, ws 
cannot risk our own security by anything going 
wrong in Nepal which permits either that barrier 
5 
to be crossed or otherwise weakens our frontier. ^ 
U, Timothey George, Robert Litwak -I Shahram Chaubin, 
Security in Southern Asia, 198/4, p.?5. 
5. Parliamentary Debates, New Delhi, 6 Dec.1950, Vol.VI,no.17, 
p.1269. 
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Side by side, a separate treaty of trade and commerce was 
also signed by the two countries which was to cover the period 
of a decade. Nehru stressed the rationale of Indian policy 
towards Nepal in the following words: 
Nepal in old days that is to say, the British 
days of India, was an independent country? called 
so. But strictly speaking, it was not very 
independent, except internally... But her 
foreign relations were strictly limited to its 
relations with the Government of India, that 
is to say, the British Government functioning 
in India.... Now when we came into the picture 
we assured Nepal that we would not only respect 
her independence, but we wanted to see Nepal 
developed into a strong and progressive country. 
"We went further in this respect than the 
British Government had done; that is to say, 
Nepal began to develop other foreign relations. 
V/e welcomed it. Vve did not come in the way, 
although that was something far in addition to 
what had been the position in British time. 
Naturally, and quite frankly, we do not like, 
and we do not propose to be any foreign inter-
ference in Nepal. iVe recognize Nepal as an 
independent country we wish it well. So our 
relationship/in-tiinGte and no other country's 
relationship with "^ epal can be: as intimate, and 
every other country 'nust have to realise- and 
appreciate this intimate geographical, cultural 
and other relationships of India and Nepal. 
6. Parliamentary Debates. New Delhi, 6th Dec.1950, Vol.VI, 
no.17, p.1268. 
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These words have generally served as a basis for Ind ia ' s 
pol icy tov/ards Nepal and reveal , in p a r t , i t s contradictory 
nature and i t s inherent weaknesses. For, on the one hand, geo-
p o l i t i c a l reasons and regional conf l ic t s made i t imperative 
for India t o ensure some semblance of influence on Nepal, and, 
on the other , these reasons led India to desire a s trong and 
s t ab l e Nepal. Yet, India also had to take in to account the 
fac t tha t i t could not always influence the in te rna t iona l 
r e l a t i o n s of a sovereign country. . I t had urged Nepal t o 
introduce democratic reforms, in keeping with modern tendencies , 
for the l e t t e r ' s own progress and development. Several attempts 
had been made to introduce a cons t i tu t ion embodying ;3ome 
democratic innovations and reforms. However, for varying 
reasons, such attempts were invariably met with res i s t ance by 
e i t h e r the Ranas or p c l i t l c i e n s , r e su l t i ng f ina l ly in an armed 
Revolt towards the end of 1950. Various factors influenced 
Ind i e ' s a t t i t ude the new Government of Nepal. In the f i r s t 
place India looked at the emergence of the new government of 
Nepal as a triumph of nationalism and democratic forces. In 
a broadcast from New Delhi on January 2A, 1951 Mr. Nehru said: 
The set t lement in Nepal i s a states-manlikie 
act on the par t of a l l concerned. I t marks 
the beginning of a new era in the h i s tory 
of our s i s t e r country. There will be many 
d i f f i c u l t i e s ahead and a multitude of 
problems, but i f the people of Nepal and 
t h e i r representat ives seek the good of 
t h e i r country with a s ingleness of purpose 
-101-
and c o - o p e r a t e with one ano ther i n t h i s 
g r e a t t a s k , I am su re t h a t success w i l l 
come t o them . . . . Nepal i s independent 
and we value her independence. But she 
i s a l s o in c lo se touch wif.h IndJa and, 
t h e r e f o r e , we hnve especially welcomed 
the b ig s t e p towards democracy t h a t i s 
7 
about t o be t aken . The Chinese govern-
ment maintained her p o s i t i o n i n Lahsa 
and o the r t r a d i n g c e n t r e of T ibe t . 
Perhaps , t h i s was t h e second f a c t o r 
which inf luenced Indo-Nepal i se r e l a t i o n s , 
because t h e v i s i t o r of Nepal of ten used 
t o come i n t h i s a rea . 
Indian Economic Ass is tance t o Nepal s e t in 1951-52 short ly 
a f t e r the c l o s e of Rana's government. Jawahar la l Nehru pa id a 
v i s i t to Nepal on l6 th June 1951 for i n c r e a s i n g c l o s e coopera-
t i o n between t h e two c o u n t r i e s . After a r r i v i n g i n Nepal , he 
was given warm welcome by King Tr ibhuran , crown prince Mahendra 
Birbikram Shah Dav and o the r p r i n c i e s . ^ Nehru was the f i r s t 
fore ign prime m i n i s t e r t o v i s i t Kathmandu. Addressing a huge 
public meeting Nehru sa id " I f you seek our help in say, 
t echnica l or o the r s p h a r e s , we w i l l do our utmost t o be useful 
10 t o you, but we never want t o i n t e r f e r e " . I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s 
7 . Jawahar la l Nehru: I n d i a ' s Foreign P o l i c y - Se lec ted Speeches, 
September 19^6- Apr i l 1961, p.A37. 
8. Harmandar Singhi Ind ia and Her Neifi:hbours, Books i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
( Ind ia ) Milap ChowK-Jullundar C i t y , 1967, p . ^ 0 . 
9. O.P.Ralhan: Jawahar la l Nehru Abroad-- A c h r o n o l o g i c a l s tudy , 
Uppal PublisFuli^r House, \ew LeThi, o .95 . 
10. The Statesman. 1? Junp 1=*S1. 
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with Nepal was cordial. However, anti-Indian feelin/js ran 
high in 1955-5'^  as crisis followed in the Nepali administration 
until even the Nepali Congress, the counterpart and a close 
ally of the Indian National Congress, demanded in 195^ the 
withdrawal of all Indian civilian exoerts and military menions 
11 in the interest of wholesome rel^ 'tlons between India and Nepal. 
^dian leaders have always the view that Nepal should 
have a popular regime. After overthrow of the Rana autocracy. 
King Tibhuvan expressed his desire for merger of Nepal with 
India. However Nehru rejected the offer of the king because he 
12 
wanted Nepal to retain her independence. Many of the leaders 
of the popular movement in Nepal have been very intimately 
connected with Indian politicions. They were educated in India 
and trained in public life over here. It was natural for these 
leaders, therefore, to desire strong friendly relations with 
this country. 
The prime minister of Nepal, Tanka Parsad Acharya 
addressing a news conference on 29th May 1956 said that Nepal 
had made an informal approach to the Government of India 
suggesting a revision of 1950 treaty and had received an 
assurance from India that if Nepal suggested a revision of the 
existing Trade Treaty, it would be duly considered. -' Consiquentl]r 
11. M.G.Gupta, India's Foreign Policy, theory & practice,Agra 198^ ' 
12. V.P. Lutt, op.cit., p.187 P«2 7 
13. The Hindustan Ti-nes, '50 ^ ay IQ^ )^ . 
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after giving statements of T.P. Acharya, India and Nepal 
initiated a dialogue for revision of Trade Treaty of 1950 in 
the second week of January 1957. Specially, the discussion, 
drew to a centre round clause V of the Agreement. Nepalese 
government was in favour of removing the differences by putting 
out or revise by changing some matters of the clause. Under 
this clause, the Governnipnt ol Nepal wanted to levy at rates 
not lower than those in fot'ce for- the time being in India 
customs duties on import from and exports to countries outside 
India. Moreover, Nepal demanded to levy on goods produced or 
manufac :ured in Nepal which were exported to India export duty 
at sufficient rates to prevent their sale in India at prices 
more suitable than those of goods produced or manufactured in 
India which were subject to excise duty. Problems connecting 
foreign exchange and their availability to Nepal and India's 
technical and financial assistance to Nepal also centred in 
14 the discussion. 
Steps to strengthen the economy of Nepal continued on 
6 January 1958, the Government of Nepal announced the setting 
up of a Planning Board under the chairmanship of King Mahendra's 
IS younger brother Prince Bir Bikramshah Dev. ' The Government 
also laid stress on stabilising the power and energy. Condition 
of Nepal and concluded an agreement with the Government of India 
at Kathmandu on 20 November 1958 under which the Indian Govern-
ment undertook to execute a hydroelectric project near Trisali 
Bazar, 30 miles north-west of Kathmandu, at a cost of Rs.35 crores 
14. The Statefflman, 14 January 1957 
15. Ibid, 7 January 19=)8 
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t o be borne by I n d i e . The Agreement a l s o inc luded the 
16 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of t r ansmis s ion l i n e s from T r i s u l e t o Kathmandu. 
Another agreement was signed between t h e two c o u n t r i e s on 
h December 1959 ret~.^-roing, the '"•pndok P r o j e c t . I t was si^posed 
to i r r i g a t e about 37,00,000 acres in the two c o u n t r i e s and 
gene ra t e 20,000 K'* of power and a l s o envisaged t h e construct ion 
of a bar rage a t Bhaisalotion. The t o t a l cos t of the project t o 
be wholly borne by I n d i a , was es t imated a t Rs .50 .5 crores . 
Apart from i r r i g a t i o n and power f a c i l i t i e s the other advantages 
that Nepal had der ived from the p r o j e c t were t h e improved 
communiiications as a r e s u l t of the construction of a bridge over 
the barrage, s erv i ce roads and t e l e p h o n e , t e l e g r a p h and road 
17 l i n k s . ' The f a s t d e t e r i o r a t i n g S ino - Ind ian r e l a t i o n s and 
s i t u a t i o n developed and t h e dangers of t h e cold war made the 
Government of Nepal extremely cautous about t h e a t t i t u d e i t 
adopted towards the S ino- Indian border d i s p u t e . Nepal's neutral 
a t t i t u d e aroused t h e fea r of those who suspected Chinese 
aggres s ion on Nepal any day and those groups which wanted the ir 
country to remain c lose t o India s u r p r i s i n g l y s tar ted demanding 
that Koirala should follow a more f r i e n d l y p o l i c y towards China. 
In t h i s constant t u s s c l e cracks appeared in the Nepali Congress 
when a s e c t i o n of the party i t s e l f supported the opposit ion 
charge t h a t the Government was s e l l i n g out the country to India. 
16. The Sta tesman, ?1 November 1958, p,^h 
17. Foreign Affa i rs Record, Voi.V, no .12 , Lee.1959, pp.493-94. 
18. Anuradha Gupta, Pol i t n s in I'^epall A study of Post Rana 
P o l i t i c a l Level opm ents 'ar iu Par ty PoTrt Ics( Bombay, 1964; , 
pp .154-155. 
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The Sino-Indian border dispute and the revolt in Tibet 
provided an opportunity to Nepal to come closer to India. 
After swearing as Prime Minister, B.P. Koirala in a policy 
broadcast to the nation declared that Nepali Congress Govern-
ment would not subscribe to any military bloc nor give up her 
policy of neutrality In hoc international relations. Her 
relations with India, he said were " historic and unseparable 
19 
and they were growing closer. " -^ It was felt that Indo-
Nepalese relations would be further strengthened by the 
progressive policy that Koirala had proposed to pursue at home 
and the policy of 'non-alignment* that he wanted to follow on 
20 Nepal's international relations. 
On 28 May, Koirala declared that India had never interfered 
with Nepal's sovereignty. There was no difficulty either from 
the Indian side or here about the revision of Indo-Nepalese 
21 Trade Treaty of 1950, Nehru's visit to Kathmandu provided 
another opportunity to both the countries to strengthen their 
ties. Indian Prime Minister officially visited Nepal from 11 to 
22 
14 June 1959." Speaking at a reception given by the Nepal-
India Friendship Association, Jawaharlal Nehru said that the 
two countries had no designs on one another. The story of Indo-
Nepalese relations was a story of old cultural and religious 
19. Delhi Hindustan Standard, 29 May 1959. 
20. Ibid, (ed.) " Nepal" 29 May 1959? and also Hindustan Times(ei 
20. "^ niepal'fe New Regime" , 30 May 1959. 
21. The Statesman, 30 May 1959-
22. O.P.Ralhan, op. cit. . po. ^ 03-8 
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t i e s . He had shown his happiness t h a t an elected Government 
was functioning in Nepal.'-^ Nehru and Koirala had discussed 
the s i t u a t i o n in Tibet and ce r t a in questions r e l a t i n g to 
Nepal's development p lans . Regarding the Tibetan s i t u a t i o n 
there was iden t i ty of views i f not of assessment. The Govern-
ment of Nepal's assessment of the s i t ua t ion seemed to be t h a t 
the l iqu ida t ion of T ibe t ' s autonomy had posed a permanent 
t h rea t to her secur i ty . I t vv-as a lso feared tha t the presence 
of Chinese forces on the f ront iers might be a source of 
pressure on Nepal. 
Apart from strengthening Indo-Nepalese t i e s Nehru^s v i s i t 
had given a new assurance and sense of confidence t o the people 
and Government of Nepal and had helped in removing misunder-
standing about c e r t a in Indo-Nepalese matters which were 
frequently magnified out of ipnorence for p o l i t i c a l purposes by 
some sect ions of Nepalese opinic;rj. Most important of a l l , the 
v i s i t had brought to the surface these ui-ges wViich were deeper 
than normal t i e s between the two neighbours and which in the 
case of Nepal and India, arose from t h e i r closely l inked 
geography, cu l tu re , r e l ig ion and his tory and these urges had 
helped further cement friendship and cooperation. As a Nepali 
leader said a v i s i t by Nehru to Nepal i s important at any time 
but coming at the present c r i t i c a l moment i t i s memorable and 
h i s t o r i c . The t a lk s were understood to have disclosed tha t 
23. Statements, 12 June 1959, pp. 1,7 
24. Hindustan Times, 14 June 1959 
25. Hindustan Times, 15 June, 1959. 
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the King and the Nepalese leaders were understood to consider 
the darkest cloud of all. That was the situation created by 
the developments in Tibet. According to Nepal thinking, their 
northern "border had always been most sensitive with a difficult 
terrain making it almost impossible to guard or even watch 
property. While direct attack was considered improbable what 
the Nepalese fpared more was pressure from infiltration. 
There were some elements in Nepal which could be appeared at 
the game of power politics. 
Nehru at his press conference said emphatically that he 
feared no invasion from China, but he also said that there were 
many countries who while loudly hailing the Panchsheel, violated 
its principles. Whatever might be the assessment of the two 
countries, it seemed clear that the talks with Nehru had brought 
a sense of reassurance to Nepal. This of course does not, arise 
from military assistance or pact. Nehru at the press conference 
refuted these suggestions, but from the considerations of the 
Tibet situation and the larger context of world affairs and 
India's known interest in the integrity of Nepal and from the 
belief mutually shared that the non-alignment policy was the 
27 best for both. 
The talks had been of great value in dispelling certain 
misunderstandings in the Indo-Nepalese relations. Nehru made 
2^' Hindustan Times, 15 June 1959. 
27. Ibid. 
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clear in public and orivate t ha t as far as India was concerned, 
her desire was to help and not to i n t e r f e re . Regarding the 
t rade t r ea ty about which zhere had been some propaganda a 
decision to revise i t while taking in to account Nepal's wishes 
had been reached. In th i s connection the f i r s t ac t of the 
present government was to give not ice of termination in 
accordance with the t r ea ty terms. The other point of misunder*-
standing had ar isen out of the use of Indian mi l i t a ry personnel 
at checkpost on Nepal's northern f ron t i e r s . Nehru declared ' ""• 
that they were there at Nepal's i nv i t a t i on and would be 
withdrawn as soon as Nepalese personnel being trained took their 
place and in any case when Nepal desired, mul l i f ies th i s point 
of propaganda on the hand. 
The v i s i t of Jawaharlal Nehru had enabled the government 
of India to co l l ec t the f i r s t hand information on the government 
of Nepal views on the Tibetan s i t u a t i o n and the Sino-Indian 
border dispute. The Indian government was at l eas t sat i s f ied 
to note the s im i l a r i t y of views on the Tibetan issue but Nepal 
stand on the issue was not as bold as the Indians had taken. 
One th ing was common to both as the secur i ty and integrity of 
India and Nepal were closely linked with the turmoil in Tibet, 
Nepal somewhat neutral btand on the issue s ign i f i can t that 
there was a lack of und erst and inp- between King I^ahendra and 
pro-Indian B. P. Koix-ala gover-nment. I t seemed i t was because 
28. Hindustan Times> 15 June 1959-
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of k ing ' s l e n i e n t a t t i t u d e towards China, that Koirala 
Government a f t e r assuming o f f i c e dared not t o be vocal on the 
Tibetan i s s u e . 
Ther'e was no mentjon in the j o i n t communique vJiether 
both t h e l e a d e r s had s p e c i f i c a l l y d iscussed the Sino-Indian 
border d i s p u t e . The bypassing of the i s sue meant that Nepal 
wanted to remain n e u t r a l on the i s s u e of t h e Sino-Indian border 
d i s p u t e . 
The v i s i t had a l so shown t h a t one of them had no 
predatory i n s t i n c t s . ^ A week before Nehru's a r r i v a l , a 
campaign was launched by some people t h a t t he object of the 
v i s i t was to conclude a defence pac t between the two countries . 
Another group t r i e d to c r e a t e new susp i c ious by c i r c u l a t i n g 
accounts of how the t r a d e and commercial agreement with India 
was adve r se ly a f f e c t i n g the economy of Nepal, But Nehru's v i s i t 
had completely changed the atmosphere i n I n d i a ' s favour because 
the talked with utmost f rankness and touched each and every 
i s s u e and succeeded i n s i l e n c i n g the oppos i t ion group. His 
v i s i t has a l so l e n t new s t r e n g t h to Nepa l ' s e l e c t e d government 
and for the time being the danger from t h e loose ta lk and from 
^0 the a c t i v i t i e s of defeated p o l i t i c i a n s were averted.^ 
29. The S t a t e s m a n ( e d . ) , " Nepal and I n d i a " 16 June 1959. 
30. The Statesman,, Mahesh Chandra, " Nepal After the Elect ion" , 
17 June 1959-
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But even after Nehru'b visit, the opposition parties 
in some way or other were maligning, B.P. Koirala Qovernment 
for h.-is pro-Indian policy. The Executive Committee of the 
National Democratic Front which consisted of Dr.K.I.Singh's 
United Democratic Party, Tanka Prasad Acharya, Parja Parshbd 
and Ramanath Sharraa Praja Tanatrik Mahasabha, in a resolution 
said that the Nehru-Koirala joint communique had indicated! 
that J^ epal had abandoned her traditional policy of neutrality 
and instead aligned herself with India. It further stated 
that the two Prime Ministers discussed Tibet and the joint 
communique said the views of both countries on the Tibetan 
situation were identical. And since defence policy was 
complementary to foreign policy it could not be ruled out that 
the defence policies of the two countries were identical. The 
executive of the Front also complained that the joint communj 
indicated India's dominance in Nepal's development. Nepal was 
thus, the resolution added, in the process of becoming India's 
satellite. It warned the people of Nepal that the Nepali 
congress government had greatly damaged Nepal's sovereignty to 
• 5 1 
satisfy its own interests.^ 
Clarifying his statement for the consumption of the 
Nepali opposition leaders critical of the statement. Nehru 
repealed in a press conference that a paragraph in the hlthero 
unpublished letters exchanged between the Government of Nepal 
31. Tl-te Statesman, 24 June 1959. 
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and India when the 1950 leace and Frieridship Treaty was Signed 
which in effect converts the Treaty into a part of Mutual 
Assistance in case of foreign aggression. He made It clear 
that he was merely stating a position which had existed for 
over nine years. He described the statement of Kolrala in 
32 this connection as " entirely correct" . 
The Government of Nepal had adopted a very cautious 
approach to the Slno-Indian border issue and the Tibetan 
problem and was happy that her diplomacy was quite successful. 
Barring political matters, Koirala Government did not hesitate 
in collaborating with India in the economic development of 
Nepal. The Government of India was aware of the limitations 
of the Koirala Government on political issues and succeeded in 
convincing the Government of Nepal to sign the Gandak Project 
Agreement on 4 December 1959. Once again the pro-Peking lobby 
launched a mini agitation against the Government and a anti-
Indian tirade started which was based on the plea that India 
would be more beneficial than Nepal after the implimentation 
of the Agreement. The National Democratic Front, the Red 
communist Party and the Nepalese Communist Party with the 
support of National Students Federation and National Youth 
Federation had organised demonstration against the Government 
after the signing of the Gandak Agreement. 
32. Asian Recorder, Vol.V, No.LI, 19-25 December 1959, p.3061. 
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When the news of the unlawiul activities of the 
Chinese troops reached Kathrriundu, the agitation lost its 
charm. The unexpected development met severe criticism in 
the Nepalese press. Lnder tt-ese circumstances, the Prime 
Minister of Nepal paid an official visit to New Delhi on 17 
January 1960 for consulting with Indian leaders. His visit 
to New Delhi strengthen his state of mind after the discussion 
of the whole situation and the developments at home with the 
Indian Prime Minister. The Joint communique issued on 28 
January reaffirmed that India and Nepal •• have a vital 
interest in each other's freedom, integrity, security and 
progress" and agreeing that the two governments should 
maintain close consultations in matters of common interest. 
It also announced that at Nepal's request India would provide 
financial assistance to the extents of Rs. 18 crores to help 
Nepal's economi'c^ d^'evelopment. Although the communique 
mentioned only in general terms the discussions between the 
two Prime Ministers on " the present international situation 
as it affects the two countries. " They were known to have 
covered comprehensively the developments on the northern border 
of India and Nepal.^^ 
The two countries continued to maintain their close 
co-operation by sifrning a new tiheaty of Trade and Transit on 
on 11 September i960 in Kathmandu to remove misunderstandings 
33. For the text of the communique see, FAR, 1 Jan.I960. 
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regarding the old trenty of 1950. It contained fourteen 
article dealing with trade and transit facilities. According 
to the preamble, the Treaty aimed at expanding trade between 
the two countries, encouraging collaboration in economic 
development and facilitating trade with other countries. Under 
that Treaty, Nepal would continue to levy important and export 
duties on goods imported from or exported to India, India, 
however, agreed that excise duties levied on goods exported 
to Nepal would be refunded to the Nepalese Government. Both 
the countries agreed to take measures to prevent smuggling of 
their currencies from a third country and to prevent entry of 
goods passed in transit. The treaty laid down that Nepal would 
permit imports from a third country only and against her own 
foreign exchange resources. It stipulated thaf'neither party 
will issue any import license on the basis that foreign 
exchange for it will be arranged by nationals of the other 
party". If the Government of Nepal wanted to pursue a trade 
policy divergent from that of India there would be mutual 
consultations so as to ensure that there was no flow of goods 
imported from a third country into India. Official sources in 
New Delhi explained that the Treaty, if operated in the spirit 
in which it was conceivpd, might lead to the development of a 
common market between India and Nepal within a limited field 
and encourage similar arranf^ ements with other Asian and African 
countries. It was landmark in the annals of the two countries 
and gave a boost of the Indo-Nepal trade. One thing was clear 
from the treaty regarding the intensions of Indian Government. 
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She wanted to see Nepal economically stable and prosperous 
otherwise tVie Government of India had not removed the short-
comings of the 1950 treaties. India while respecting the 
feelings of the people of Nepal tried her best to accommodites 
their views and demands. 
In a surpirising move on 15 December 1950 King Mahendra 
issued a Royal Proclamation and took over the Government, 
dissolved the Parliament, deposed all the ministers and banned 
all the political activities throughout Nepal. He levelled 
serious charges against Koirala Government which according to 
the proclamation: 
Taking shelter behiind the democratic systems, 
Set aside the interests of the country and 
the people, ana wipJded authority in manner 
desi,p;ned to fulfil the individual and party 
interests only. Whereas, in defiance of 
the laws of the realm, the council of 
Ministers made an attempt to dislocate and 
paralyse the administration machinery in 
the name of investing it with speed, 
55 
smartness and competence. 
However, Nehru was not satisfied with the charges 
levelled against Koirala Government and said in the Rajya Sabha 
that " these are vague *charges and it is difficult to say o^ythtog 
about a vague charge. " ^  The Indian Press and some opposition 
34. The Hindu, 12 September 1960. 
35. Proclamation, Speeches and Messages. Vol.11, Dec.1960-65, 
H.M.King Mahendra Bi Bikramshah Eeva(Nepal Dept. of 
Publication, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,1967),p.1 
36. RaJya Sabha Debates, Vol.XXKI, No.17, 20 Dec.I960,Col.2708, 
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parties of India. The Parja Socialist Party, The eommunist 
party, Jana Sengh and Swatantra Party reacted against the 
37 
King's action and condemned it in one way or the other. The 
criticism by the Government of India and the way, the press 
and political parties reacted against the Royal take over, in 
retaliation the Nepalese press launched anti-Indian propaganda. 
The Government of India was much worried about the anti-Indian 
tirade launched in Nepal because of the tense relations with 
China. Jawaharlal Nehru on 6 January 1961 deplored what he 
called an " astonishingly virulant" Newspaper campaign in 
Nepal against India. He said, " that is what we are getting 
in exchange for all the friendship and help we have given in 
the last ten years or so" , and believed that the campaign 
had at least the passive support of King Mahendra. He also 
made it clear that India had never interfered in the inter-
national gffairs of Nepal but had given advice only,when it 
was sought and once again reiterated a belief he had expressed 
earlier that the democratic structure of Nepalese Government 
had been " suddenly overnight suppressed and described King 
38 Mahendra sei2ure of power against the concept of democracy."' 
37. The Statesmen(ed.)," Drama in Nepal'.' 17 Dec. I960 
Indian Express(ed. j, "~~k Coup in Reverse" , 17 Dec. I960, 
Times of India(ed.)," Nepal ^' 17 December I960. 
Hindustan Times (ed. ), 'H^ Jepal ", 17 December, 1960. 
38. New York Times, 7 January 1961. 
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The Nepalese Government refuted the charge of Nehru 
against the press of t h e i r country. Tulsi Gi r i , Nepalese 
Foreign Minister said that the press react ion in Nepal was 
mostly provoked by the Indian contemporaries and appealed to 
both the countries to " break the vicious c i r c l e " harming 
re la t ions betv.een r>o b^ot^•erly -i.-i !.<hDours. " The Government 
of Nepal had published a twen'v-y lour page pamphlet containing 
excerpts from the Nepalese pres.b welcoming the royal takeover 
and those containing attack on India. One of the ed i to r i a l 
wri t ings reproduced in the pamphlet questioned the propriety 
of Nehru's statement about the events in Nepal. I t asked him 
i f democracy did not end in Kcirala through the Indian President 
ac t ion , how did i t end in Nepal, where the King acted to save 
democracy. An a r t i c l e contributed to local newspaper to run 
in two piece se r i e s under the headline " what i s I nd i a ' s design" 
accused India of es tabl ishing " economic colonial i s sue" through 
the new t rade t r ea ty with Nepal. I t warned India to rest 
AO 
" content with Kashmir and Bhutan and not to cast eye on Nepal. 
In spite of the bad blood created by the press of India 
and Nepal, and charges and counter charges levelled by the 
political elites of both the countries against each other, both 
the countries were genuinely in a m§^d to curb the activities 
41 
ox these elements. 
39. Hhe Hindustan Times, 9 January 1961 
40. Ibid.. 9 January 1961. 
^^' The Hindu, 19 January 196I. 
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Under these circumstances, Dr. Tulsi Girl, Foreign, 
Defence and Palace Affairs Minister of Nepal visited New 
Delhi, from 19 to 22 January 1961. The discussions had 
covered a wide range of subjects including the suspension of 
democracy in Nepal,Nepal's economic development plans and 
Indo-Nepalese relations. After the end of visit he said 
that the purpose of his visit was to remove '• misunderstandings" 
in Nehur's mind concerning the Royal takeover. Evidently he 
did not raise in the course of his talks with Nehru the issue 
of Nepali political workers operating from India, the point 
on which it was thought he would ask for some kind of 
assurance. It seems Giri failed to convince Nehru the 
circumstances which compelled the king to dismiss Koirala 
Ministry and that was why he could not even share to discuss 
the issue of Nepali political workers with Nehru. However, 
anti-Indian propaganda continued by the Government of Nepal. 
It was expected that King Mahendra would visit New 
Delhi in March 1962 and would discuss with Nehru the develop-
ments whi.ch had adversly affected the Indo-Nepal relations. 
But on 2 February, Radio Nepal announced the cancellation of 
Mahendra*s visit to New Delhi. He had decided to cancel his 
visit to New Delhi in view of the strained relations between 
India and Nepal. The announcement said " King also called 
A2, Times of India, 20 January 1961. 
43. The Statesman,23 January 1961. 
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upon the Government of Indici to des i s t from forming the 
provocation anti-Nepal agi ta t ion in India t e r r i t o r y otherwise 
there would be a set bacK in Indo-Nepal Relations, The 
commoner, commenting on the cance l l s t ion of v i s i t said that 
favourable conditions should be created for such a v i s i t . "'^  
The cam3)aign against India was geting momentum day by day in 
Nepal. 
King Mahendra fa i lu re to curb the violence and to 
check the growing tendencies amongst the people of Nepal for 
the r es to ra t ion of democratic norms had probably compelled 
the King to rev i se h i s decision not to v i s i t India . 
On the other hand India was also very keen for the 
normalisation of Indo-Nepal r e l a t ions because of the growing 
tensions on the Sino-Indian border because of the border dispute 
with China because in tha t s i t ua t ion p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and 
peaceful atmosphere on the kingdom was v i t a l for Indian 
Securi ty and i n t e g r i t y . 
King Mahendra v i s i t ed India from 18 to 2? April 1962 
and discussed with Nehru a l l the problems which had created 
a wedge between India and Nepal. The goint statement issued 
at the end of the v i s i t on 25 AprJl said that Nehru and King 
Mahendra " agreed tnat propagandi.st publ icat ions led to 
misunderstanding" . They also decided tha t in the event of 
44. Pakistan Times, 5 February 1962. 
45. The commoner(Kathmandu), 5 Feb.1962; and also Indian 
Express(ed. ) . "Heal the r i f t " , 19 March, 196^1 
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differences of opinion between the two Governments, senior 
officials of the two countries were asked to hold Joint 
informal enquiries to establish facts. It placed emphasis 
on Indo-Nepalese interest in each others security. It also 
said that " while freedom of expression was permitted in 
India, the Government of India was against all violent or 
unlawful activities of any sort. The visit was indeed 
helpful in removing misunderstanding and miscalculations 
which were standing in the way of the good relations of the 
two countries. It had provided an opportunity to both the 
leaders to discuss each and every issue in a very cordial 
atmosphere and put Corward the respective positions of their 
Government. 
After Chinese aggression against India in 1962, China 
started persuing a policy of winrtin," over countries situated 
in the Himalayan region having common boi-ders with India, 
China has therefore, helped Wepel very much in her development 
47 
and other activities. 
Reacting to the Sino-Indian war king Mahendra on 11 
November said that this country cannot afford to be a calf 
standing between the two fighting bulls...." The conflict 
was a matter of concern and regret and added that it must be 
resolved through mutual negotiations between India and China. 
46. Foreign Affairs Record. Vol.IV, No.4, April 1962. 
47. S. Narayan, op.cit., p.69. 
48 . The Commoner(Kathmandu), 5 Feb.1962; and a l s o 
"Time t o r e l a x " , Hindustan Times of March 1962, 
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No doubt the Nepalese Government attitude was neutral on the 
conflict and it was the best cause o£ action which the 
government of Nepal had adopted. China and Nepal had signed 
a number of treaties and agreements and the former was also 
contributing much for the development plans of Nepal. 
King Mahendra had realized after the war that Nepal 
foreign policy should be based on some new adjustments and 
understandings becciuse hostility with India meant, the 
political instability in Mepai. The events in 1961-62 proved 
that India had a considerable offect on the political elites 
of Nepal who were opposing the Royal Government. 
During this period ac times differences cropped up 
between India and Nepal. Indian leaders adopted a positive 
attitudes and managed to resolve the disputes. Lai Bahadur 
49 
Shastri went to Nepal on 4th March 1963 solution were found 
to many of the outstanding disputes between the two countries. 
Later other Indian leaders also visited that country. In fact, 
Nepal is irked by what she considers to be the attitude of a 
big brother on the part of India. On the other hand, India 
is anxious to have friendly cooperation with that country. 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi visited Nepal on 4th October, 1966 to 
reaffirm her cordial foreign policy to the country and announced 
•50 
an a i d of Rs.40 c ro re s for Nepal ' s t h i r d f i v e - y e a r p l a n . •'^  
— — • • II I - ! • • nil i m i ^ M ^ — — ^ ^ M i i i i MniMw I I. • mi I II •••!• I I II .M—i II - ^ . i — . • • .1—• • III fwm^-^^-m n i i « • — — - ^ w ^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ l ^ i ^ ^ ^ — — i ^ — • » 
49. S.P. Moni, Foreign Pol icy of Nepal, Delhi 1973, p . 125. 
50. Asian Recorder , Vol .XII , no.47,- 19-25 November 1966, 
p.7404. 
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This was twice t h e amount India had con t r i bu t ed for the second 
p l a n and n e a r l y one - f i f t h of the t o t a l ou t lay proposed t o be 
expended dur ing the p l an . Mrs.Gandhi a l so assured Kathmandu 
machinery for a proposed paper f ac to ry and po in t ed out India ' s 
i n t e r e s t in t h e m u l t i - m i l l i o n k i l o w a t t h y d r o - e l e c t r i c pro;)ect 
which, according t o U.N. survey , could produce on completion 
6.8 m i l l i o n K. V^. of power and whose su rp lus could be purchased 
by I n d i a . At the end of her v i s i t , Mrs . Ind i r a Gandhi and the 
shah of Nepal agreed to cont inue t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l fr iendship 
and common t i e s of h i s t o r y , geography and c u l t u r e binding t h e i r 
c o u n t r i e s and peop le , v i t a l i n t e r e s t in each o t h e r ' s t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y , p r o s p e r i t y ana wel -be ing , while r e i t e r a t i n g t h e i r 
f a i t h in the p r i n c i p l e s of non-al ignment . 
La t e r , s t i l l , two agreements were s igned in Kathmandu 
on 19 December 1966, on the c o n s t r u c t i o n of East-West highway 
from Thsipa t o Janakpur along the sou thern t e r a i r eg ion and the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of a j o i n t p r o j e c t over the Kosi r i v e r for 
i r r i g a t i o n , power and flood p r o t e c t i o n t h a t would b e n e f i t 
some 800,000 ac re s in Bihar and 70,000 acres in Nepal . The 
highway was es t imated t o cos t some 22 c ro res and the kosi canal 
52 projec t about 70 lakhs.-^ 
51. Ski). Muni, op.cit. , p. 126 
52. Foreign Affairs Record, December 1966. 
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The c o n s t r u c t i o n with Chinese a s s i s t a n c e of the Kodari 
road and a n t i - I n d i a a c t i v i t i e s by the Chinese in Nepal notably 
a f f e c t e d both the Covernment and Mip publ ic in I n d i a . Indian 
l e a d e r s f e l t tl a t the road mic^ht be dangerous for I n d i a ' s 
s e c u r i t y because China could use the ro^d for a t t a c k on India. 
In t h e s e c i r cums tances , on July -5, 196? in t h e Lok Sabha, the 
fo re ign Affa i rs M i n i s t e r , M,C. Chag-J a sa id t h a t Ind ia was ready 
t o face any a t t a c k o r ig ina t ed by the road. 
Ind ia expressed her concern v,'ith the Government of 
Nepal a t repea ted a n t i - I n d i a n demonst ra t ions by the Chinese 
a t Kathmandu on 24 and 25 June, 1967. This was t h e second 
I n d i a n remconstrance wi th in a week a g a i n s t Chinese a c t i v i t i e s . 
After t h i s Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r , Morarj i Desai v i s i t e d Nepal 
on 22-24 October 1967, to express the concern of Ind ian 
Governments. On 1? October, 1963, P r e s i d e n t Zakir Husain went 
to Nepal t o communicate I n d i a ' s s tand and to J u s t i f y t h e 
53 a c t i v i t i e s which were a g a i n s t I n d i a , 
This was the reason why towards t h e end of 195?, India 
agreed to withdraw the Indian personne l from d i f f e r e n t mi l i tary 
check p o s t s . This s t e p was in s t rumen ta l in normal iz ing 
54 
r e l a t i o n s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s for some t ime . 
53. S.D, Muni, op. ci t . , p .2 ' ;9. 
54. V.P. Dut t , op.Ci.t. , p, 195. 
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BHUTAN 
The name of the country 'Bhutan' has been derived from 
the term 'Bhotanta' which was the ancient Indian name which 
55 
at one time stood for Tibet. - After various anglicizations 
(Bootan, Shotan, Boutan) the name was settled towards the end 
56 
of the last century as 'Bhutan'.' -^  
Bhutan's origin as a nation goes back to the twelth century 
when immigrating Tibetans subjugated the local tribes and 
established their supremacy. It took four centuries for the 
migrant Tibtan to establish clear-cut geographical boundaries 
of Bhutan and set up a politico-religious system of governance 
which was similar to that of Tibet. Ethnically, culturally and 
politically it emerged as a homogeneous entity in the seventeenth 
57 
century conducting its own economic and political relations. 
Since independence, India's foreign policy towards Bhutan has 
been unique. Bhutan had signed treaties with British India in 
1865 and 1910 accepting British control in regard to foreign 
affair, according to which Bhutan could not be placed in the 
same category as Nepal. Legally it was recognised as a. 
sovereign foreign state unlike Sikkim's " protectorate" status, 
but Bhutan could have no external relations except under British 
55. Nari Rustomji, Bhutan, The Drago Kingdom in crisis, 
New Delhi, 1978, p.4 
56. Michael Aris, Bhutan, the early history of a Himalayan region, 
Ghaziabad, 1978, p.xxiv. 
57. B.S. Das, in World Focus vol.6. No.11-12, Nov.Dec. 19B5» p.73. 
58. Nari Rustomji, op.cit., pp.B.I'^ . 
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guidance but she got an assurance of non-interference in her 
internal affairs. Bhutan occupied a vital position in British 
India's security environment. Following Communist takeover in 
China in 19^9, Bhutan proposed to India to continue to maintain 
its former position in the light of the treaties with British 
India. Eventually a treaty between India and Bhutan was signed 
on August 8, 1949. Under this treaty it was decided to follow 
a policy of friendship, neighbourliness and non-interference 
in each other's affairs. It was also decided that the Government 
of Bhutan would be guided by the advice of the Government of 
59 India in regard to her foreign relations.-^ -^  Furthermore, arms 
could be imported into Bhutan from or through India provided 
this did not constitute a danger to India, Bhutan agreed not to 
export arms either through her Government or through private 
individuals. It was PISO agreed that equal justice would be 
dispensed to nationals of either state residing in the other's 
territory and extradition facilities would be accorded whenever 
60 necessary. 
Thus Indian foreign policy towards Bhutan continued to be 
according to the previous treaties and Bhutan remained independent 
and advanced on the path of progress. Jawaharlal Nehru said in 
his speech on the occasion of his visit to Bhutan on September 23, 
1958 that India's only desire as regards their country was 
59. Madhu Limaye, Problems of India's Foreign Policy, Delhi, 
1984, p.284. 
60. Foreign Policy of India; Text of Documents 1947-49(New Delhi, 
Lok Sabha i^ e^cretariat 1959) edn.2, p. 17 
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that it should remain independent and choose its ovm road of 
progress. He added that the two countries are like brothers, 
India is the elder brother and Bhutan is the younger but all the 
same they are brothers, and brother must live in amity. 
During this visit Nehru initiated dialogue with the Mahara;3a 
of Bhutan, about the all-round development of Bhutan. Nehru 
suggested to Bhutan that she should make progress according to 
the will of her own and their foreign pressures should not hinder 
be allowed to interfere with her internal affairs. He added 
that the world was changing fast and Bhutan could not remain 
isolated but that any change Bhutan underwent should be in 
accordance with its own will and not because of the pressure of 
other countries. Again he said that the freedom of both Bhutan 
and India should be safeguarded so that no one from outside could 
do any harm to them. 
The Chinese government published a map in pictorial magazine 
of July 1958 denoting large tracts of not only Indian but 
Bhutanese territory as belonging to China, involved the territorial 
integrity of Bhutan as well. After this in October 1958, China 
sent a proposal to New Delhi that the common frontier of India 
Ax 
and China be redrawn. after surveys and talks with neighbouring 
61. O.P.Ralhan, Jawaharlal Nehru Abroad, op.cit., p. 29$, 
62. Arora and Appadorai, India in World Affairs(1957-58), 
op.cit,, p,80 
63* Arora and Appodorai, op.cit.. p,80 - 81 
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countries. But India made it clear on 2 December 1958 that 
India's international borders were settled and could not be 
a matter of negotiations. 
Jawaharlal Nehru clarified the attitude and responsibilities 
of his government for Bhutan and he said in the context on 28 
August 1959. The Government of India is responsible for the 
protection of the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan and of the 
territorial integrity of these two states and any aggression 
against Bhutan and Sikkim will be considered as aggression 
64 
against India. 
India gave technical and material aid to Bhutan. India 
also provided Ks.70 million to Bhutan for approving road commu-
nication both between the two countries as well as within Bhutan. 
The development of road communication was very helpful in the 
progress of Bhutan, India also allowed Bhutan to to use Indian 
forest roads in the border areas for her benefits. The Reserve 
Bank of India fulfilled all the foi eign exchange needs of Bhutan.^ 
Then on 7 September 1959i Nehru placed a white paper or» th^ 
tables of both the houses of p rliament aboyt, the communication 
exchanged views between the Government of India and China In 
this regard between 1954 and 1959. 
64. A.Appadarai and M.S.Rajan, or).cit. , po. 173-174. 
65. India Lok Sabha Debates, seco 
28 August 1959 ed, 4802. 
66. MMLIC, 195^-1959, white paper. 
nd series, vol.XXXIII, 
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Speaking on the subject on Premier Chou-En-Lai said on 
8 September 1959 thrit this question aid not fall within the 
scope of their discussion, r.ddinp that China is willing to 
live togethei- in fr-iendship with .'Jikkim and Bhutan, without 
committing aggression against each other, and has always 
respected the proper relations between them and India. 
In this context Nehru gave the following statement in 
Lok Sabha on 12 September, 1959.* 
I beg to differ from Premier Chou-En-Lai. 
It does very much fall within the scope 
of our present or future discussion. If 
he thinks that he can deal with it as 
something apart from Indie, we are not 
agreeable to that. We have publicly, and 
rightly, undertaken certain responsibilities 
for the defence of Sikkjm and Bhutan, if 
they are attacked. It is very necessary 
for us to understand that if something happens 
on their borders, then it is the same thing 
68 
as an interference with the border of India. 
Nehru wrote a letter to Chou En-Lai on 26 September 1959 
asking him to clarify the Chinese position in the matter. In 
this letter he said: 
67. White paper II, :5eptember-!\'ovprnber 1959, Government of India, 
Ministry of External Affairs, p.'50. 
68. Nehru Speeches, Vol.IV, op.cit., pp.214-215. 
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It is not clear to us what exactly is the 
implication of youx^  statement that the 
boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan do not 
fall within the scope of the present 
discussion. In fact, Chinese maps show 
sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of 
Tibet. Under treaty relationships with 
Bhutan, the Government of India are the 
only competent authority to take up with 
other Governments matters concerning 
Bhutan's external relations .... The 
rectification of errors in Chinese maps 
regarding the boundary of Bhutan with 
Tibet is therefore a matter which has to 
be discussed alonf:wit}-. the boundary of 
India with tl-ie Tibet re^ J^ on of China in 
the same sector. ' "^  
Prime Minister Dorji of Bhutan whole heartedly appreciated 
Nehru's statements regarding Bhutan's territory in these words: 
The Government of Bhutan situated as it 
does not possess the means to repel any 
large scale attack on its territories..., 
Bhutan is not an Indian protectorate, 
nor is there any clause in the Treaty 
between India and Bhutan relating to 
70 defence. 
During t h e S lno- Ind ian war of 1962, the Ind ian government 
s t r o n g l y c r i t i c i z e d Chinese government 's a c t i o n of f l y i n g her 
69. White Paper I I , Sept . -Nov. 1959, p .30 
70. A.Appadorai and M.S.Ra,jan, o p . c i t . , p . 175-
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a i r c r a f t in the space of Bhutan saying that the r e spons ib i l i t y 
of Indian government has been to safeguard Bhutan in her 
external a f f a i r s . In response to t h i s the Chinese government 
saidJ 
The fact tha t the Indian Government has 
once again groundlessly invented the l i e 
about so-cal led v i o l a t i o n s . . . . can only 
be regarded as an attempt of the Indian 
s i d e . . . . t o sow discord in the friendly . 
71 r e l a t i ons between China and Bhutan. 
The King of Bhutan endorsed his Prime Min is te r ' s statement 
in t h i s matter and addedl 
We have at present no roads, no t rade or 
industry . . . . We must develop our s t a t e 
f i rs t . '^^ 
In January 1965, Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shas t r i ca l led 
the King in Calcutta for a two-day meeting and considered the 
developments r e su l t i ng from the moves of Pakistan and China. 
The Prime Minister a lso talked about the economic development 
in Bhutan in t h i s meeting. He said: 
71 . Ib id , p.1755 Notes by Ministry of Foreign Affairs t o Chlna-
• PeFTng to the Embassy of India, 24 Dec.1962, White Paper,No.8,p.8 
72. A.Appadorai and M.S.Rajan, o p . c i t . , p.176;and see Indo-Bhutan 
Ehiendship by R.N.Anil, Hindustan Times, Sept.27, 1985. 
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Bhutan is an independent country and 
we have always accepted it. The King 
himself agrees that there has been 
no pressure in any matter on the part 
of the government of India, 
Thus Indian foreign policy towards Bhutan since independence 
has been to protect Bhutan against external aggression. Bhutan, 
on her part, has remained faithful to India and has been 
following a policy of friendship and cooperation towards India. 
73. KCA , Vol.15, 21-23 August 1965, p.209^6. 
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INDIA»S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The distance between India and the USA is over 10,000 
miles. The two countries have different geographical features, 
climate, races, culture, customs and manners. India and USA 
have been following different policies on international issues. 
USA had close economic link with Britain and established direct 
trade contacts with British India in 1785. -^ fter the Jay treaty 
of 1794 with BritSiin, USA realised the great importance of trade 
with India and Indian businessmen too were keen to do much of 
their business with USA because they found it to be very 
2 
profitable for them. 
At the Instance of the International Banking Corporation the 
National City Bank of New York established a branch in Bombay in 
1903 and another in Calcutta in 1904. Actually, USA was the 
second biggest trader with India, even during the British rule. 
As a result a number of the American Manufacturing Company, the 
Ludlow Jute Company, the Angus Company, the Cleveland Akron 
Company, and the Reigal Company set up their branches in India 
in the Jute industry. 
1. Foreign Policy of India, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 
1987, p.42. 
2. Hunter Miller: Treaties and other Tnternation Acts of the 
United States of America(Washington D.C., 1931), p.255. 
3. Robert A. DunnJ American Foreit^ n Investments (New York, 1926) 
p.163. 
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United States of America realized the importance of the 
Independence of India and supported Indians in getting freedom 
from British riuQed India. This was because she wanted to open 
a door for her global security in the region. She also felt 
that the prestige of USA would be enhanced, if, India got its 
independence through her efforts. The attitude of Indian 
leaders towards USA was very cordial during the period of the 
struggle for the independence of the country. India was greatly 
obliged to F.D. Roosevelt, President of USA, for his efforts to 
bring about the independence in India. Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit 
Nehru were able to get US help for the pull out of the British 
from India. President Franklin D.Roosevelt took up the issue 
of Indian freedom with the British Prime Minister, Winston 
Churchill, during the letter's visit to the United States in 
December 19^1. After this, the USA decided to send her diplomat 
to pursuade Great Britain grant freedom to India. After this, 
on March 3, 1945, William Phillips proposed a round table 
conference of Britain and India under American chairmanship and 
with America acting as a guarantor of British commitments. Great 
Britain was not ready to consldf-x^  such a proposal.-^ Britain even 
refused to give permission to Phillips to meet Gandhiji in jail* 
In these circumstances, on February 12, 1943 William Phillips-
sent a letter to Roosevelt requesting him to interrence personally 
in the British-Indian dispute. In this letter he said, that he 
4. W.Norman Brown, The United States of India and Pakistan, 
p.362 (Cambridge,1963). 
5. William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy(Baston, 1952) p.345. 
6. M.G.Gupta; Foreip:n Policies of Ma.jor World Power,Agra 1986, 
p.232. 
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had de tec ted a s u s p i c i o n on tl 'e v i c e r o y ' s pa r t with regard t o 
7 
his who asked him directly what his intentions were. 
After this, USA did not do anything against the wishes of 
Britain because she did not went to annoy h<-;i' closest ally. 
Later, Phillips sent a letter to Phillip D.Merrell, officer in-
charge of the American Mission in New Delhi, to arrange for the 
import gftindian Jute and jute products, mica and manganese to 
USA, He also suggested that different methods of purchase should 
be employed such as purchase by private agencies by the United 
Q 
States government directly and joint British-American purchase. 
In 19'^ 3» India faced a great famine. Addressing the House 
of Representatives on December -?1, 19^3, Congressman Karl Mundt 
(Republican, South Dakota) requested United States tried to 
make United Nations Relief & Rehabilitation Administration to 
revise its charter to include India, but the British government 
did not agree to allow any UMRRA help to India. 
On March ^h, 19^6, a full meeting of the Combined Food 
Board was held, chaired by U.S.Secretary of Agriculture, Clinton 
Anderson. The Indian representatives felt that USA was not ready 
to help Indians in their problems. Indian leaders were greatly 
shocked at this attitude. India's Agent General in the United 
7. FAR 1943, Vol.IV, p.189 
8. A. Gury Hope, Amer'ica & Waraj ' s ; The U.S. Role in Indian 
Independence. 
9. Congress ional Record, 89(1944) , pp.11099-11102. 
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States, Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, raised the issue of t.o 
Indian famine at the Conference of UNRRA in Atlantic City on 
March 26, 19*^ 6, •• We seek only bread and we seek it only Lo 
live. Millions of Indians were already within the uneasy 
hearing of what John Cafden, a high official in the deportment 
of Agriculture in America had described as the flutteriaj,s of 
10 the wings of the ^ngel of Death, 
Nehru requested Acting Secretary of Agriculture William L. 
Clayton that in view of very serious food situation in India 
urgently needed relief be provided to millions of starving 
11 people of India. 
In spite of such an attitudes of USA, Pandit Nehru 
broadcasting from New Delhi on 7 September 19^6, he saidi 
We send our greetings to the people of the 
United States of America to whom destiny 
has given a major role in international 
affairs. We trust that this tremendous 
responsibility will be utilized for the 
furtherance of peace and human freedom 
12 
everywhere. Indian leaders continued to 
maintain cordial relations with USA. The 
public opinion and the press both replaced 
1"^  this friendly attitude. ^ 
10. New York Times, March 21, 1946, p.14; Ten Millions Will Die. 
reprint from the Washington Post, March 15, 1946. 
11. New York Times, January 31, 19A6, p.3 
12. Nehru, speeches, Vol.1, p.3 
15. M.G.Gupta, op.cit. , p. 158. 
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Highlighting Indian foreign policy before she got her ii. . ,-tn-
dence, Nehru said that India would take full part in inlctoational 
conferences as a free nation with her own policy and not acrely 
as a satellite of another nation. Nehru wanted to get i.elp 
from all dominant countries of the world because at ths'. Lime 
India was economically militarily very weak. On January '-12, 
1947 he said: 
If we seek to be free, independent, democratic 
Republic, it is not to dissociate ourselves 
from other countries, but rather as a free 
nation to cooperate in the fullest measure with 
other countries for peace and freedom, to 
cooperate with Britian, with the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, with the United Stater^  
of America, with the Soviet Union, and with all 
15 
other countries, big and small, 
Indian political system and the political set up of ' .^A 
have been very much similar. USA is a democracy and so is India, 
If Indian democracy succeeds, the American way of life is bound 
to be strengthened. The purposes and objectives of the foreign 
policy of India and USA too, were of the same nature. For 
example, the maintenance of the sovereign and Independent states 
in the world, the pursuit of peace and security, support for 
the United Nations, support for the right of self-determination 
of nations and opposition of imperialsim and racialism etc 
14. Foreign Policy of India, op.cit., p.5 
15« Nehru speeches, Vol.!, p.22 
16. M.C.ChagIa; An Ambassador speaks, p.83 
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After India's independence, an Embassy was set up by USA 
in New Delhi for establishing close cooperation between India 
and USA and for tackling the problems facing the world. 
Emphasising a close cooperation between India and USA, Nehru 
said on December 4, 19A7t 
We shall be friends with America. We intend 
cooperating with the United States of America.,,. 
We have had, as the House knows, a distinguished 
representative of the United States here for some 
17 time past. 
The main reason for deterioration in Indo-US ties was 
America's pro-Pakistani and anti-Indian attitude. Nehru 
strongly expressed his opinion in these words: 
We have declared that tl-ie fate of Kashmir is 
ultimately to be decided by the people. That 
pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has 
supported it, not only to the people of 
Kashmir but to the world. We will not and .% 
cannot back out of it. We are prepared 
when peace and law and order have been 
established to have a referendum held under 
international auspices like the United 
Nations,''^ 
17. M.C.Chapla; An Ambassador speaks, p.S^. 
18. Security Council Official Records, (SCOR)3 yr.suppl.for Nov. 194^  
19. Nehru, speeches, Vol.1, op.cit., pp.160-161. p.139-
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On the other hand the American government and people 
have-always condeiined India for not accepting the United 
Nations' resolutions and the proposals of various UN 
Commissions on Kashmir. USA agreed to put India's case 
regarding the Kashmir issue in UNO but did not give much 
attention to the other prior steps taken by India. The 
USA and its satellites tried to pressurise Indian leaders 
20 
into changing their stand on the plebiscite issue. 
However, USA took no interest in the south Asian 
countries, including India till the emergence of a Communist 
regime in China. After the Communist victory in China, USA 
began to realise the importance of South Asia, and tried to 
normalize her relations with India. 
USA wanted India to counter-balance Communist China, 
Mr. Henry Grady, the US Ambassador in India had said as far 
back as December 1, 19^ 7 that it was " tremendously Important 
21 to keep India on our side in the world struggle. Nehru also 
emphasised the need of close cooperation between India and USA. 
Addressing the Constituent Asseuibly, he said on December 4, 
1947: 
We propose t o keep on t h e c l o s e s t terms 
of f r i e n d s h i p with o the r c o u n t r i e s u n l e s s 
they themselves c r e a t e d i f f i c u l t i e s . We 
s h a l l be f r i ends with America. We in tend 
20. SCOR, 5 y r . 463 mtg, 7 Feb. 1950, p . 13 
21 . Raghunath Kam: buper Powers and I n d o - P a k i s t a n i sub-continent , 
New Delhi . 1985, pp.fr-5. 
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cooperatinp with the United States of 
America. 
In January 19^8 however USA and its allies did not agree 
to name Pakistan as an aggressor during the debate on Kashmir 
in the Security Council. 
Non-alignment had been the keynote of India's foreign 
policy and Nehru was the chief architect of this policy. There 
is a certain ambiguity about India's foreign policy. It is 
sometimes described as 'independent' at other times a policy of 
non-alignment. It often confuses political analysts. Nehru 
himself made a self-contradictory and confusing statement an 
India's foreign policy in Indian Constituent Assembly on March 8, 
1948. 
An independent policy, is the best. V/hat that policy 
should be at a particular moment, it is very difficult for me 
or for this House to say, because things change rapdily from 
day to day. It may be that we have to choose what might be a 
lesser evil in certain circumstances.... I can quite conceive 
of our siding even with an imperialist Power - I do not mind 
saying that in a certain set of circumstances that may be the 
lesser of the two evils. 
22. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreij^ n Policy, selected speeches, 
Sept.1946-April 1961, p.?8. 
23. S.L.Popiai and Phillips Talbat; India and America, London, 
n. d. p.71. 
2k. Nehru, speeches, vol.2, p.219, 
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Nehru c l e a r l y enuncia ted a p o l i c y of non-al ignment i n 
t h e Indian Par l iament on 8 March 19^9 saying t h a t non-
al ignment did not mean avoiding c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p with other 
c o u n t r i e s . He s a i d : 
Our po l i cy w i l l cont inue to be not only t o 
keep apa r t from power a l ignments but t o make 
25 f r i e n d l y coopera teoo possiDlo». 
Nehru denied fol lowing a p o l i c y of pa s s ive n e u t r a l i t y . I n 
a speech he s a i d : 
We have to achieve freedom and t o defend i t . 
We have t o meet aggress ion and r e s i s t i t and 
t h e force employed must be adequate t o the 
p u r p o s e . . . . We a re n e i t h e r b l ind t o r e a l i t y 
nor do we propose t o acqu iese i n any cha l l enge 
to man's freedom from whatever qua r t e r i t 
may come. Wien fret dom,is menaced or j u s t i c e 
th rea tened or where aggress ion takes p l a c e , 
we can not be and sha l l not be n e u t r a l . " 
Nehru blamed the western c o u n t r i e s for looking upon that 
I n d i a ' s po l i cy of non-alignment ss a po l i cy of n e u t r a l i t y . He 
averred t h a t non-al ignment was q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from neu tra l i ty . 
Nehru l ikened a p o l i c y of pa s s ive n e u t r a l i t y as to a pe rsons 
who s i t s on the fence and cannot dec ide between r i g h t and wrong. 
25. Sr inivas C, Mundumbai; United •:3tates Foreign Po l i cy 
towards I n d i a (1947-5^) i'^ ew Delh i , 1980, p . 6 9 . 
26. Congress ional Record, 19^9, P a r t 16, A6409 
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He a s s e r t e d thnt Ind ia would not be neuti^al and the po l i cy of 
non-alignment was anything but ;. piolicy of n e u t r a l s . He said 
that Indie bel ieved in non-alignment because she f e l t that 
the only way to achieve peace i s to extend the cl imate of peace 
and to prevent the cold war spreading into tVie other part of 
27 
the worlc'. 
American policy makers were very straip_:ht forward about 
the foreign policy objectives relating to India on August 30, 
1949« Columnist Walter Lippman said that an increasing number 
of diplomats feel that India with her military and economic 
potentialities is the key to successful United States foreign 
policy for Asia, On September 25, 1949 Malcolm Hobbes of the 
overseas New Agency reported from V/ashington that " India(was) 
seen as an unparalleled opportunity for the United States to 
28 
make up lost ground in Asia. " 
India adopted a policy of non-alignment because she wanted 
to play an important role in international affairs and thus.she 
tried to avoided joining any superpower block. 
Deputy Minister for External Affairs, B.V. Keskar made the 
following statement in the Lok Sabha on March 23, 1952: 
27. Indian News(Washington, D.C.), Jan.1, 1961, p.7. 
28. New York Times, August 31, 1949-
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But however the voices of India and the United 
States may appear to differ, there is much in 
common between them. Like you, we have 
achieved our freedom through a revolution, 
though our methods were different from yours.-"^  
Originally, perhaps, it, was curiosity that impelled me 
to come here. But in later years, more and more the thought 
came to me that it was necessary, it was desirable and perhaps, 
inevitable that India and the United States should know each 
other more and cooperate with each other more. 
Indian government accorded recognition of the Red Peking 
government promptly in 19^9 as the legitimate government of 
China and established diplomatic ties with that country on 
30 December 19*^ 9, while USA ruled out recognising the new Peking 
government on the ground that Chians's Nationalist government 
was the only real and legitimate government of China.-^ -^  Thus, 
India differed from the policy of USA on the question of the 
recognition of China, After this, India, alongwith USSR 
supported China's representation in the United Nations. This 
created slight tensions between India and USA. Another reason 
of tension between the two countries has been American support 
for Pakistan in her conflict with India- However, India and 
the USA signed an agreement on 2 P'ebruary 1950, for financing 
34 
certain educational exchange programs. 
51. Nehru speeches, Vol.IT, on.196, 198. 
32. Nehru speeches, Vol. IT , n-'^ O^ , 
33. A. Appadorai and M.S.'Kajan, India's foreign policy and 
Relations, op. cit, , p.'^ iv, 
34,, United Nations, Treaty Series, No, 1?14, Vol.89, p. 127. 
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In June, 1950 the armed forces of North Korea launched an 
unprovoked attack on the 6outh Korean Republic. An emergency 
meeting of the SecurJt.y Council v.'as called at the request of 
the USA. India whole-heartedly supported the US moves for 
overcoming the Korean crisis. On June 25, 1950 the Security 
Council passed a resolution to the effect that North Korean 
armed attack was a clear case of aggression and breach of the 
peace. It called upon the parties to immediately stop 
hostilities and demanded withdrawal of North Korean forces to 
the 38th Parallel. The resolution also requested all the member 
countries to render every assistance to the United Nations for 
the implementation of this resolution and to refrain from giving 
assistance to the North Korean authorities. On 27 June, the' 
Security Council passed another resolution moved by USA. In 
this resolution the Security Council asked its member countries 
to extend help to South Korea for repulsing the armed attack 
36 
and for maintaining peace and security in the region. Both 
India and USA strongly supported the UN resolution and came 
closder to each other. In this context addressing the Indian 
Parliament, Nehru said that aggression had taken place by North 
Korea over South Korea adding that it was a wrong act that had 
37 to be condemned and resisted. India's support for UN resolutions 
35. Ved Vati Chatur-shreni; Indo-lJS Kelations, New Delhi, 1980 
p.88. 
36. A.Appador'ai and K.S.Rajan, op. cit. , pp.^?5. 
37. India, Parlianie-'ntary Debates, Vol.5, Part II, 3 August, 
1950, Col.223. 
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da'ted 25 and 27 June was greatly appreciated by U.S.A. and 
its allies. After this, India did not support the U.S. 
resolution moved in the Security Council on the Korean dispute 
on 7 July but abstained from voting on the resolution. 
Commenting on the Korean question, Nehru said that it was 
true there was aggression there and added that it was also true 
that of the parties concerned, none was wholly free from the 
blame. On 13 July 1950 Nehru sent a letter to the American 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheason, in which he mentioned Indian 
59 
attitude regarding Korean issue. India also wanted China s 
seat in ttie Security Council; Nehru thought that China, USSR 
and USA should cooperate to resolve the Korean conflict. 
This attitude of India was not appreciated by USA. Thus 
relations between India and USA became bitter. U.S.A. criticised 
Indian stand regarding the Korean crisis. In this context, 
addressing t?ie Indian Parliament, Nehru said on 3 August 1950: 
The best assistance India could render in that 
grave crisis was to help limit the area of 
conflict and to try to end it. 
He added that to provide military assistance v/as beyond India's 
40 
capacity and that such assistance, would make little difference. 
38. Nehru, speeches, Vol.1, 1949-53, pp.121-125-
39. Dept. of State Bulletin(Washington) Vol.3, 31 July 1950,p.170. 
40. India, Parliamentary Debate, Vol.5 part 2,4 August 1950, 
Col.371. 
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She voted against another American sponsored General 
Assembly resolution securing China as an aggressor. In 
this way India differed from USA on the issue of the 
Korean crisis. Disagreement on this issue between the 
two countries continued till the year 1951* 
Notwithstanding differences on political issues, 
India continued to receive aid from USA in economic and 
technical fields. 
In 1951 India asked the United States for a loan on 
easy terms for the purchase of two million tons of grains 
from American stocks. -^  US agreed to give the aid under 
Indo-American Technical Cooperation Agreement of 1951* 
U.S.A. was of the opinion that economic aid must be 
provided to India to check Communist influence. In this 
context Senator Fergusson expressed his view asi 
We expect our negotiation authorities to 
bargain whole heartedly and realistically 
to serve our vital interests in obtaining 
41. Deptt. of S.B. (Washington) Vol.23, 31 July, 1950, p. 170 
42. M.G.Gupta, op. cit. , p.244. 
43. Indian Emergency Assistance Act, 1951, op,cit,, p.2-5, 
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these materials in exchange for the 
grain which India needs so desperately. 
Although economic aid wss sanctioned the President of 
U.S.A. was authorisea to terminate any aid if he found it 
inconsistent with the national interests and security of the 
country, U.S.A. also made generous contribution to India to 
overcome her food shortages. In addition, India continued to 
receive aid from the various American foundations like Ford, 
Rockefeller, Carnegi etc. It may be noted that this generous 
economic aid was given to win over India to the American side. 
India continued with her policy of getting economic aid 
from abroad, but preferred to follow a policy of non-alignment. 
Consequently, Eisenhower administration decided to give military 
aid to Pakistan. This embittered relations between India and 
U.S.A. Conflicting views of the two countries on the issue of 
colonialism tended to increase this bitterness. While the USA 
advocated an evolutionary approach tc the problem of colonies 
and supported the colonial pov/ers wherever nationalist movements 
were dominated by the Communists forces India supported people 
of all colonies against colonial powers irrespective of ideology, 
for example, on the issue of the independence of Indonesia, the 
two countries were opposed to each other. On the issue of 
44. Congrt-ssional Tiecord, 82nd Congress, 18th session, May 16, 
1951, p.5410. 
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Coloniala3m, Nehru said on June 1?, 1952.' 
I attach the greatest importance to the 
United Nations but I must repeat that 
the United Nations has swerved from its 
original moorings and has gradually-
become a protector of colonialism in an 
45 
indirect way. This is a danp;erous deviation. 
India was annoyed with the attitude of USA in her dispute 
with Pakistan over Kashmir. Though USA had accepted the 
validity of Kashmir's accession to India, she supported Pakistan 
on the issue of the tribal invasion aided and abetted by Pakistan 
and refused to agree with India's stand that this was an act of 
aggression. India felt that this action of USA was unjust. 
Nehru declared that the United States had taken a " strangely 
narrow view" in that matter. He added that when there was 
•Communist* threat to Greece and Turkey, the US reacted promptly 
while criticizing Communif^ t China for its attack on Korea, it 
refrained from criticizing Pakistan for its similar action 
against Kashmir, In this context Jawaharlal Nehru said In 
March 1954 that United States had not only condemnly refrained 
from the Pakistani aggression but also tried to dissuad India 
46 press the issue in the interest of peace. 
45, Nehru, speeches, Vol.II, p.318. 
46. Kunni Krishnan, The Unfriendly friends, India and America. 
New Delhi, 1974, p. 129. 
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Indian relations with UoA were greatly worsened due to 
the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between USA and Pakistan 
which was signed on 1Q May 195-^ . Under this agreement, US 
and Pakistan agreed to abide by the principles enunciated in 
the UN Charter and asserted that their participation in 
individual and collective self defence agreements was in 
conformity with the Charter. U3 also undertook to give arms 
aid to Pakistan. This action of USA was bitterly criticized 
by Indian leaders. Such criticism has been going on since that 
time because the US government has been consistently giving 
military aid to Pakistan. In this regard Jawaharlal Nehru said*. 
If we object to military aid being given to 
Pakistan, we would be hypocrites and 
unprincipled opportunists to accept such 
aid ourselves. The aid created a grave 
48 
situation for us in India and for Asia. 
Indian leaders have been of the opinion that US arms aid 
to Pakistan was not in the interest ol peace in the subcontinent, 
Nehru called upon Asian govcrnTientfa not to accept US military 
aid. He felt that such military aid would lead to imperialism 
in hegemony in Asia,^ Responding to this criticism of US 
Military aid to Pakistan President Eisenhower assured India that 
the arms would not be used against India, Eisenhower sent a 
letter to Nehru promising US help to India. In this letter he 
47. The Statesman, 20 May 1954, p.1 
48. A.Appadorai and M.S.Rajan, op. cit. , p.?29. 
49. Hindu. 1 Feb. 1954 
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said: 
I am confirming publicly that if our aid 
to any country, including Pakistan is 
misused and directed against another in 
aggression I will undertake immediately.... 
appropriate action both with and without 
the UN to thwart such aggression. 
At first, the US government wanted to win over the 
the 
countries of/subcontinent by providing military and economic 
aid to their governments. Another factor responsible for 
American interest in the sub-continent was the problem of how 
to prevent Communists from establishing their foothold in the 
sub-continent. The USA government felt that the Communist 
governments — Red China and USSR would gain control of 
Pakistan by political means. 
Soviet leaders N.A.Bulganin and N.S.Khrushchev visited 
India in 1955. They criticised the USA attitude and that of her 
allies of creating disunity in the region. They also condemned 
European colonial powers, particularly the Portuguese for not 
freeing their Indian colonies of Goa, Daman and Dieu which 
were an integral part of India for centuries. In the same year 
the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles visited Portugal 
and supported Portuguese domination over Indian territory. He 
said that Goa was a province of Portugal and not a colonial 
51 possession. 
50. Department of State Bulletin, Voi.30, 15 March 1954, p.401. 
51. •department of State Bulletin, Vol.33, 12 Dec. 1955, p.967 
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In February 1956, the President of India, Dr. Rajendra 
Prasad, addressing a joint session of Parliament said: 
My Government deeply regret the reference 
made by the Secretary of State of the 
United States to the Portuguese conquests 
abroad as 'provinces' of Portugal and the 
further implications that they are an 
integral part of Portugal iteself. 
Many Indian leaders also crticised American attitude of 
supporting Portuguese claim on Indian soil. Jawaharlal Nehru 
said that the US attitude was unfavourable to India. He said 
in the Lok Sabha, that he entirely agreed with those who thought 
5? that it was a very serious matter with far-reaching consequences. •^' 
In March 1956, John Foster Dulles visited India with the inlention 
of reducin/r tension betwpen the two countries. He said to the 
Indian Prime Minister that the US did not support Portugal against 
India.^^ 
After P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower 's term was over t h e new P r e s i d e n t 
of t h e US Mr. Kennedy declared t h a t h i s country did not accept 
Por tuguese claim on Goa. The P r e s i d e n t wrote a l e t t e r t o Ind ian 
Prime M i n i s t e r , Jawahar la l Nehru saying the US regarded these 
t e r r i t o r i e s as c o l o n i e s and not as Portuguese overseas p rov inces . 
At t h e same t ime, the US government put p r e s s u r e on t h e Por tuguese 
5A government to p u l l out from Indi a. 
52. Lok Sabha Debates . Vo l . 9 , Par t I I , 5 Dec.1955, co l . 1282 . 
53. A.Appadorai and M.S.Rajan, op. c i t . , p . 2 3 3 . 
54. New York Times, 18 Dec. 1961. 
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In 1958 United States of America provided Indie a lo 
of 325 mill ion and gave another £ 3250 million to Indif. 
enable her to buy wheat under PL-480. Then, on 4 May 19o 
the US governjTjerit (.-ntered into an agreemont with India fo. ,je 
l a r g e s t t ransact ion ever made by the United States with a.,_ 
country under PL-430, amountin^^ to £1,276 mil l ion. 
The President i<-ennedy sent a l e t t e r to the Prime Min. v^r 
of India on 14 December I96I asking him not to use force t 
capture the Portuguese colonies because t h i s was l i k e l y t. 
endanger peace. He reminded Jawaharlal Nehru that the In._..a 
government had been adopted a policy of non-alignment and 
peaceful co-existence and added t h a t mi l i ta ry action was •< j i n s t 
the Indian a t t i t u d e of solving outstanding in te rna t iona l p; ::;lem 
by peaceful methods,^ On 18 December 1961, the Security .,v.,uncil 
took up the dispute between India and Portugal over Goa an J other 
portugues possession in India. This meeting was convened i.'c the 
instance of the US and i t s s a t e l l i t e s who wanted to p res su , i se 
India in to not taking mi l i t a ry act ion against Portugal for pu l l ing 
out from the Indian s o i l . At the meeting of the Security Council, 
r epresen ta t ive of US, Adlai E. Stevenson, strongly condemned 
Indian mi l i t a ry ac t ion , which he sa id , was t o t a l l y against her 
own p r inc ip le of using only peaceful method for dealing with 
55. His tor ica l S t a t i s t i c s of the United Sta tes : Colonial Tiihes 
to 1970, part"7X'.Washington, 1975) p.STTi 
56. New York T imes , 15 Lec.8. 18 D e c , 196I . 
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such problems. However, India asserted her right to take 
military action to end colonialism in India, although she 
agreed to continue her affairs to resolve the dispute by 
57 peaceful means. 
Addressing a press conference on 18 December 1961 in 
New Delhi, Nehru said " It was no pleasure to us to undertake 
armed action, but the Portuguese left no choice open to us. 
Although relation between India and the USA had deteriorated 
because of their conflicting position on the issue of Goa, 
this state of affairs did not last long for many years. The 
US Secretary of State, Lean Rusk, said at the beginning of 1962 
in an interview that the US wanted better relationship with 
59 India and also agreed to give her economic and financial aid. -^^ 
In the Sino-India clash of 196^, the US and its allies 
showed great interest in India. US took a serious view of 
the Chinese invasion of India and offered military aid as well 
as air-umbrella to India to check the tide of Chinese aggression. 
The US government agreed to provide extensive military assistance 
to India, in spite of the protest lodged by Pakistan. Pakistan 
was not happy with the US government for giving arras assistance 
to India because she felt that her own security was endangered 
57. A.Appadorai and M.S.Rajan, op.cit. , p.?35. 
58. B.N.Chakrawarty, India speaks to America, Calcutta, 1966, 
p.186. 
59. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol.46, 22 Jan.1962, p.124. 
60. New Hork Times, 22 Oct. 1962. 
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by this move. However, the US clearly stated that India would 
have to resolve the Kashmir problem with Pakistan. In this 
connection, it is worth mentioning that the first consignment 
of US arras reached India on 3 November 1962 after a pact between 
62 India and US has been signed on November 14, 1962, In addition 
arms, the US also provided twelve C-130 Hercules transport 
planes with American Crews to ferry troops and equipment to the 
border battle regions. The president of US also proclaimed on 
20 November 1962 to send the American mjssion under the super-
vision of Assistant secretary of state for far Eastern Affairs, 
Averell H.Harrimann, to India to enquire of the Indian needs for 
long term. 
On 19 November 1962 India secretly requested the US for 
'American fighting air support' to defend India's defenceless 
cities in the crucial time. Besides as assistance, the President 
64 Kennedy urged the Great Britain to send air defence to India. 
The US government has always tried to help India in every 
crucjal time. In 1964, the UnJted States of America extended 
65 its economic assistance of £ 864 million. Thus, India continued 
to receive aid from the USA in economic and technical fields. 
The USA has alv/ays given assistance mainly with a view to win 
India. 
61. C.P» Bhambhri, op. c i t . , p . 3 7 , A.Appordorai and M.S.Rajan, 
op. c i t . p . 230. 
62. D.R.Mankekar, The g u i l t y man of 1962(Bombay 1968) , p , 6 4 . 
63 . Dept, of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , American fo re ign p o l i c y , 1 9 6 2 , 
TWashington D. C. 1963) p . 1020. 
64. C.Theodre, Kennedy(London 1965), n. 63 , p.665« 
65. HSUS, Colonia l Times t o 1978 P t . 2 , p . 8 7 3 . 
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Thus, it is clear that Indo-American cooperation has 
been extended from time to time. However Indo-American 
relations continued to be at low key in some situations. 
There has not been much hostile attitude in close 
cooperation between the two countries. At present Indo-
American cooperation has started improving than the past. 
Indian foreigTn policy in ery cordial in these days. 
C h a p t e r - VI I 
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE 
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
-155--
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST 
REPUBLICS 
At the outlet before going into details of India's 
foreign policy towards Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
after achieving independence it seems necessary to give its 
background in brief. During the British rule, India 
considered the U.S.S.R. a threat to India's security. However, 
Indian leaders did not accept this view of the Britishers. 
So far as the British Government was concerned, it almost 
always maintained that there was a serious danger from Russia 
to India's security. As Jawaharlal Nehru expressed himself 
in the following words on the issue: 
'We have grown up in the tradition, carefully 
nurtured by England, of hostility to Russia. 
For long years past the bogey of a Russian 
invasion has been held up to us and has been 
made the excuse of vast expenditure on our 
armaments. In the days of the Tsar we were 
told that imperialism of Russia was for ever 
driving South, connecting an outlet to the sea 
or may be India itself. The Tsar has gone 
but the rivalry between England and Russia 
continues and we are now told that India is 
threatened by the Soviet Governement. 
Thus, Indian leaders did not follow the policy of the British 
Government because this policy was that of a dominant imperial 
power of the world. 
1. Jawaharlal Nehru, Soviet Russia: Some Random sketches & 
Impressions, Bombay, 1929, p.191 
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The Editor of Kesri, Mr. R.G.Tilak observed that Lenin"3 
foreign policy did not aim at annexing any foreign territory 
or interferring in the internal affairs of any state, adding 
that all this led to the conclusion that the only true devotees 
2 
of the principle of self-determination were the Bolsheviks. 
Mahatma Gandhi pronounced his views about the Russian revolution 
in the following words: 
There is no questioning the fact that the 
Bolshevik ideal has behind it, the purest 
sacrifice of countless men and women who 
have given up their all for its sake, and 
an ideal that is sanctified by the sacrifices 
of such master spirits as Lenin cannot go 
in vain: the noble example of their renun-
ciation will be emblazoned for ever and 
purify the ideal as time passes. 
Giving expression to the fear of Russian aggression on 
India Viceroy Chelmsford asked the leaders of the Indian 
National Congress to give up their agitation and join hands 
with the British in meeting this alleged Bolshevik menace, 
Gandhiji replied to this sayingi 
I have never believed in Bolshevik menace 
and why any Indian Government should fear 
Russia, Bolshveik or any menace. 
2. Kes, Poona, 20 July 1920 cited in ^ardesai S.G.Indie And 
the Russian Revolution, New Delhi, 1967, pp.21-26. 
3* Young Indie, 15 November 1928, p.7-
4. Cited in Prasad, Bisweshwar, Our Foreign Policy Legacy, 
New Delhi 1965, P-7. 
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Gandhiji said this even though he did not feel sympathetic 
towards the U.S.S.R. 
The impression of the Russian Revolution on the bulk 
of Indian leaders was most clearly reflected in the attitude 
o£ Jawaharlal Nehru. He took a lively academic interest in 
the scientific viewpoint of Marxism as an interpretation of 
history. Besides, it is worth pointing out that his fasci-
nation for Marxism was confined to its broad features rather 
than to its fine points. At no time could he be termed a 
doctrinaire Marxist. Gandhi's influence reinforced his 
dislike for violence. His adherence to democratic values was 
always very strong. For him the central problem was how to 
combine democracies with socialism, how to maintain individual 
freedom and initiative and yet have centralized control and 
planning of democratic life of the people on the national as 
well as the international plane. 
Nehru took part in the Conference against Imperialism in 
Brussels on 9th and 10th February 192? and he visited^ USSR 
with favourable impression on him. After returning from USSR 
he said: 
5. Jawaharlal Nehru: Discovery of India, p.560. 
6. O.P. Ralhan, Jawaharlal Nehru Abroad, Delhi 1983, p.2; 
and also Vinod Bhatia, J.Nehru & making of Indo-Soviet 
Relations, 1917-^7, New Delhi, 1981, p.67. 
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I must confess that the impressions I 
carried back from Moscow were very 
favourable and all my reading has confirmed 
those impressions, although there is much 
7 
that I do not like or admire. 
Nehru also observed the strategic geographical 
situation of India and felt the importance of the USSR as a 
neighbouring country. He highlighted the significance of 
the USSR in these wordst 
Russia cannot be ignored by us, because 
she is our neighbour, a powerful neighbovir, 
which may be friendly to us, or may be a 
thorn in our side. 
Later, Nehru was greatly impressed by the support the 
USSR lent in removing the struggles for sending colonialism 
and Imperialism from all over the world. In one of his 
speeches, he said; 
And Russia, v^at of her. An outcast like 
us from nations and much slandered after 
erring. But in spite of her many mistakes, 
she stands today as the greatest opponent 
of imperialism and her record with the 
nations of the East has been just and 
9 generous. 
7. Jawaharlal Nehru, Soviet Russia: Some Random Sketches and 
Impressions, Bombay^ 1^2^, p.3^. 
8. Ibid., p.3^ 
9. J . B r i g h t . e d : Before and After Independence. Delh i ,1950, 
p.66. 
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Nehru thought that like India, Russia too, had a 
backward agricultural economy and an outdated social order 
before the October Revolution. In this context he said that 
if Russia found a satisfactory solution for these, the task 
10 for India would be made easier. Nehru considered socialism 
as a system which was being more suitable for the India 
environment than capitalism. He asserted that in the interest 
of the people of India must try to follow the peace-loving 
and anti-aggression policy of Russia. On 4th February, 1936, 
Nehru spoke of Ffussians in these terms: 
With regard to Soviet Russia, the first 
proposition is that there is no power in 
the world today vs*iich is more peaceful and 
less inclined to aggression than Soviet 
Russia. T thjnk that is admitted by 
11 
everybody. 
Presiding over the forty ninth session of the Indian 
National Congress in 1936 Nehru advocated a policy of align-
ment with the socialist and nationalist forces in the world 
struggling against imperialism and fascism. He remarked: 
10, Soviet Russia, SRSI - p.4 
11- J. Bright, ed: op^ cfit. , p.66 
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We see the world divided into two vast 
groups today - the imperialist and fascist 
on one side, the socialist and nationalist 
on the other. There is some overlapping 
of the two, and the line between them is 
difficult to draw .., Inevitably we take 
our stand with the progressive forces of 
the world which are ranged against fascism 
and imperialism, 
Nehru ennuaciated his attitude towards USSR in these 
words: 
Some glimpse we can have of this new 
civilization(socialism) in the territo-
ries of the USSR. Much has happened 
there which had pained rae greatly and 
with which I disagree, but I look upon 
that great and fascinating unfolding of 
a new order and a new civilization as 
the most promising feature of our dismal 
age. If the future is full of hope it 
is largely because of Soviet Russia and 
what it has done, and I am convinced 
that if some world catastrophe does not 
intervene, this new civilisation will 
1 5 
spread to other lands. 
Developments in Russia greatly affected Nehru. However, 
he did not agree with some policies of the USSR. The German-
Soviet Non-aggression Pact in 1939 perplexed him. He uttered 
12. Report of the Forty ninth session of the Indian National 
Congress, Allahabad, pp.9-12. 
13. Ibid. , p. 9-12 
-161-
his disagreement thus: 
As the war progressed, new problems arose, 
or the old problems took new shape,.., the 
old standards to fade away. There were 
many shocks and adjustment was difficult -
the Russian-German Pact, the Soviet's 
invasion of Finland, the friendly approach 
of Russia towards Japan* Were there any 
principles, and standards of conduct in 
this world, or was it all sheer opportunism. 
When Hitler attacked Russia, Nehru and the Indian 
15 
National Congress expressed sympathy towards the USSR. 
Nehru continued to follow a policy of maintaining relations 
with both capitalist and socialist countries 
because he wanted India to play an important role by adopting 
a policy of non-alignment. 
The Indian National Congress started thinking of getting 
Russia's help in pushing the British out of India because it 
was aware that a new type of government had been set up in 
the USSR. Some Indian leaders went to Russia for getting help 
from her in their struggle for freedom. But they could not 
succeed in receiving aid from USSR for that country had 
achieved independence after a long struggle and was not in a 
position to the Indian people by supplying arms to them or 
oust .r 
helping them in other ways to/the British from India. 
1A. Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, London, 1953, p.609. 
15- Congress Bulletin, 5 Feb. 1942, p.5. 
16. H.Kapur: Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-27, Geneva,1965, 
pp,230-232. 
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In his first broadcast as the head of the Interim 
(li.vernrripnt Jawaharlal Nehru, sent India's greetings to the 
people of the USSR. He said on Sept,7, 1946: 
They are our neighbours in Asia and 
inevitably we shall have to undertake 
many common tasks and have much to do 
17 
with each other. 
He added: 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
is another mighty country which is 
playing a tremendous part in the world, 
not only a mighty country, but, for us 
in India, a neighbouring country. 
Tt is clear from the above statements that he wanted to have 
close association with the USSR because he thought that it 
was a powerful country and could play an important role in 
maintaining peace and harmony in the world and would also 
be very helpful to India in the future as she was India's 
neighbour. 
Jawaharlal was of the opinion that India and the USSR 
should develop closest possible ties with each other, Conse-
(pently, Indifi established diplomatic links with the USSR on 
April 13, 19A7. After that Nehru sent his sister as Indian 
17- Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches, Vol.1, New Delhi, 1983, p.3. 
18. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, selected speeches, 
Sept. 19A6,April 1961, New Delhi, 1971, p.6 
19. r-iv ' atesmaiuNew ).>eM<i, April 16,1947, p«l; ana also 
Niii.tn.-i la Joshi; FQuridation of Indo-Sovlet Relations,New 
belhi, 1975, p.1/8; and also Rasheeduddin KhantIndia and 
Soviet Union, New Delhi,1975, p.27. 
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20 Ambassador t o Moscow. On 25 June 19^7 Mrs.Vijaylaxmi P a n d i t , 
WCJS appointed Irjidia's f i r s t Ambassador to the USSR. He sa id 
t h a t Ind ia in tended coopera t ing both the United S t a t e s of 
21 America and with the Soviet Union. . He ©aid t h a t the Sovie t 
Union being I n d i a ' s neighbour , she s h a l l i n e v i t a b l y develop 
not 
c l o s e r e l a t i o n s with i t and cou ld /a f fo rd t o an tagon i se i t . 
Thus, Ind ia r e a l i z e d being the d e s i r a b i l i t y of f r i e n d l y 
vnth her mighty neighboui-^s, China and USSR are most powerful 
>:ounlries c lo se t o Indian border . Ind ia could not ignore t h e 
f:eographical s e t t i n g in which she i s s i t u a t e d . 
Nehru a p p r e c i a t e d USSR for promoting peace in t h e world. 
He thought t h a t Russians might be he lpfu l i n t h e s t r u g g l e for 
the freedom of I n d i a , Indian l e a d e r s c a l l e d a Conference of 
Asian n a t i o n s which was held from March 23 t o Apr i l 2 , 19^7. 
Ind ia was anxious for t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of Russians in t h a t 
-conference. 
After g e t t i n g independence, India could not get much 
sympathy from USSR because the Sov ie t Union was not happy with 
I n d i a ' s po l icy of non-al ignment . USSR a l s o thought t h a t Ind ia 
20. Statesman, 25 June 1947, p . 1« 
2 1 . Nehru I n d i a ' s Foreign P o l i c y , o p . c i t . , p . 28 
Foreign Po l i cy of I n d i a , Lo''^  Sabha S e c r e t a r i a t , N.Delhi , 
1^57. p . l5 
' ? . K.P.S.Menon, Many Worlds, An Autobiography, Oxford 1964, 
pp .229-30. 
^'>• Kess lng ' s Contemporary Archives(London), 4-11 Oct. 1947, 
p .8852. 
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was close to USA and its allies. The Indian leaders 
observed: 
Though she received formal independence, 
India has neverthless remained dependent 
on the British imperialists and finds 
herself increasingly bound by the US 
imperialists. Key positions in her economy... 
are under the control of British capital... 
Contrary to India's national interests, 
her Government is impelling the country 
into ever greater economic bondage to the 
United States, and is hampering the 
development of trade relations with the 
Soviet Union arid the People's Democracies. 
India also Joined the British Commonwealth. This was another 
reason why USSR became unhappy with India. Stalin did not 
like the Indian Ambassador accredited to Moscow and did not 
send any condolence message to India on the assassination of 
25 
Mahatma Gandhi on 30th January 19^. 
The USSR joined India in condemning the Butch aggression 
over Indonesia. However, USSR was reluctant to see India as 
play an Important role in solving the problem of Indonesia. 
On the occasion of the presidential speech Nehru said in New 
Delhi inaugurating the eighteen nations conference on Indonesia 
on January 20, 1949J 
?A. New Times, no,22, 31 May 1950, p.30, no,32, U August 1948, 
pp.9-15, and no.3, 12 Jan 1949, pp.8-12. 
25. M.Saleem Kidwai, Indo-Soviet Relations, New Delhi,1985,p.40 
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Our primary purpose is to consider how 
best we can help the Security Council to 
bring about a rapid and peaceful solution 
of the Indonesian problem. 
In December 1949 India recognised Red China. This also 
contributed to India's co-operation towards USSR. The USSR 
was also appreciated the role of India inside and outside 
the UNO as an anti~coloni a] power. 
Addressing the Supreme Soviet on 8 August 1955 Malenkov 
said; 
Of great importance for the promotion of 
peace in the £ast is the attitude of so 
big a country as India. India has made a 
substantial contribution to the efforts of 
the peace-loving countries to stop the 
Korean war. Our relations with India are 
growing firmer and cultural and economic 
intercourse with her is becoming wider. 
We hope that relations between India and 
the Soviet Union will become stronger and 
develop in a spirit of friendly cooperation. 27 
Later, India and the USSF^  signed a trade agreement on 
2 December 1953.^^ 
India's decision to welcome the developments in Greece 
and her stand on Korea caused differences between India and 
26. Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol.1, op.cit. p.327. 
27. New Times, no.33, 1953. supplement, p.15. 
28. India's Trade agreements with other countries; As in 
force on Dec.15, 1953 (N.D. 1954), pp.l46-56v and also 
Zafar Imam: Ideology and Reality in Soviet Policy in Asia» 
Ludhiana, 1975, p.52. 
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l.'SoK- India also opposed the Communist revolution in Malaya 
find this was not liked by created the USSR. However, after 
some time developments in Korean resulted in a change in 
India's atLitude towards the USSR. India played its role 
as a non-aligned force in this regard. The USSR was much 
impressed by the efforts of India to bring about ceasfire in 
Korea and her refusal to brand Red China as an aggressor. 
Stalin died on 5 March 1953* Expressing his sorrow on the 
death of Stalin Nehru said that he was a man of great stature 
who moulded the destinies of his age and proved himself great 
in peace and war. USSR also changed its policy after the 
death of Stalin. The USA and its satellites were annoyed with 
the non-alignment of India, John Foster Dulles, US Secretary 
of State was of the view that " those who are not with us are 
against us" . The USSR adopted a policy of neutrality in 
international conflicts involving India. She was silent on 
the issue of Kashmir till 1955.^° 
The Russians realised the significance of newly indepen-
dent non-aligned countries by observing the policy of those 
who are not against us are for us instead of the American 
attitude of those who are not with us are against us. The 
USSR felt that India's support would be for her benefit as 
well as for that of her allies. -^  
?9. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.1, Pt.11, March 6, 1953, cols. 
1568-70. 
50. Ibid., p.39 
31. K.F.S.Menon; The Flying Troika, p. 3'9< and also Raghunath 
Ram: rjovjet Policy towards Pakistan, New Delhi, 1983, 
pp.62-63. 
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The Russians acknowledged that India's wishes should 
be respected in any conference where the future of the Asian 
people was being discussed. The USSR voted in the General 
Assembly political Committee to include India as a participant 
in the Conference on Korea, while USA opposed this move. The 
representative of USA, Malotov said: 
Who can deny that a country like India 
with a population of more than 300 million 
people, has entered into a new, historic 
arena? Not long ago India was a colonial 
country. But now nobody can deny that 
India is occupying a very important olace 
among the countries which are consolidating . 
their national independence and striving 
to secure weighty place in world affairs, •^~ 
The USSR also suggested the name of India for the membership 
a neutral nations commission to supervise the ceasefire in 
Indo-China. From 195^ onwards the Soviet Union worked for 
the inclusion of India in all international forums on dis-
armament. For example, it called in 195^ ^ for the addition 
of the Communist China, Czechoslovakia and India to the UN's 
Disarmament Commission. 53 
Nehru visited Russia from 7th to ?3rd June in 1955 
to seek cooperation and help from USSR. He was warmly 
received in Russia. On this occasion, Nehru said: 
32, New Times, No.2A 195^ supplement p.A 
35. Statesman, 21 April 195^ ,^ p. 1 
3A. O.P. Ralhan, op.cit., p. 138 
-168-
I do not claim that, we can achieve big 
objectives in world affairs but all of 
us can help a little in lessening 
tensions which itsell is a step in the 
right direction. 
He felt that his visit of the USSR would be helpful in 
reducing world tensions and would also bring Indian closer 
to the USSR, After arriving at Moscow he said: 
We did not understand some of the develop-
ments in your country, even as you might 
not have understood much that we did ... 
We should endeavour to remove all walls 
and barriers to the growth of our minds 
and hearts, such as come in the way of 
international cooperation. There is no 
reason why different countries having 
different political or social or economic 
systems should not cooperate in this way, 
provided there is no interference with 
each other and no imposition or attempt 
-ze. 
to dominate. 
India also signed a trade agreement on 2 i'ebruary 1955 with 
the USSR for the setting up of a modern integrated iron and 
steel plant at Bhilai. 
35. At a press conference in New Delhi on 30 May 1955, FAR 
New Delhi, vol.1, no. 5, May 1955, p. 102. 
36. Ibid., 22 June 1955, Vol.1, no. 6, June 1955, pp.13A-35. 
37. FAR, Vol.1, no. 2, Feb. 1955, pp. 32-37. 
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On June 1955 talks between the leaders of India and 
the USSR showed that there were cordial relations and better 
understanding between them. They also agreed to follow the 
principles of Panchsheel. The joint communique issued by 
them on the occasion said: 
The essence of true coexistence in which 
both Prime Ministers have profound faith 
Is that states of different social 
structures can exist side by side in peace 
and concord and work for the common good.... 
The two Prime Ministers, taking note of 
the mutual benefits of such cooperation, 
will seek to promote and strengthen 
relations between their two countries in 
the economic and cultural fields as well 
as in that of scientific and technical 
research. i 
India wanted close cooperation .' with the USSR because she 
felt that close ties of the two countries would be helpful in 
maintaining world peace as well as, Indians security. India 
and the USSR condemned the Western countries for extending 
military aid to Pakistan.^ 
Towards the end of 1955 Rulganin, the Soviet Prime 
Minister and Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party, visited India and were accorded a tremendous 
58. A.Appadorai 8< M.S.Rajan, op.cit. , p.265 
39. Ibid. , p.265 
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welcome. This visit helped to strengthen Indo-Soviet 
: ri eridshj p. They supported India on the Goa issue. The two 
leader's delivered various speeches on economic and political 
issues. Bulganin expressed his views a joint session of the 
two Houses of Indian Parliament on 21 November 1955 in the 
following wordsj 
In the long run, we are striving for the 
same objectives: to lessen international 
tension, to preserve and strengthen peace, 
to prevent war, and to save mankind from 
its horrors; to guarantee the undisturbed 
work and joys of peaceful life for the 
peoples throughout the world. 
India had to reassure the wor3d that there was no change 
in its policy of non-alignment or neutrality and that she was 
not becoming communist. In this regard Nehru said at an open 
air rally for the Soviet visitors, on 29 November in Calcutta! 
Controversies have arisen in other countries 
about the consequences of the visit of the 
Soviet leaders to India. They ask*. Is India 
aligning herself with the Communist countries 
and the Soviet Union? Is she giving up her 
policy of non-alignment and neutrality?... 
People in many parts of the world seem to 
think that if you are friendly with one 
person, that means that you are hostile and 
inimical to the others - as if you can only 
^0. Hindustan Times, 22 Nov. 1955, p.*^ -
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be friendly with one to be hostile to 
another. The area of friendship should 
not be confined by a wall of hostility. 
That is our national and international 
outlook, and that is the real bsis of 
the policy of neutrality or non-alignment 
41 that India follows. 
India acquired a crucial position in Soviet foreign 
policy and external relations, Bulganin his favourable 
impression of the Indian visit while addressing the Supreme 
Soviet Bulganin said in the following words; 
Our visit to India has brought our two 
countries still closer.,.. This great 
friendship we shall continue to develop 
42 
and strengthen. 
Similar views were also expressed by Krushchev, Ha said: 
We set much value on our friendship with 
India.... Both we and our Indian friends 
would like to develop and strengthen 
these friendly relations without in any 
way hanning India's and Soviet Union's 
relations with other countries... We 
fully understand and support the position 
of the Indian leaders who have decalred 
that India maintains a neutral position 
43 between us and the other states. 
41, FAR, Vol.1, no. 12, Dec,1955, pp.250-53-
42. Speeches and Official Documents, Noveratoer^ December 1955» 
New Times 1955. 
45. K.C.A. , 21-28 Jan. 1956, pp. 1454-55-
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Thus it is evident that Indian foreign policy towards USSR 
>'jh Iremendously chanKed after the visit of the two Soviet 
leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev, and that India had an 
important place in Soviet forei-tn policy. 
In the second half of 1956, during the Suez crisis, 
India along with the USSR, condemned the aggression on Egypt 
and callled for efforts to halt aggression and resotre peace. 
India took a firm stand in the UNO to condemn the aggression. 
Criticising the Ango-French action Nehru had said: " In all 
my experience of foreign affairs, I have come across no 
grosser case of naked aggression than what England and 
France are trying to do." India also offerred her 
soldiers for the UNO Emergency Force in Egypt to look after 
45 the implementation of the Egypt-Israeli armistice. The 
Suez, crisis concided with a revolt in Hungary. India, 
declined abstained from voting on an American resolution 
which demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops, from that 
country and holding of elections under the auspices of United 
Nations. When the Soviet Union intervened and crushed the 
revolt, India condemned the Russian attitude as, "a gross 
and brutal exercise of violence and armed might against weaker 
countries" . However, Government of India did not agree to 
the demand of the opposition parties that she should not 
recognise the Kadar Government in Hungary. The gulf that was 
44. The Hindu, Madras, 1 November 1956. 
45. FAR, Vol.11, no. 11, Nov. 1956, pp.74-75. 
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caused between USSR and India on the issues was soon bridged. 
A meeting of All India Congress Committee was held in November 
1956 in Calcutta at which a resolution was passed stating its 
strong resentment and disapproval of the invasion of Egypt by-
Israel and the armed action taken by the UK and France against 
Egypt with a view to imposing their will on her. On the issue 
of Hungary resolution said that in that country there was civil 
conflict involving considerable loss of life, as well as the 
use of foreign armed forces and hoped that the foreign troops 
in Hungary would be withdrawn and that the people of Hungary 
would decide their own future by peaceful methods, . Speaking 
on the resolution Nehru saidJ 
If countries which are militarily weak are 
to be threatened by more powerful countries, 
then we revert to the rule of brutal might 
and law of the jungle. All our declarations 
of peaceful co-existence and respect for 
integrity and independence of nations, non-
aggression, non-intervpntion and mutual 
respect, which we have repeated so often, 
have no meaning left and the world reverts 
to international barbarism. 
Again, in November 1956, addressing the Lok Sabha on 
the question of the Suez and the Hungarian crises, Nehru 
said: 
A6, Asian Recorder, 10-16 Nov.1956, p.1129 
U7. FAR, Vol.11, no.11, Nov.1956, p. 173 
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In regard to Hungary, the difficulty 
was that the broad facts were not clear 
to us. Also the occurrences in Hungary 
took place in a moment when suddenly the 
international situation became very much 
worse and we had to be a little surer and 
clearer as to what had actually happened 
and what the present position was .... 
I made it perfectly clear, first, that 
foreign forces should be removed both 
from Egypt and Hungary, although the two 
cases are not parallel; and secondly, 
that the people of Hungary should be 
given the opportunity to determine their 
future.^® 
India supported the resolution of the Columbo Powers which 
met on 12-14 November 1956 saying that the Soviet forces 
should be withdrawn from Hungary speedily and that the 
Hungarian people should be left to decide their own future 
and the form of government they wished to have, without 
A9 
external intervention from any quarter. Thus India strongly 
criticized the Israeli and Anglo-French attack on Egypt, and 
this was appreciated by USSR. She also opposed Soviet 
involvement in Hungary, but even then India's relations with 
the USSR remained cordial on the whole. 
48. Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches, Vol.IIl(New Delhi 1983) 
pp.321- 2 2 
49. FAR, Vol.11, no. 11, Nov.1956, p.176 
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India's attitude regarding the question of election in 
Hungary was expressed by Nehru. He said that: 
Elections under UN auspices was contrary 
to the UN Charter and would reduce 
Hungary to less than a sovereign State. 
He added that any acceptance of inter-
vention of this type and foreign 
supervised elections would set a bad 
precedent which might be utilized in 
50 future for intervention in other countries. 
Nehru had in mind the issue of Kashmir for which he wanted 
Soviet support. After the indication of Nehru, Bulganin 
said: 
We believe that at the present moment 
which is of such a great importance to 
the fates of the states and people of 
the East, the voice of India in the 
defeHice of immediate and effective 
measures against the aggression and 
your personal prestige could play an 
51 
outstanding part. 
52 When on 5th January 1957 , Eisenhower was suggested a formula 
to solve the problem of West Asia, Nehru, alongwith some leaders 
of the region condemned it and supported the proposal advanced 
50. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.IX, no.3, Part III, 16 Nov.1956, 
Col. 265-66. 
51. FAR, Vol.11, no.11, November 1956, p.173 
52. The Hindustan Times, Jan.7, 1957, p.7 
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by the Soviet Union which cnlled for the pulling out of 
foreign troops from the Kiddle East. 
Indian Parliament passed a resolution on 22nd and 27th 
May 1957 asking the big powers to stop nuclear tests. In 
June 1957 USSR supported India's move to send the delegate 
to the 5-power Disarmament Commission which was held in 
London. Nehru spoke in Parliament as the issue of Bisarma-
m en t a s I 
I suppose that the basic issue which perhaps 
governs other matters is that of disarmament.... 
All kinds of proposals have been made, but 
the fact is that at the present moment, again, 
the Disarmament Commission faces a deadlock.... 
It is not our desire to push ourselves in 
these committees or commissions, but naturally, 
we would like to help, we are prepared to 
do so. 
The representative of Soviet Union appreciated the Indian 
attitude of arms control. On I4th November 1957 India moved 
a resolution regarding arms control before the General 
Assembly. USSR supported the Indian move. Similar attitudes 
in such matters helped in bringing India & the USSR closer. 
On the subject of India's attitude towards the USSR 
and China Nehru had the following to say in the Rajya Sabhat 
53. Ra.lva Sabha Official Records. Vol.18, No. 18, 9 Sept. 1957, 
cols. it193-9A. 
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I can say with complete honesty that 
there is not the remotest chance of 
India being afraid of Russia and China, 
or India havinp, tmy conflict with 
Russia or China- T am not saying on 
any kind of sentimental or even idealist 
basis but purely on political grounds. 
Even if we differ, if we are opposed in 
various policies, neverthless there will 
54 be no conflict. 
The above statements of Nehru reveals that Indian relation 
with USSR was very cordial, at least during this period. 
The attitude of USSR towards Yu!2;oslavia of pressurising 
the latter to remain in Soviet camp shocked Nehru. Tito did 
not like the Soviet stand and Nehru was fast friend of Tito. 
Nehru expressed his strong feelings on the issue in May 1958. 
Khrushchev responded by saying the Indian ambassador to 
Moscow that he hoped India wc-uld let the USSR and Yugoslavia 
55 their ideological disputes in their own way.-^ -^  
When the crises in Jordan and Lebanon broke out in 
July 1958, USSR wanted India to keep aloof on the issues, 
American and British troops reached Lebanon and Jordan to 
prevent a possible uprising similar to that which had already 
overthrown the Iraqi government. On this occasion, addressing 
54. Ra.jya Sabha Official Records, Vol.19, No. 19, 12 Dec. 1957, 
C( 
(a o a 
:or.W6. 
55- Menon, The Flying Troika, p.?.08. 
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the Indian Parliament Nehru said and India did not accept 
that foreign troops should be used in any territory adding & 
there can be no settlement and no return to normalicy until 
56 foreign troops were removed. Thus Nehru made it quite 
clear that in his opinion foreign troops should not interfere 
in West Asia. 
USSR wanted India's friendly cooperation but she did 
not like any criticism on India's oart of her or her allies. 
The policy of non-alignment was proved to be a cause of 
tension between USSR and India. Conflict between Yugoslavia 
and the USSR created apprehension in the minds of Indian 
leaders. The attitude of the USSR perplexed Nehru and he 
could not help expressing his annoyance publicly to the Soviet 
leaders when Imre Nagy and his supporters were executed in 
Hungary. On this Hungarian tragedy Nehru expressed himself 
In regard to the recent execution in Hungary 
of Imre Nagy and some of his colleagues, I 
was shocked when I learnt of it, and I have 
expressed my deep distress over it. It is 
obvious that this has resulted in passionate 
feelings, charges, countercharges, and an 
increase in tension so that, in effect, it 
has taken us back from that movement towards 
a lessening of tensions. I think it has 
57 been very unfortunate. 
56. Lok Sabha Debates. Pt.2, Vol.18, No.4, 1A August 1958, 
col.865. 
57. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Selected 
speeches, 1946-1961 (New Lelhi 1983) p.563. 
-179-
The Soviet leaders were annoyed with Nehru's statement over 
the execution of Imre Nagy- Nehru made the following comment 
on Communism in practice' 
We see the growing contradictions within 
the rigid framework of Communism itself. 
Its suppression of individual freedom 
brings about moral reactions. Its contempt 
for what might be called the moral and 
spiritual side of life not only ignores 
something that is basic in man, but deprives 
human behaviour of standards and values* 
Its unfortunate associations with violence 
encourages a certain evil tendency in human 
beings,^ 
Although Nehru accepted the view of Communist that Capitalism 
was based on violence and conflict, he said that Communists 
themselves were guilty of imposing the views by means of 
violence and did not like those who did not agree with their 
views. " The USSR was worried over this harsh comment against 
Communism and did not think it proper to remain silent. 
It is import^ ant to note that in the year 1959 relations 
between the USSR and- China became tense. During the same 
period China occupied some areas of land in India. This 
became a matter of grave concern for India. Thus China became 
58' The Basic Approach, AICC Economic Review, 15th May 1958, 
pp.3-6-
59. Ibid,, pp.3-6 
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the main cause of concern for both India and the USSR. So 
both the countries started maintaining close cooperation 
with each other. However, it does not mean that it was only 
because of the apathetic relations of USSR with China that 
India extended its cooperation to the USSR. 
The Soviet Union agreed to give an aid of Rs.95.2 million 
to establish four plants for the production of synthetic 
chemicopharmaceutical preparations, antibiotics, and basic 
surgical instruments. Another project covered by the Soviet-
Indian agreement of May 1959 was the establishment of a fifty 
million surgical instruments factory near Madras. 
In 1959 India's relations with China became bitter because 
China began to capture some area^ of Indian land. After this 
action of Chinese government TASS said on 8th September 1959 
that the Soviet Union had amicable relations with both the 
countries i.e. India and China. 
Addressing the Press Conference on 21st October 1959 
Nehru said: 
I consider the USSR first of all as 
having reached nonrialcy after a 
revolution. Secondly, I consider the 
USSR a territorially satisfied power... 
But China has not gathered over the 
fil first flush of its revolutionary mentality. 
60. J.A.Naik, Soviet Policy Towards India, Vikas, New Delhi 
1970, pp.174-5? and also V.K.R.V.Rao & Dharam Narayan, 
Foreign and India's Economic Development, p. 45. 
51. The Hindustan Times. Oct.22, 1959, p.1. 
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It is worth mentioning that the 1959 edition of the 
Soviet World Atlas (Atlas Mira) delieneated India's 
international borders .as south of Slkkiro and Bhutan instead 
of the north ad depicted in Indian maps. The 1959 Atlas 
Mira, like the 1955 edition, depicted the Aksai Chin areas 
of Ladakh, South East Bhutan, and NEFA as Chinese territories. 
Obviously, this hurt the feelings of the Indian nationalists 
and had a adverse effect on Indian policy towards USSR. 
However, KhriAShchev, submitted in his report to the third 
Session of the Supreme Soviet on 31st October 1959 Khurscheve 
expressing his concern about the border disputes between India 
and China and said that this crisis should be tackled by 
. T 62 
peaceful means 
In November 1959 Nehru spoke in the Parliament on Indo-
china border issue: 
There is a marked difference between the 
broad approach of the USSR to world problem 
and Chinese approach. I do not think 
there is any country in the world which is 
more anxious for peace than the USSR. And 
I think that is the p;eneral view of people -
even of their' opponents. But I doubt if 
there is any country in the world which 
63 
cares less for oeace than China today. 
62. Ms. Khrushchev's report to the Third Session of USSR, 
Supreme Soviet on 31 Oct.1959, p.20. 
^3. Lok Sabha Debates, Pt.2, Vol.25, No.10, 27 November 1959, 
col. 2206. 
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A statement on the issup on 2^-'n6 December 19^ 39, by the 
USSR was silent on whether she was sunnorting or criticising 
the Chinese government on its stand is the disputes Indian 
government felt that the Soviet attitude was very heloful 
for its security. Nehru interpreted this statement of the 
Soviet Union by saying that, considering everything, the 
statement was a fair one and an unusual one for the Soviet 
Government to sponsor. Thus Indian Government highly 
appreciated the helpful attitude of the Soviet Union on the 
Issue of Indo-China conflict. 
However, a number of Indian leaders were unhappy with 
this state of affairs. They give exerted their pressure to 
new shape to India's foreign policy. They felt India's 
Security lay the aligning with the Super Powers but Nehru 
was totally against Joining military alliances of either of 
the Super Powers. He thought that India should be aloof from 
their power politics in the interest of her own security. 
The high level visits took place In early 1960, 
Vorshilov, President of the Supreme Soviet and Khrushchev paid 
a visit to India, The President of India usually does not 
receive high dignitaries. But on this occasion, President 
was present at the airport to welcome them. Thus it is clear 
that Indian Government desired close cooperation with the USSR, 
At a civic receiption to Khrushchev at Calcutta, Nehru said: 
64. The Hindustan Times'. September 12, 1959, p. 1 
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The most important thing which he has 
done and which has impressed all of us 
is that he has kept the flag of peace 
flying in the world. He has spoken in 
favour of peace at many places and has 
worked for it« This is a cause in 
which in India are especially interested.... 
We want friendship with your country and 
with your people. 
During this visit, Khrushchev expressed his support for India's 
policy of non-alignment. India and USSR agreed on the issue 
of total disarmament. Both the countries assured each other 
of everlasting friendship and cooperation. Nevertheless, 
Khrushchev objected to the multi-party system in India. 
Addressing the Indian Parliament he said that the multi-party 
system should not exist because it was harmful for the society. 
In June 1960 Dr.Rajendra Prasad, the President of India 
visited the USSR, The Soviet President enthusiastically 
received him and said: 
Warm friendship and wide cooperation between 
our governments and peoples is very bright 
evidence of the fact that nothing can stop 
the irresistable longings of the progressive 
forces from establishing new relationship 
based on principles of peaceful co-existence 
between the countries. 
65. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp.579-80. 
66. The Hindu, 21 June 1960. 
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Addressing at a Soviet-Indian friendship meeting Dr,Rajendra 
Prasad said* 
The USSR and India had shown to all 
sceptics and cynics on rip^ ht and left 
that two great countries, adhering to 
different traditions and to different 
philosophies, can cooperate freely and 
successfully in furthering not only 
the improvement of the well-being of 
the people, but also the consolidation 
of peace. 
When Dr.RaJendra Prasad met his Soviet counterpart, the 
latter said that their friendship was greatly promoted by the 
58 
exchange of visits between Soviet and Indian Statesmen. 
However, Indian policy differed with that of the USSR on 
the Congo crisis, Congo had got its independence in June 1960. 
Prior to this it was a colony of Belgium. Shortly after 
independence the army of Congo revolted against the Belgian 
officers. The USSR and other Communist countries like China 
and Czechoslovakia supplied war material to Lumumba, the Prime 
Minister of Congo, which the Western Powers supported Tshomba, 
who was pro-Belgian and thereby encouraged Belgians to return 
in Katanga and Kasai provinces. The Belgians took advantage 
of this situation and sent their armies to Congo on the 
pretext of maintaining law and order and saving the civilian 
67. The Statesman, July 1, I960, p.9-
68. The Hindu. 1 July I960. 
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population. The Congo government requested the Security 
Council to " protect the national territory of Congo against 
the present external aggression which is a threat to inter-
national peace. " '^  India and the USSR were both of the 
opinion that the Belgian troops should be pulled out from 
Congo. On July 14, I960, the Security Council passed a 
resolution by which Belgium was asked to withdraw its troops 
from Congo. The resolution also authorised the Secretary 
General to send a peace-keeping force to Congo which was to 
be raised by the UN and was to consist of contingents from 
29 nations excluding the two Super Powers. While the USSR 
was against the deployment of UN force in the Congo, the 
Indian Government was in favour of this move. But she did 
not agree to participate in the contingents of 29 nations 
because she felt that if the UN failed in the Congo, it would 
be a disaster not only for the Congo but for the whole world? 
it would fade away in the Congo and its reputation would 
continue to suffer. But later on, India agreed to send an 
array brigade at the disposal of the UN for service in the 
Congo because the UN agreed India to do so. India desired 
from the Secretary General that her forces should not intervene 
with the forces of any member country of the UN except that 
of Congolese and Belgians, India also laid stress that the 
brigade should function as a unit by itself and not be linked 
70 
with other units. 
69. The Statesman, 1"^  July 1960, p. 1. 
70. T.A.Nizami, The Communist Party and Indian Foreign Policy, 
New Delhi 1971, pp.201-202. 
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7 1 In February 14, 1961 , Lumumba was murdered in the 
province of Katanga. A report published in the USA in 1975 
by a Senate Committee to study Governmental operations of 
intelligence activities by the American stated that the CIA 
72 
was behind the murder. This created world-wide sympathy 
for the Congolese and Soviet Union was worry at this tragic 
em] of Lumumba, After the murder of Lumumba, differences 
arose between India and the \Jb3R on the question of how to 
tackle the Congo crisis. Speaking against the murder of 
Lumumba, Nehru said that he was not in agreement with the 
Soviet stand demanding immediate withdrawal of the UN forces 
from Congo. He said on Feb.13, 1961 in the Lok Sabha: 
If all the United Nations Forces are 
withdrawn from there, the United Nations 
ceases to function there and will withdraw 
itself. If that happens, the consequence 
will not only be a continuing civil war 
but there would also be the danger of 
outside powers coming; in a big way to help 
their respective ccuntries or those whom 
they acknowledged, which would be a very 
7^ 
serious thing. 
Nehru condemned the external aggression in Cuba on 
April 20, 1961. He said on April 20, 1961 in Rajya Sabha that 
71. A.A.Gromyko and B.N.Ponomarev(ed), Soviet Foreign Policy» 
Vol.11, 1917-1980, Progress Publishers(Moscow 1981),p.282. 
72. Ibid., p.282 
73. Jawaharlai Nehru, Ind ia ' s Foreign Policy, o p . c i t . , p .523' 
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he thought that there should be no intervention from any side 
in Cuba, and that It should be left to work out its own destiny; 
Thib shows India's incllnalJon towards the USSR rather than 
towards the USA, which brought Indin and USSR closer once again. 
Disagreements arose between India and USSR on the 
Secretary General's role in the Congo crisis. The USSR sharply 
critised the General Secretary's handling the dispute of Congo 
and also asked for his dismisal. However, Nehru appreciated 
the role of the Secretary General for having acted with " vision 
and wisdom". Later, on 31st August 1961, he expressed his 
appreciation for General Secretary and the United Nations in 
these words on April 20, 1961 in the Rajya Sabha*. 
I would like to express on behalf of the 
Government our appreciation of the steps 
which have been taken broadly by the 
United Nations in the Congo. 
Although in the UN, India voted against the motion of the 
seating of the Congolese President Kasavubu's delegation 
supported by the United States. In short, there was differences 
of opinion between the USSR and India on Congo crises. India's 
interference on Congo issue also shows the actual policy of 
non-alignment freedom of action. However, in spite of these 
divergent views between India and the USSR, they continued to 
7k, Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.588. 
75. Lok Sabha i-^ ebates, No-15, 51 August 1961, col. 5929. 
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76 
maintain r e l a t i ons of friendship and cooperation. 
Nehru paid his third v j s i t to Moscow on September 6-11, 
77 
1961 after attending the Summit Gonference at Belgrade. On 
his arrival in Moscow, Khruschev, the Soviet Prime Minister 
expressed his views In these words'-
I believe the present visit and exchange 
of views on the most important problem 
of the present international situation 
will lead to a further development and 
strengthening of good relations and 
cooperation between the Soviet Union 
and India in the interest of peace among 
nations. 
he 
Further/added that the friendship between the Soviet Union 
and India was a reliable and durable friendship, which had 
stood the test of time. Nehru wanted to< discuss some new 
problems such as nuclear test ban treaty, the achievements of 
non-alignment summit and getting economic aid from USSR. 
Nehru said that he hoped their contacts would continue and 
that there would be more meetings and exchange of views on 
world problems. 
During this visit Khrushchev expressed warm feelings 
of friendship on behalf of the Soviet people for the people 
of India. He said to Nehru during the few days he had spent 
76, New Times, No. 10, supplement 1961, pp. 3^ -^58. 
77. O.P. Ralhan, op.cit., pp.370-37?. 
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in the capital of the Soviet Union he must have noticed that 
the people of the Soviet Union nurtured the most sincere 
7R feelings of friendship towards the people of India. 
Nehru had a discussion with the Soviet leaders on the 
German issue, and the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru agreed 
with Khrushchev that the fact of existence of two German 
states could not be ignored for the time being and that any 
attempt to change the frontiers would have dangerous conse-
79 quences. . 
Nehru agreed that only s oeaceful solution of German 
An 
was desirable. Nehru did not want to interfere on the 
question of German Democratic Republic and USSR for their 
handling of territory and population under control. Indian 
attitude on the Berlin crisis was one of supporting the stand 
of the USSR.®^ 
On 18 iJecember 1961, Brezhnev supported the Indian 
stand claiming sovereignty over Goa. Khrushchev sent a cable 
to Nehru stating that the bold action of the Indian Government 
to remove the outpost of colonialism in its territory was 
quite r'easonable and legal. Western countries did not want 
78. IbW. , p. 37^ 
79. Foreign Policy of India, Text of Documents, p.506-7 
80. The Hindustan Times, 20 May 1965, p.6 
81. Ra.iva Sabha Debates, Vol.KXXV, 23 August 1961, col. 1379. 
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Goa to be merged with India. ror t h i s purpose they moved 
a resolut ion in the Security Council, This resolu t ion was 
vetoed by USSR. The Soviet representa t ive argued tha t 
I n d i a ' s act ion was according to the pr inc ip les of the UN 
op 
Charter. 
The Indian leaders and people were grateful for the 
Soviet support for India on the issue of Goa. Nehru and 
other Indian leaders appreciated Khrushchev statements. They 
noticed a welcome change in Soviet policy towards India. The 
attitude of the Soviet Union was not favourable to India 
during Initial period of Indo-Chinese conflict in October 
196?, but this did not affect cordial ties between the USSR 
and India, 
When China attacked on India in 1962, the USSR did not 
say anything for two days. On 30th October 1962 the USSR 
supported China's proposals in General Assembly and said 
India should accept this. India was sorely disappointed at 
the attitude of the Soviet Union. 
On November 9, 1962 Nehru expressed his appreciation 
of tlie assistance for USSR that since the letter had changed 
its attitude and had agreed to cooperate with India in helping 
MargreT" W.Fisher, Asian Sulvey^ Vol.ll, no. 2 , 
82. Institute of international studies, University of 
California(April 1962), p.3-
83. The Hindustan Times. 31 Oct.1962, p.1. 
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her to manufacture " MIG" fip;hter planes which clearly 
showed that the Soviet Union supported India in her conflict 
with Red China. On 12th Lecember 1962, addressing the Supreme 
84 Soviet, Khrushchev made a speech on the conflict of Sino-India 
in which he expressed his sharp criticism of Chinese troops 
and his support for the stand of India. Khrushchev said! 
Since the .^hinese are withdrawing, would 
it not have been better not to have moved 
forward at all from the position on whiich 
they stood at that time. 
With the collaboration of USSR, India set up the Oil 
and Natural Gas Commission in 1963<> So, it may be seen that 
oil exploration was started in India with the help of the 
Soviet Union. Many Indian geologists, geophysicts and 
drillers have been trained with the help of the Soviet Oil 
specialists. 
Among the developing non-communist countries India was 
the first one to be a trading partner of the USSR. It was 
India,after the U.A,R. and the Mali Federation started having 
such relations with the Soviet Union. 
In January 1964 Pakistan pointed out the Bogey of 
threat from India on Kashmir dispute. Participating in the 
84. N.S.Khrushchev's report on USSR in Dec. 1962. 
85. Political Affairs, New York, Jan.1963, pp.27-61. 
86. V.P.Kadyshev, Vneshnaya Torgovlya,SSSR, p.34 
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discussion of the Security Council the representative of 
the USSR said that the position of Kashmir belonging to 
India had already been settled by the people of Kashmir. 
Western countries were egging Pakistan on to raise the 
problem of consensus on the issue but the USSR and 
Czechoslovakia were not ready to agree to this proposal. 
Thus the resolution moved in the UN relating to this by the 
Western powers was kept in abyance due to the fear of veto 
from USSR. Thus, Indic'-i and the USSR came closer to one 
another while Western countries tried to harm India. 
In the Press Conference addressed by Nehru on May 22, 
1964 Jawaharlal Nehru spoke regarding the issue of Soviet 
Transmitter. He stated that he had nothing to say about it 
except that they had made a proposal and this was being 
considered. 
To conclude, although there were some divergence of 
opinion from time to time between India and the USSR, they 
were never hostile towards each other. Rather their ties 
were strengthened, based on harmony anc\ mutual cooperation. 
87. Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches, Vol.5, p.222. 
C h a p t e r - V I I I 
C O N C L U S I O N 
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India's foreign policy during the British Raj and 
after has remained idealistic. Thus India's approach of 
non-alignment Just after her independence was misunderstood 
by the Super Powers. The policy of non-alignment was a new 
venture in a world divided into two compartments and had 
its own risks. Perhaps this was the reason that the People's 
Republic of China could dare to attack India in 1962 and it 
could receive very little aid from the Super Powers to meet 
this contingency. It was at that time, the then Prime 
Minister of India Pt*. J. L. Nehru realized the bet royal of 
China of the world outside. India could no longer depend 
on out side help, and had to strengthen her defences, 
•c-spjite her foreiqn lolirv i xini tat. i ons she succeeded in 
managing economic and technical aid from the countries of 
both the Power blocs. Later as blamed that India's membership 
of the Commonwealth had to some extent soften her stand 
towards issues relevant for third world development. However, 
as Nehru explained, membership of the Commonwealth was 
advantageous to India without affecting her Sovereignty. 
India opposed the policy of racial discrimination and 
condemned the policy of apartheid of the South Africa Govt. 
She could also clearly initiate her issues on Rhodesia. 
Thus the membership of the Commonwealth helped India providing 
facilities in raising issues of particular reference. However, 
she has enhanced her prestige in international sphere through 
her policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. India 
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has been able to make an impact on international politics. 
She has succeeded in creatinp; a sense of increasing partici-
pation of Asian and African states in international affairs. 
India has also won the trust of the world, which is 
evidenced by the fact that she was invited to take up 
responsibilities by the world body in Korea, Indo-China and 
Congo. India has also openly expressed her opinions on the 
various international issues like naked aggression of France, 
Britain and Israel in Suez and Soviet interference in Hungary. 
Thus India has made efforts to contribute quite a bit to the 
reduction of tensions in the international sphere. However, 
despite all odds, India has consistantly supported the 
dependent countries and opposed their exploitation by colonial 
and imperial powers. For example, when the Dutch tried to 
re-establish their hold over Indonesia, an appeal was made by 
India and other South-Asian countries to the Security Council 
that ultimately resulted in the recognition of Indonesia's 
independence. She also supported the cause of Libya, Tunisia 
and Algeria, India has also upheld the principle of Co-
operation and Co-existence between states following different 
political systems. She has always reposed faith in the United 
Nations and has supported the principle of the settlement of 
disputes through peaceful means. 
Similarly, she co-operated with U.N. on the issues of 
Korea-Indo-China, as well as those of the Labanese border and 
Congo. 
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India has envinced sppcinl interest in developing 
close relations with otbpr Asian Countries. For this 
purpose she convened Asian HeJatlons Conference in 19^7 and 
19^9 at New Delhi and was one of the sponsors of Bandung 
Conference of Afro-Asian Countries in 1955. 
India was against the division of countries like 
Palestine, Korea, Indo-China and Germany because she was 
fully aware of the implications of partition. Ever since, 
the creation of Pakistan, India's relations with that country 
have never been cordial. The initial bitterness was created 
mutually by the partition of the country. Moreover, some 
other factors responsible for tension between two countries 
are as follows: r 
Pakistan, entered into military alliances like Baghdad 
Pack and SEATO with a view to strengthening her position 
vis-a-vis India. Pakistan got much military assistance in 
the name of the communist threat but actually this aid was 
used against India during the conflict of 1965 and US did 
nothing to prevent Pakistan from doing so. After India's 
relations with China worsened Pakistan entered into agreement 
with China and handed over large portions of Indian territory 
to China through a treaty. Pakistan got huge assistance in 
the form of financial loans, technical assistance and military 
help from China. During the Indo-Pak War in 1965 Pakistan 
received full support frcim China, 
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Kashmir issue has continued to strain relations between 
the two countries since 19"^ ?- After independence, Kashmir's 
Initial response takint^  side with India through a treaty of 
19^7 was not acceptable to Pakistan which started applying 
pressure and encouraging armed Pathans to invade Kashmir. 
In subsequent years efforts were made to solve this issue but 
these efforts came to nought. India's policy towards Pakistan 
is based on the unstated assumptions that it should be made 
to realize the futility of her policy aiming at parity with 
India notv;ithstandlng the disparities between the two in 
regard to size population and resources and that Pakistan 
should be persuated to give up its policy of confrontation 
against India. Both countries have attempted to improve their 
mutual relations but so far much progress could not be made 
in this direction. 
Flelations between India and China were very cordial till 
the outbreak of hostilities between the two in 1962. India 
was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic 
relations with the Communist Government of China and pleaded 
her case for the membership of the United Nations. Not only 
this two countries adopted the famous five principle of 
Panchsheel in 195^. Relations between India and the People's 
Republic of China ceased to be cordial after India gave asylum 
to Lalai Lama was fled from Tibet following an uprising there 
which was suppressed by China. Since than, China has continued 
with her hostile policy to\yards India, She also mounted 
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full-f ledged at tack in 1962 which ended in a military-
debacle for India. During the conf l ic t , India got ass is tance 
from U.S.A., U.S.S.R. desisted from doing anything against 
India. Subsequently Afro-Asian countries effor t with the 
help of proposed Colombo Plan to bring once again these 
countries together remain f u r t i l e as India was ready to 
accept the plan in festo but China expressed ce r t a in r e s e r -
vations about i t . 
The Indo-Chinese confl ic t led to the choice r e l a t ions 
between China and Pakistan, This was also harnriful for Ind i a ' s 
secur i ty , China and Pakistan concluded an agreement regarding 
the boundary by which i t gave away large port ions of Indian 
t e r r i t o r y to China which resulted in huge f inancial and 
mi l i t a ry ass is tance to Pakistan. China's ambition to 
dominate South-East Asia and her asp i ra t ion for the leadership 
of the Communist World, also affected Indo-Chinese re la t ion . 
Sr i Lanka has developed a d i s t i n c t i v e c i v i l i s a t i o n and 
yet India has influenced her very g rea t ly . This has created 
re l ig ious a f f i n i t i e s between the two countries side by side 
with a shared colonial experience of the l a s t two centur ies . 
The Sinhalese perception of re la t ionsh ip with India i s also 
influenced by the fact that Sri Lanka, an island Just over 
65,000 kms in area , has a giant for a v i r t u a l l y sole neighbour. 
In 19'^ 9» Sri Lanka joined India in condemning Netherland's 
mi l i ta ry designs in Indonesia with simaltaneous denial of 
t r a n s i t f a c i l i t i e s to Dutch mi l i ta ry a i r c ra f t and vesse ls . 
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The Sirimavo Shastr i agreement of 1964 was a major step 
towards resolving the problems of the Indian migrants 
s e t t l ed in the is land. But, the agreement was not imple-
mented by the Government of Sri Lanka. The problems of 
the Indian Tamils who had s e t t l ed these s t i l l remained the 
same. Thus, Ind ia ' s re la t ions with Sri Lanka could not 
be cord ia l . 
Ind ia ' s r e l a t i ons with Nepal and Bhutan have been 
cord ia l . India concluded an agreement with Nepal in 1950 
which was extended in 1960. India also signed a t r e a t y 
with Bhutan in 19^9 which involved close cooperation between 
the two countr ies . Thus, Ind ia ' s foreign policy towards 
Nepal and Bhutan has been of mutual cooperation and under-
standing. 
India was indebted to [(oosevelt for his support in 
her s t ruggle for freedom. However, the USA took no In t e r e s t 
in South Asia after-19^7 because she adopted an ant i - Indian 
a t t i t u d e on the Kashmir issue in the secur i ty council . The 
USA also wanted India to join mi l i t a ry a l l i ances sponsored 
by her. Their differences were widened due to the conf l ic t ing 
a t t i t u d e of the two countries on various i ssues . Conflict 
between the two countries was inevi tab le as they looked at 
t h e i r national i n t e r e s t s d i f fe ren t ly Indie believed tha t 
her i n t e r e s t s could best be served by following a non-aligned 
pol icy, i . e . the policy of not joining e i ther of the power 
-199-
blocs , since she needed peace and aid from a l l countries 
for the tremendous task of reconstructing the country. But 
to the United S t a t e s , the inevi tab le danger to her secur i ty 
arose from the expansionist pol ic ies of communist Russia, 
Therefore i t was busy gainirjg a l l i e s and concluding mil i tary 
pacts with other countries to contain communist expansionism. 
Hence i t could not approve of Ind i a ' s policy of non-alignment 
which was dubbed as immoral by John Foster Duller. India was 
also regarded as Pro-Soviet in her foreign policy perceptions, 
India opposed colonaialism of a l l kinds. The USA supported 
colonial powers with which i t had close t i e s , Ind ia ' s 
recognit ion of people 's Republic of China and her e f for t s to 
seek China's admission in UNO were not l iked by the USA, The 
United States refused to accord recognition to China, India 
i s as sens i t ive about Kashmir as France was about Alsaca-
Lorraine during the period 1870-1914, India holds tha t 
Kashmir's accession to her i s f inal and irrevocable while 
America wants India to carry out i t s promise of p l e b i s c i t e 
and l e t the people of Kashmir excercise t h e i r r i g h t of self-
determination. In sp i t e of these difference, India continued 
to receive economic and technical aid from the USA in economic 
and technical f i e l d s . 
Ind ia ' s refusal to hold p l e b i s c i t e in in terpre ted in 
Washington as a proof that the people of Kashmir do not wish 
to remain with India. The USA also provided mi l i t a ry aid to 
Pakistan in 1954. Americ;^n 7ii l i tary ass is tance to Pakistan 
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has always been considered of doubtful value. It has 
produced a deep sense of injury and anti-American animus 
in India. 
India cannot remain i r.di ffer^ -nt to a naval compeltiton 
between the two Super Powers in an area which is so close 
to it. Hence, India in strongly opposed to the increasing 
naval presence of the US in the Indian ocean and the expansion 
of the base facilities in Diego Garcia since it would result 
in a rival soviet naval force stationed in the ocean. But 
USA's strategic land and port policies in South West Asia 
require a strong naval presence in the region. Thus, India 
and the USA have very different perceptions of the South West 
Asian situation. So far the US has ignored all Indian 
protests and rejected all attempts at making the Indian ocean 
a zone of peace and is going ahead with its plans. US aid 
policy was perhaps largely with a view to win over India to 
her side. During the Indo-China conflict of 1962, the USA 
offered prompt assistance to India. 
Hence, for the present, the prospects of revival of 
cordial relations between US and India seem bleak and it 
would require a conscious effort on the part of either of 
them to put Indo-American relations on a stable basis. This 
can be done only if the two countries arrive at some sort of 
understanding on the subject and devise a framework within 
which differences can be contained, if not resolved, without 
resulting in hostility. 
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Till independence, India had practically no relations 
with the Soviet Union. £-ven after independence, for some 
time, relations between the two could not be cordial because 
of India's decision to join the Commonwealth and her stand 
on i^ reece and Korea. India's policy of non-alignment was 
also misunderstood by USSR. But soon relations between the 
two became cordial due to India's open condemnation of colonial 
powers and her quick recognition of the Communist Government 
of China. The death of Stalin and Pakistan's military alliance 
with western powers also brought the two countries closer. 
Soviet Union also supported India on the issues of Kashmir 
and Goa. She has also supported India with economic assistance. 
During the Chinese aggression of 1962, USSR gave India the 
promised MIG planes. But in the wake of this war when China 
and Pakistan came closer Russia adopted en attitude of 
neutrality. To, sum up, it may be said that a community of 
interests between Indifi and the USSR resulted in the steady 
growth of friendship and mutual diplomatic support. India, 
USSR relations developed on the basis of mutuality of interests 
and similarity of actions and reactions to a variety of 
challenges to both. The national interests of the two 
countries, moreover developed along courses that were parallel, 
and often identical. 
India adopted a deliberate policy of friendship with 
all countries which would go further in gaining security than 
almost anything else till Indo-Chinese conflict of 1962. 
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I t i s enough to s t a t e tha t a f t e r 20 October 1962, Jawaharlal 
Nehru himself was d is i l lus ioned in t h i s respect . Friendship 
with a l l countries might be f ru i t fu l in ra i s ing pres t ige of 
thfc country. 
The foreign policy of any country has to be governed 
by her s e l f - i n t e r e s t , in conformity with the l esswr i t t en 
code of in te rna t iona l morality. Keeping in view her se l f -
i n t e r e s t and in s p i t e of facing several problems India has 
successfully t r i e d to develop be t t e r relat^tjns—wtttr-o^Hi-er-
countr ies . Jawaharlal Nehru was opposed to power blocs and 
mi l i t a ry a l l i ances which led to her adopting non-alignment 
as a policy and t h i s has created a be t t e r climate in the 
region. 
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/ 118 ''-• 20 May 1950 
LETTER TO THE SHCURTi'Y COir>rcrL : 1XDL\ 
**"»^ have been instructed by t t c Govemmem of India to refer to the 
letter dated 24 March I?5~', from ihe .Perma^^at Representative of 
Pakistan addressed to th-' Frciident cf the Secn-rv- Council reg^arding 
recent developments in Lr.-r.Vh S '--"?78\ 
Tlie P.d'olan P^:; :ar : . R^:-rc-5;rta;\e df-:-•=> that hi^ ]<Ttcr of 
3 Decenbcr (S'!-2lLl' \,..: ' •.•.'•.'-<} :o p-.it pre ".:rc on India and to 
aggravate tJic si'.u.ilion i - i ' • 1 ; Clinr--.- :r.;ni-sIons into Ladakh. 
This denial, I regret to -a;., f "' >i the p a t . r m of other previous 
denials refcricd to brief.v in n.im::ra3h 2 of r iv Pi ter of 22 December 
1959 (S/4249). 
In paragraph 3 of his k::er , the Pakistan Rr3resentati\ e refers to 
the resolution of tlic Security Ccnndi dared 17 January- 1948. The 
Securit}' Gonncii rescluticn c" 17 Jp.nnary I94iT -v-liich Pakistan has 
consis-.ciiriy violated, refers :c ir";e ^raadon which -.'-as the subject matter 
of India's complaint t3 ti'e Serarity Councii and directs the parties 
to keep_the Con.ncil inf : r~ed cf aii ir jportant drveiopments in regard 
to that situation. In utter disrrgnrd cf tiiis rescitrdcr, Pakistan marched 
13 re,?n!ar armed forces ::,"c da: iadian L'nion terd-iory of J a n n ^ u and 
Kashm.ir, annexed tn- n T t ' . : : . . '.*. s cf tne Sta-- during the period 
of the ceasc-.f.ir, in'nvr.rec " - "-"-*;•-.'; rtrei'cth o" the .<-(vcal!cd Azad 
Kasli!;nr foiccs, ah. ' d . ' . :; "^ _• ri"":'d cf ti:c csase-firc, received 
rr_iJitaiy aid anrl j . i ned n. '. ' - • v. 'd '^-r-^by .n::casing its m.ilitary 
-•,;oLi«;:.-'S of ;'s cb . ' '^  ' . , - - . - , ., ,, 
c c n i p , ' '"•i 11 t ' • f.: y 
i-la hr.^.r,'I he f/o'•;•.""•""' ' ""'"' ' '•' "-":••:'_ e to 
the c d'',ciopn:''n-is to •. z - .'• " - - c z :n 'd . 
The pontic n of !.hc Go'. : . - r" n.t c: Ind.a nn the naatter cf t i e recent 
Chinese incur'doi s int''' h'.'^',._ "a bsen cieariy sti.^d in paragraph 
5 cf my letter of 22 D^cer-ir-e- '. "d^, l i t e recent b-crjrsicn by China 
into territory of the p-.d,'-. "•. a a . : n f give ^h^-istan. herteh" an 
cider aggretsor on L'nicn t ' ~ _r . " .'•- r i r l ' a e;:"i; ' : ro h e^r ad'.'antage 
a similtir aggietsion fror.i a: c- r g- - - T . 
I'', is reg ;c3tcd tb.?t this,;":: . .•: < • - ; " . v be b . . -_ I^it •'o tine r.odce 
cf the members of the S'.' _--• b 
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No. 125 1 
UNITE!) STATES OF AiVIERiCA 
and 
INDIA 
iirreemcut tor (ln;iu(>us<^ crrliun oducaiional exeijaiige pro-
m'anis (wilh «>\|)lanalor) liu^nioraniduui). Sijj^ued at Nrw 
Urihi, on 2 Vehvn^Ay^ I%0 
"^u 
> ' • ? ' 
'^ iM 




iocoi'd rrl.iiii au iHianiC'Cnu'ii,: dr r«'iiains pro<i;rani!iiin,'', 
(foi'liaiigi' dans Ic d«>inaiiH' <li- r<'duraltoiiS (aver nu'-ino-
landiun oxplicald"). Sfjj;nr a N(>w-f)<'lSd, Ic 2 rcvricr 19,")0 
Inli o/Juiil amden'i 
hrciiiUit jun Irs f^tah-ilnis d AinoiqiK h i /inn 1951. 
12<S ( mil il \'(itii)ii\ Inn/] S c ; / M 
\ n I ' M \( .Kl I Ml N I ' HI I W M N Mi l ( . ( ) \ I K \i \ l l \ 
( )l IINDIA ^ I) I 111 ( , ( ) \ I KNiMI N I Ol M l ! UNI 1 It 
M \ I I S Oi AMI KK A ! ( ) K I I N A N C I N C . C I 1( 1 \l 
i DIK \ I l O N M I \ ( I IANC.i ' I 'ROCKAIMS S I ( , N l l ) A i 
i \ L W D J . L I I J , ON 2 1J<BRUARY 1950 
' I I K ( ju\ ( i in i i<nl ol liulii uul ih t (i()\ ci iiiiR lU ol llic DnilLcl States r 
Anicric i ( 
D t s i u n g 10 pionuHc iviilhti iniilual u n d c i s t a n d m g between the pcoplt^ 
of Inch I md the United StUcs ol Amciica by a wider exchange of knowlcd? 
ind p ioks s ion i l t a k n t s th iough educational contacts , 
( o i i s u k i n; t h u i t i i o i "12 (1)) o( the United States Stiiplus ikopcri 
Act ol kM4 IS hUMuU i hv I'uhhc I nv No 584, 79th Congress,- providi 
til I th( S c L i ' t m ot I ol ihi I lilted S t i les oi Aincnca may enter m 
III is^ui. iKiit \ 1 h I \ I 1 j () ( i n n u n l hjr tht use ol ciiiieneies oi ercd 
'o I I t I 1 1 ^ ) i n m n t a([ii iKd is i icsult ol siiifil 
H s I " I '" 1 'ill. Il I 111 il I ii\ iiK ind 
1 M 1 1 111 I h i \ I ( I I (, (. I. I 1 I 
fiRii' </ l i t I 11 (td -> K (I \ i i ic i ic i pdi iitiU lo the \ i u ( u K n t he ' ii 
I 111 (1 )\ ( I niiK 111 ol 1 IK I ml till ( JO\ (. I unit 111 ol t IK I ni t td St ites ol \iiii ii 
on Sci t l iment oi ItMii 1 i i c R i c i p i o t i l \ i d , Siiiplus \ \ n I ' lopci t ) i 
Chin is i,-;ii'd M l ) 16 i')l{) ' IS inotlilicd in leeoulanei. with the Ind 
IndepencLnce ( I n t m i i t o n i l \ i i uigeincnts) O u k i of 1947, 
H u e igK eel \ loHdWs 
ArLulc I 
i l i t ic sK ill he e I t ' l l heel i loinul ition to be known is the United St iii 
L dueational JoundUuM in Ind i i (hei eiii litei designated tlie I ounelation 
wliieh sh ill he l e e o n i ' / d h\ thi d o v e i n n u n t of Ineh i uid tlu (joveinincr 
01 the I niled St it(-^ ol \ni le i i m o igu i i /Uion eie ittel uul est ibhshed 
l ieihtt te the idiui u t i i a ol tiK eehui t ion i l I ' o i i n n to be fmin ' t t l 1 
a i d 111 ulc I u il ' I ( I, I in iiinu n! ol the i iiite d ' t i l e e 
' C 11 It, i i i i o t o i I o 1 2 1 III I 1 9 5 0 1 t i o n i t h ci lU of ij i i t i i i i . in l e i o u h n c w i t h 
t i t l e 15 
11 I M I ( 0 I 1 
IJ II 1 N 1 1 i II 1 V I ' 1 1 I 
I ^tU^i^nj^ 'iU3.^ 
^0 I mil I \ t/hniis hill!) '^i III \ 
22TSI 
19^  
iiiuK I llu I 1 (I 1 I pi \\{ \ u M\u ul 1 \i. I pi I Jii OS nK il 111 \ I i nk I 
l u l l I (IK I )u \ i l 111)11 l iu l 1 t \ n \p l li )iu l lu d m lu mil liii ! l i s 
1 lull 1 m ! t IK I luU I I ( I ^ iK 1K 1 I l lu ) 11. I I t t i u 1, m I i \i t 
l u l l ol t u i i t i K i c s 1)1 L m l i l loi c u i u n t u loi t i n p u i p ( s < . s set l o i t h u\ t ' ' ' 
p u c a t if^rcc i ncu t 1 
l l u l i i iuls in K1( IV 111 ihl li\ the ( , ov ( i i i i iu ii( ol ( I K l l u i t u l Si Uc'^  1 f 
A m c i u i w i l l i m llu c o n d i i m n s uul l u u i l U i o n s h t i c u u l t c i set ( o t t h , s h i l l b ( | 
U s u i b y the l o u i u i i t i o n oi s u c h o t h c i ins t i u n u iil ilily is in ly be i g u c d upo": 
by t he ( ; { ) v u i i i n c n l ol I n d i i iiul t he ( J O V C I i inici i t ol tlic U n i t e d S t i t cs t f 
A i i H i K i hji t he p u i p o c is set l o i t h in S e c t i o n 12 (b ) ol t he U n i t e d Stittj 
S i i i p h i s I ' l o p t i l ) y\el ol l ' ) 41 is u n e n d e d ol 
( I ) (imiKiiifi; s t i id i i s u s i u i h i n s t n u l i o n i n i l o t l u t u l i R i t i o i n l u tu i l i o 
ol 01 ioi L i l i / i I I ill I Diu d Si lUs ol \ i i u 1 iL I in s c h o o l s uul inst 
i u l i o n ol hi) lu 1 1 1 1 1 ) lo( ill d in In h i 01 ol l lu 11 i l ion il ol liulu 
III 1 l u l S t i l t h ) )ls uul m i i l u t i o n s ol hi jdici !< umii) . ' hu Uis! 
outsicU the (. ( n l n u I il I nite d St ite I 1 u\ 111 V^l isk i ( i iu ludli i) ' lb 
Ah uti I 1 I 1 1 I ) I II 1 1 I I I h \ 111 I M III I II I 
I I 1 I 111 I I u I c I 11 I. 1 ' ( I lu [ I. 1 
1 I u h I t ) Ui )i li nil -, (H 
C ) iui 1 1 h I (11 1 1 1 I t on li )! l ud i 1 w h dt l u ' ) U •• 
I I 1 il I ( I, I 1 11 I I iiti 1 ol h i h( 1 1 u mil 111 l lu 1 
II 1 n i l s ' 11 I \1 \ I 1 ( K ludms t iu \ h uii ui Isl UKKJ ^ 
P i c I i\u 1 111 i l l \ III Isl u u l s uu l whose it nd u u e will 11 
eh I n \ ( o 1 a I ti e I l u l c d St ite s ol \ i ue 11^ i il m o p p o t tu iu t ) lO 
til ne! ucli sc lux 1 uul i n s t i t u t i o n s 
It 
h!i(h 2 
In l u i l l u i i i i e ol l lu i l i i u i u i t io i ied p u i p o s the l o u n d i t i o n inn { 
sub )cc t to the pi )\ I u ns ( i ill ^ t it ' u e me lit i \e u 1 e 11 po \ ci (ee 2 
s u ) to ' h e c i i> in j ; ou el t i i^ pu poses ol the p iese i i t i ^ ' i cen ien l inekuiini, | 
t h e follow 111 ' I 
(1) Reeei \c lunels s 
(2) ( )p i .n u u l o p e i U i 1 \\k i c ( o u u l s in t h e n u n c o( t h e l o u i u l u i o i i in | 
I d e p o s u o i ) 01 de pejsiteuics to b e d e s i g n i l e d by t h e S c e t e t a r y of Stitc 
ol t he I n i t c d S t i t e s ol \ m c i i c t 
( ] ) D w b u i s e Km U uul m ikc in m t s u id i d \ a u e e s e>f f u n d s 
(4) V t d u i i c , holtl u id 1 1 ) e ol p i o p e i t ) m t h e 11 n i le ol t h e l o u n d i t i o n 
IS the b o n d ol D i u t i 1 ol t in l o u n d i t i o n mxy e o n s i d e i neecss i r i 
»>J*UR'iJ»*^^*^ " ^ fciiA/^^^ *ii-i^^W^^r *.j«j.n>.4 
l^"'^ "•(i5MflWv<t'»^w*» 
1 n I III/ (I Milnni', lidily SilKs 
^7—TT-C— 
19)1 
1)1 ill II ilil( [ iui \ ul( li Iiowc \ (. I th U I I K icc iu is idon OI ii\y ic il iHopcrt) 
s l uU lu NiihiLct to Ux 1111(11 i p p i o v i l ol l!ic S c c n U i y o! Si i lc ot'th 
I m U d S t lit. «l A U K U L V , 
(5) I'i 111 u l o p i , mil l U M mil p i o i ^ i u n s in , u ( o u l n i ( ( will i l lu piiiposi 
ol S i i l i u n \2 (i)) ol llu U n i l n l h l i t c s S i i i p l i i , P i o p c i t y Act ol 19-1^ 
I iniLiulccl 
I 
(6) R u o n m i c n d to the Ho ml ol 1 oicigu bcholaisliips, provided fort'! 
the United State SiupKis Piopci ty Act of 1944, \s amended, student.• 
piolessui u s t i i i h I hoi us lesKknts m l iul i i , iiul mslitulions J 
hiilii (pniiliiii ID I II i| Il in llu j 1 M I'll 111 Kiouli i iLi ^\ltll lli 
II >IL 111 \ l I 
(7) R( to i i i i iu ml lo llii iliMi ml I t o m l ol i o i i i i ' i i S i l i o l i i Inps siitl: 
ipi il (11 idoi is fo (ill ( l( ( ' ion o( p 11 (It ip ni( 111 (iu pi o<;i 1111 ^ 1 
in i\ ill I 111 111 I ( 11 
{ ) 1 11 \ 111 I 111 I 111 I II I ill I )1 1 111 u I on 111 I) I llu I 111 I ml II oM 
ill K k d l)\ iiiilil I u d h\ the S c t u l n y ol St UL ol l lu I niti 
I 111 o! "* Mil I II 1 
( ) ) 1 iit^ 1 c n I \ ( i 111 ' d h i 1 ulni i i isti It \ ( mil ( l i 111 1I st ilF 11 
I llu' I i>, (hi I 11 n il \ 1^  e t l i i i ol ou t ol ( I K lu iu l n 1'( 
u 1 ' 
] i / i < l ( ) 
\U I oiniiiil nil 111 Dili llu I iiiii L \p i IK1)( in I b) the i on iu i ition si 1 
IK 111 u ' t p in n ml (o n min i tl lnKli''et (o hi i p [ ) i o \ e d l ) \ ( lu Si e i e t my of St t: 
of the ! 111(1-cl S( lies ol A m i 111 1 pill u m t to s u c h l e g u L i t i o n s as h e m ly [nescribc' 
A) tick 4 
\ i he n u n i[;i.in(-nt a n d t l n e c d o n o( t h e a l i a i r s of t h e I o u n d t t i o n s h i l l b i 
\ c s t e d m I H o u d ol D i i e i t o i s t o n i s l m g of e i g h t D i r e e t o r s ( h e r e i n a f t e r dc^i; 1 
n a t e d t h e B o n d ), (oui ot \ s h o m sh ill h e n a t i o m i s of I n d n a n d foni ofwhon! 
s h i l l 1)( c i l i / i n I I ill I ml il ^l iK ol A i m n c i in i d d i l i o n , the piincipii 
ollieei in e h n g i ot t h e Dip lo i 1 itie Miss ion ol t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ot Amencij 
(0 l i u h i ( h i u i n i l i i i lit n n 111 l lu ( hii I ol l\li i o n " ) h i l l he Ihmounii 
f I u i m n I li 1' 1 id I h 1 I I ( (lu d e t u h n u ; \ o ( e in t h e event o f j | 
t OU 1 111 O U 1 1! 
( 1 un 1 I ' 1 M 
( . w i 1 ' 
1 1 1 I M 1' tn C h in 111 in ol 1' l!o u d 1 
(I I 1 \\y to \ o I 11 1 u in n 
t 1 s | 1 I I ) \ 1 n in, oiiU \nd \ m u s e l lu iMoh^j i 
ol ' m i 1 on the L i i u l I h C im I ol \ ' i s s i o n sh ill h n e t h e p o w e i lo ippoi'M 
7^ ^  
H4 / niliil \iilt(>)i\ l i i i t l \ SI III s m\ 
u u l u m i N l U ( t ! i / u i o l l l i l i i i U i l ^ t i k (i! \ I I K I I I D I I I I U l i o i u l , i l k i 
I w o 111 w h o i 1 li ill 1)( ilii i 1 1)1 I I K I l u l l (1 ^il il( 1 oi ( II n ( I \ K ( ( I i l l i li I ( I 
111 III !i I i 
1 lu i )i 1 (, I to i h i l l c I \ 11 )i 1 I In 11 i iu ol I lu II i[) | i () i i i l iiK lU u n t i l ill' | 
11 How 111 '^ I ) ( ( ( i i i l x I ) 1 I m i h i l l I) ( 111 i l j l t l(ji It i [ ) | ) o i i U i u c i i l \ I t intiL I 
b y 1 ( 1 o n ol i c s i c n i t i o i i li in I i o ' i< s i c k n c t o u t K I C I n d i i t \ | ) i i i t iun o | 
s c i v i c t OI o l h t i w i i it ill he (ill li m K I U K I U K I w i t h i h i i p p o m t lu i;l pi u 
i l i m I I l o i ill 11 ( l u s u 111 li 
1 h< i J i H c t o i s sli ill St 1 \ < i l h o i i l t o n i p i n i l i o n b i l l t l i t i o i n u l i t ion IJ j 
i i i t h o i i / t ti t o p i ) 1 h e iK(-( s u \ ( •• 1 I II t s ol t l R D n ct t o i s 111 it It lu l i n g t h e i i in l 
i n j s o( 1 III I ' ll u (I 
hluli 5 
1 ht li( l i d s h ill i d o p t sill h b \ I i\\ i n d i p p o i n t s u c h t o i n i n i t t c t s i-. i 
s h ill d ( ( 111 IK ( i i \ l o i t i t 1 I )l l i l t ill III o l t i l t , 1 o u i i t l iLltJll 
hn 'i 6 
11 t 1 1 i 1 1 I \ 
I I II 
S l u t I \ 
i \ 
II \ )i " I 
bluli 7 I 
I 
l i l t , ()i 111 If) il ( llicc oi till 1 o u id ituHi oh ill be l a l l ic capit, il c i ty oi Ii til | 
b u t m e e t i n g s ol t h e B o i i t l a n d m y oi i ts t o m n i U t e e s m a y b e h e l d m s u e h o t h a l 
p l a c e s \^ t h e B o a r d m a y f i o m t m c to t i m e d e t e r m m t , a n d t h e ac t iv i t i e s ot i-i t 
oi t h e I o u n d Uion s o i h c t i s t)i t i l l ni n b e e t i i i e d on at s u c h p l i c c s is my>\ 
b e a p p i o \ etl b} t in b o u t l 
lituk 8 
1 h e i x c e i i t u t O l h e e i sh ill b u poiisil:(k io i t h e d i i c c t i o n m d supcniMO^ 
of t h e Bo u d s pioi^i i ins ind i c tn i l i c m i t e m d m e t w i t h t h t b o u d s r tsolutun, | 
a n d d i i c t L U c m d flit p i o \ isi ) i l i h t i i n t n t In li s il S L I K I ot th i f 
t h e b o i u l 1111) 1) pt ml i s u b l 1 i 1 i it li t imt i it t i t t i i i i i t t t ^ iri, o 
dt. u d) l t In t h t e v t n l it u i o i ind to b t m i p i ic tu ab le lo i t h e B o n d to cngisel 
an l \ e e u t i \ t ( ) i h t t i t i n I j O N t i n n u n l ol t h t I n i t t d S t i l t s oi V m t u t a n 2f 
p i t n i d e in I \ t c i i t i t O i h i t i inti s i i t l is i t i n t s is m ly be d e e m e d n t t t s b i i y | 
to ensi i i t ' l u t d i 111\ t op t I 11 in < i I IK pi O n im 
STi¥**l'^t"»«ir"MLMMfHM»«p»w 




! IK St t I d 11) ol St ii( ()( llu Uni in l Si ilc s ol \ I I ILI it i \\ ill in ikc iv ul ibk 
lor < \p( lulitiiu IS iiitlioii/((l h) tlu lioiicl t i i iKi ic) ol tlu C!o\ c i miKiit oft 
l iu l i i i i i 111 iiiioui t iioi to I 11 (tl till, ((-iiin ik lit ol <S'I0(),()()() 00 (UiiitLcl St itCi| 
c u i u i K \ ) (liiiin" ia\ mi'lc ( i l t i idii \L U [ion> liuli iu c i i i u i u y htlcl m tlit; 
>u count ol tlu I i( I iiiti ol tlu Unilctl S t i l t s uui i\ nl il)k loi [uuposcs o'5 
tlus ifriitmcnt m i t cou luuL with Lnitccl S t i t t s I i\v Su th unouiUs mml 
available shi l ! not lu. in (xccss ol die budti;ctiiy limit ilioii t t ibhshcd piHsin(it| 
to AiLiclc 3 ol t h t pre cnt 'Vcu n m nt 
htii/i 10 
I iMiiilm ((]! i| in 111 ii| I li 111(1 nw ot lui i i l i i k s iiit(n(k(i loi olliin 
n ( ol llu 1 oiiii I il I 11 li ill I ( ( nipt 111 llu t( i i Mm ^ ol I luli i 11 oiii c u 1 )ii 
t l i i l u s , c \ i i c iiu i i l i \ ( i i d ( \ c i \ ollui l o i i n o l l i \ i t io i i 
\ l ' I 11 i O 1 ^ ( I p i I \ II ( I loi li I I j 1. S ( I ll ( I (HI 1 I 111 
1 u d II 1 I I \ 1 I I I I I I 
sli ill 1 I ( u 1 t 'u ( \ II pi 11 111 1 I 1 I I \ 11V 1 iiul in tlu t 111 I y ol i lull 1 \ 
lituh II I 
l lu ( n n c i n n i c if o' I n ' i i lull cvtciul to citi/ciis ol t h t United Stlu 
Of i n i t i a l usidi i i j ; in Ind i i ind (ngij^td m <diicUionil i t ln i l i c s uncki thJi 
anb[)K< s ol till l o u n d i l i o n nc'i puviki^'cs wilh rr s[}cct to cvcinption froirj 
ta \a t ion iiul otliL hii idcns ilKttin^' tlu t n l i y t r u c l , uui icsidcnce of such 
persons I lu < \ t ( i u k d to Indi in n i t ioni l icsiding in the United Stitc'>a.j 




^ . " i 
]iti(k 12 
W he-c ( r in the piescnt I ' r u n u n t the te im S ie rc t i ry of StUe oMhj 
Uni ted St lies (J1 Ameiu i is u i. d it sli ill be i indcislood to ore in the SecrctarrJ 
of St lie ol the I iiited St i les ol \ n u i i e i oi my ofhecr or employee of tKJ 
Gove 1 iu It )1 ihi 1 ml 1 •-1 t ol \iiieiK i design ted h) hiin to let in h, I 
behil i ti 
hlulc 13 
l l u p u (lit i^ icenunt m i bi. im( iided by t lu txe l i i iuu ol diploiiu'k| 
nok b( w ( ( n ih (,( \ c 11 n t i t (I I luh i md llu (lovei nment ol the Uiiitt-if 
St ite-> (I \ i iu 11 1 
\rlu}< li 
1 he ( j o \ e inmen t ol liulii ind the G o \ e n i i n c n t ol the b n i t e d States cl| 
A n u n e i sh ill m ikc ever) eiloi to iaeditate the exchange of p t i sons [)iooranj| 
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l-lcrc;!. . r. ' U -• 
coopciative effort i. • 
continuin-; dtvclor. 
India 's economy : 
RecogpJzing tlhit • 
time a four-year pn 
v/hilc the Go\crn:. : 
toward achicin^ ' c . -
c c n t n b j i ' - n lo L..,._ 
currcr.t fc , - ic\".7 • 
production and Ma" 
Conridsrln- t ' - : -
iviil be ut) /cd n! a : 
Recognir-int; u.c . . .; 
commoditie; bct\'.C''- i.-' 
nation, in a niaaar r 
United States of A- zii: 
world prices of agii itur 
u i t h friendly counta r : 
Desiring to set a -• •. ia.e 
as specified below, cf surp 
mcnt of India pariaan; 
pro-ra-
' at a ,./ e .1-/ ior a ^ s'a, acd 
! Co*.crr.rnent, :o cnya." tae 
of tlic agricaitiiral sector of 
Uaitcd Statts. by undcrtalar;^ for the first 
a"^ of .a.aria^ its ahua>Iancc of food erai-'S— 
India ac.atas Us 
-al : •'.:-~ a'acisnc/-
two L 
J^ c '^. a 
encrgie:> and resources 
- e n raaVc a siga:5cant 
vl t j her efforts .a ra-'ct 
•,c \ j a t . :-aseat:ric .h.a-al 
;aees accraiag i'lom such pi:rchasc 
:._! to both CvjLaitric".; 
f La;; lad 'ag traaic in agricultural 
ai V,iiii othci fiieadly 
aa.ai ; a feting? cf the 
ta-- or andiiiv darupt 
a-aars a 
t (h pLae 
(ajaaraa! 
fa.'es or r aattcrno ot trade 
•aders'a- a'ags \vli!ch '.'.iU ao\xrn tiae sales, 
:s agricultural conraic ditics to the Go\ern-
to Tide T of th." Agricultural Trade 
Development and .-'-a^iitaace Act, as aaicaJed (licreinaftcr referred 
to as the Act), and the measures wiiici: the t^vo Governments v.ili take 
individually and ccatcti^ f"y in furthering the expansion of such trade 
in such commodities; 
Have agreed as fc'.Io\ss: 
ArlicU I 
SALES F O R RUPEES 
1. Subjf(.'t to the aT.-a:hdjiliry of commodities for programming 
under the Act and isjuancc by the Government of the United States 
of America and acceptance by the Government of India of purchase 
atuhorizations, the Government of the United States of America 
undertakes to finance tiie sales up to the value $319 mallion, for rupees 
to purchasers authorized by the Government of India, of the agricul-
tural commodities (sho%sTa in tabic on next page) dctcEmined to be 
surplus pursuant to the Act, of the amounts indicated. 
-The provisions of this Agreement, as appHed to the balance of the 
amounts indicated in the schedule below, shall not become effective 
until January 1, 1?(5I, and shall become effective then only in the 
event that the Unifcd States Government on or after January 1, 1961, 
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i'( r;,a IrariLpditjiridi) '-o",]'; liii.iiiccil by IIH- Onvrriinicnt. of the Ui)ilC(J 
• .'Mates of Anici MM {< •;( rpt rx< !••,'•, ( n;,l'; rcMiltiiiij I'yom ihc rcquircinful 
thai l lni lul Jltatc, ll;u; \'c':';cl', lie ii icd) ;;liali he made at thft tatc of 
cxclinn;-/; for iJii'ilcil Stale;; dullai:! ijejierally applicable to import 
iransadioiv; (exrludiiifr inipor;-; pv.mtvA a preferential rate"' in eflect 
oil (lie, datf ; OJ ddllai di'.biir f-mc ill i>y liniier] State'; ban!;",, or Ijy the 
(;()\'er)inici!t oi (lie United Stales of Anierira, as prcnidcd in the 
purch;'',c ;;iilhori/.ation;;. 
I ;•//,/,' / r 
(.•r.Ni'.KAi, i : \ ' i ) f ; ! r r A K i , \ ( ; s 
1. '.Ihc (idvetiiinciii el Iniha .I'vrcs ilial il \sill lai.e all pi)'-;;,il)h: 
mrasmi"; lo prevent ihe r'-',,>!(- or !i .nrdiip-nicnl to other cotinti-icr, (jr 
ihe ii\e I'or other tliaii (hmuMie, jiuijxisc; (escepl wlierc sueh I'Ciialc, 
tran:;h!])iuent or use is ;-pe, ilicaily appro\'ed by the Government of llic 
Uiiiled Stale:; o l 'Anin ii a), ol tlu; ;,mp!ii;j ;i|;ri(:u]tural coninioditie') 
piiiclia',.(l ])iii;ai;uii h> ihe pirnr.ioiis ni'ihi.s ;i;;reeii)ent, and to as.siirc 
that ![)(• piurhase <>( MM ft < •)i,iiii(u(ilie'; doe;; not re;jtilt in incrca;;cd 
availability of th(\sc or Ji'.e oonimodiiie;; for export from India. 
2. '.riic two (Jo^•el nmri,! ; a;;iee |ii:U lliey \vill take reasonable pre-
cautions to ;i;,;;iire tha' ;iH K.\lrs or pnrclntses of Miipliis aijriciillural 
coiiiniodilie'., pniMiani i,, i!,,- Ai;i e(aiiciil will not (Ii;,])la{;c nsmal 
marketings of the l ini i id State;, oi Anieriea in these conunoditics, or 
unduly disrupt worlrl pi ices (\''ai;rjeuUuraI coninioditics or normal 
;, p;>llcn oreoninieieial iiade with hieiidly ('(Jtuitries, 
\ 3. In carr>'ing out liiis A(;recineni, tlu; (wo (Jovernincnts \vill seek 
j (o rta.'Uirr, In the t'>tli'u( pi lelii abh-, i undilioii;! of e()]iinieU;U [jri'inilliuf.; 
J private .traders to iiiii(;lif)ii eflec lively ;uid will use their best endeavors 
I to develop luitl extend continuotui niarkt:i demand for aijricullural 
' commodities. 
», 4. The (ioveiuineni of Indi i ,iiae,-s (o hu iiisli, ujnm ie(iue;a of the 
i United States of Anieriea, info; nettiDU on the ]-)roj;re;,s of the proj^ram, 
I p;\rlicvil;u-ly \«.id> x-.peei !<i thr aiii\.il ;i\ul ewiuliiiun of eoinmoditie'i 
\ ami the provi'luns fir (ha maimeniini'i; of >a:,ii;ii niarkclinip, and 
• infoni '.inn rehuiii;', to e.vpia i;, ol (iic 'uinie or like i-onunotHlie.",, 
I A'L:CC i 
i . GOXSULI 'ATION 
; The two Govennnents will upon (he request of either of tkem 
* consult regarding any matter relatincj to the application of this agrec-
; mcnt or to the operation of arrangements carried out pursuant to this 
'. AOTCcmcnt. 
ArtlcU VI 
I',N'i'l'>y IN'I'O l'OK.(.n'i ' • 
The Arrecment shtiU enter into force upon sigmiture, 
> l ! " ; ; ' : " WHKKKOta the re.pe<:tive represe.ttattves, dulyatuhott .cd 
for 'the purpose, have signed the present Agreement. • 
„0N..: at \vard.inKton in dui^healc lh,s foutth day ot >,lav 
, , ^ , , , , , . „ , , . . M . . r < . - > n n . o . . . m COVKKNM.NT o . m o , ^ ^ 
u M i i n ;/rAris OK AMI.KIOA: p^ ,^^ ,^ ^^  
(Sd.^ lAv^;irr 1). EIS!^ N^o^ •^Hi- l^^'-J 
U..ia-d 5W1« lufonnation S c v k c , New Delhi. 
i ' o R r , i ( ; \ r , ( : ( ) \ ' (}Mj( ; i-;!-i,A'i'iONS 
-'-^  111 sriitciiibcr vyy.) 
' '^  I ' .COT'IOMK; A I D A(;ia.i,Mi,N r : J N D I A A N D U . S . S . R . 
- The Government o( Iiuiia aiul the Coveiiinient of the Union of Soviet 
Sociah'st Repubhcs 
I-lii^hly apprccialinr the CMMIIH; iriri,(!-,liip bciwccn the twocountries, 
and 
_ Gm'dcd by mntiial d- >re lo fnnher the development and consoiida-
lion of reunonii;- i luip'-i iiimi 
Ila\T cdnfUKh-d ihi. \ unii on dn' |i)lhr,viiii', : 
f ; ' f / . / 
The CoverniiKMii of {\\v I 'm M I! : n\n\ hori.ihit Repubhcs, ipcc" 
irirr the ^^idu•, oi ih-- Cox ei tini.'.-i ,,| ]IV\\A. -hall extend (o the Go\'cni-
Hi.-nl nl liaha ( K dii \o ihi aniuuin nl nju- '• ilhaid ln'c hiilidivd inillion 
loubles (one rouble contain; 0-22'.{l()B <yain of fine gold) bcariu'^ the '-, 
iuteie'-t of ? • f) p'n (en; per )e,u, and shall provide at the expense'-,' 
ol'ihis (sedit the lendenn"; o( (eelnn'i a! a:isi';lancc in the'consUau tioii'*' 
<^ ! separ.nr intlusUud, ar, inuhuial and cUher enlei pi bsei. to be eidect'ed •"'' 
by tl\e (Jnvcrnnient ol'Lidia dnring the period of the Third Idvc-Ycar 
rian, 
•J he list oi" enterinises, a!) \veU as tlie kinds, periods and volumes of 
teehnieal assistanec m rtspci;t oi'cach of these enterprises shall be deter-
mined by additional agreements between the two Parties. 
Aihclc 2 
The credit mentioned in Article 1 of this Agreement shall be used 
by the Government of India in order to pay for : 
(a) Designing and snrvcy work lo be earned out by Soviet or'gam-
zations; •  '•-»-•-
{b) Deliveries from the U.S.S.R. ofequlpment, machines and materials 
\vhi(di arc. not available, in Isulla, GIF Indian ports if transported 
nn ,S()VJ'-i ships and i'OIi Sovin ports if transported on Indian ships, 
The piii(--i liii die 1 ijiiipiui'iji. nmcliinrfi and rniticrial-i «hidl bu 
Jixed en ihe basis (;f wuild market prices; 
(f) Isxp'Msc'i involved in. sendin;,' Soviet spccialisis to India for 
rcndeiini; tct hnioal aislslaucc in all niatloiii connected wid) llic 
iniplementadon oi this Agrcenieni except for tlic expenses ^^'ithin 
ihe (cniiui y ol lndia 1(1 be leinibiiised by the Indian I'.i) fy in nipcc), 
AiiiiU a 
The Government of India shall repay the amounts of the credit 
iili!i/ed Ibi- eat h enlri pt ise wiihin i'.] yeara in equal annual in^talmcnta. 
I 'hc lirst instalment for the repayment of this credit shall be paid one 
year idler the compleiion of deHvciieii for each corre.'ipuntlina; enterprise 
of the e(pn[)ment, nnu'hines and materials required for putting llicsc 
enterprises into operation and stipulated by corresponding contra^|3 
to be delueied from the IhS.Sdl . The first instalment for the repayment 
of the amounts of the credit utili/ed for rendering technical assistance 
which is not connected \silh the construction of enterprises shall be 
paid liom the dale of i onipktion of the above-mentioned technical 
assistance v/ork in respect of each project. *'-,, '! 
Intel est shall aeernc fron\ tlie dale on which the corresponding part 
of the credit is used and shall be paid during the hrst diree months ol 
f-aih ^ear follca ini; tlu- \eai I'ji \v]ii(h it ]i.(s ,uTnieri. The last pay-
nieiil shall b(; elleetud si)!)idi.ii)ci;n',ly \\)ih (he last in:)U!l:.':ent i<jr the 
rcpa\mcnt of tlu; pnnci[)al. The date of the utilization of dic credit 
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1.1.-, 1() Frbuiarv 19bO 
' ) i ) iNr ( oNr-i M<M 1 • M i n v i \-,r) K iov i ' s i u . i n v 
At the i u \ l l U i o n c)l the r , n \ ( i n n i c i i n( I n d i a M i . N b K h i i n i u h c v , 
( h \11 m.Ml ('( t h r ( Ol U( ll n ( M p r 1 i ) | l l l l - I l . , S . S , l v , p . u c l I \ IMt 1') 
liuli.i l . " m 1 I hill \ p l i u i l ' i ' ' I I h \ ' a ii i n inpaniMl 1^  Mi \ . 
A (.Iii'MU'MI, 1 I'M 1 M i M i i !i \ ' \ Mi l J ia i inv , M 1)1 In of 
C u l l u i c , M l . (.J \ / ' i " ' . iA, ( I 111 111 (hi ( on ui idi [• i'Ji Ci t l tMal 
Re la t ions Mi .S ^ ' ' ' ' '1 "^ ^ ' ' i i n a u ol ihe ( oi.ii Hire loi 
l A t e i n a l ],(unoMiH ' i la M i 1 l l j ihaM v, DeM, p ol ilic 
S u i n e n i e S(n t ' u[ il ' ^ N 1' \ ' ' l \ 1 u i m ', 1 oi c I'-i M i n i / e i 
of "the A - e i h ' i j a i i 'M' M S. • A l \ ]a iMi . , \1 A M Maihov, 
Mni ibu o'ilu Ih 'Hi ' i h ^ M - ( i i'nhl , Ih iltli ol lh( C S.S.R , 
and M I . I V. lUncd ' I •., Ai lo. ol the I ' S S.R. in I (hi. 
lu ])(!hi ,<Jid, fa (he OMK i pLu < wliU h he vrjilrd, Mi. Khni-Iirlicv 
was ac ( oidrd h\ 'hi ]aibh( \ Waim and fueudly icccption wliicli was 
im|iii";i\e foi du (Uii>e ni p iiml ti i iilhin iasin Avhieh il (litjjlaycd. 
dill e niauili I iin u ol (,(.) ulw di \',cu ahke a tiibntc to a \voilU ;.taU-s-
iiian \\lio 1) 1, I \' I'M d d( \()l((dv ni tite cause of peace a r d an cxpics- C 
'iiMi o( the li p-ii^ ivli'iiui I ia( ( I ( l)il\vi-(ii India and (he Sovlrt ' 
I hium 'iid (hi 1 ,i'i 11' d' i\ ii I niiiiii u •, 
J ''II nii; ID I ( i MI 1 ' J i n Mi K In n hi lu v ,id(h( 'MI d Me nihi i ) ol tin: 
Indian Failiann iil, v r i d d the AVoild Agriculture Fail, attended a 
Civic Reec]Ulou held in Ins Iiononi by (he city of Delhi, and fulfilled 
other jHibhc en;^agrni( iits, He la(e, visited Suratgarh and Bhilai, 
both symbols ol Indo-Soviel (OODciatiou, one in the agticultural and 
(he other m tjic mdustnal (uld. 'J iie success of these two enterprises 
has been a 'oni ic o! gi atif'( atioii to both couutrics, and augurs well 
foi the futine ni nononiii (oopci.dion between tlic two countries. / 
IIKS \Tits to lh( e (wo < end( . ",.\vv My. Khrushchev a vivid iniprcs,sion 
both of the magmtudc of the (ask upon which India is engaged and of 
the pace at wdiu h she is moving foiwaid to the altainmcJit of the im-
mediate objcctucs ol hci developmental plans. 
Mr. Khrushchev met and ..onfeucd v/ith the President, the Vice-
President, the Prime Minister and other members of the Government 
of India. His ta!k6 with (,!'• Pjirue Mmistcr, held in a friendly and 
cordial atmosphere, covered a wide range of subjects in the inter-
national sphere as wcU as .specilic matters of mutual concern to the 
two countries. • 
The two Prime Mmlstms noted with much satisfaction the recent 
favourable trcmls in world a (fairs leading to a marked lessening of 
iutcrnadonal tensions. This improvement is due in no small mca.sure to 
(Jir iiriKincil inidutivc itntl (O'Oidinatcd cUhvl of the Icadeis of tlic 
Gieat Powcis, notably Mr Khrushchev, Chairman of tlie Council of 
^liuistcrs of the U.S.b.R., ami ^^r. Risenhowor, Prcjidcnt of the U.S.A. 
The direct contacts ^vhich have been cstabhshed between them and arc 
being devclojied tluough intri'rhauge of visits have been a valuable 
factor in promoting international understanding, and have facilitated 
the welcome agreement to h(;!d a meeting, at the highest level, of the 
Icadns of U.S.S.R,, U.S.A., H.K. and'i 'Vancc in May next. The V^^  
liopi; of all iiK n o! \>c n c ai e ( e lued on this and simi-l.u meetings, and 
it IS the aiddi t ' , .di ct all in^n. l int the efioits of the leaders of the 
( . le i Power, \,ill lui i i \\i(u a lull nuMsme of .success. I'br her ptiit, 
Jutlni fjladly pletiges lu i g.jod\/iil and moi.il support for these continu-
if; and 'UCJlaiued elkxl'J lov/,i'(1'i peate, 
The Piimc Miui^ter of India repeated Ins appreciation i of 
Ml. Khiushchcv's proposals for total disarmament. In Indian eyes, 
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A Tryst with Destiny 
Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now 
the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly 
or in full measure, but very substantially. At the stroke 
of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake 
to life and freedom, A moment comes, which comes but rarely 
in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when 
an age ends, and vrtien the soul of a nation, long suppressed, 
finds utterance. It is fitting that at this solemn moment 
we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India and 
her people and to the still larger cause of humanity. 
At the dawn of history India started on her unending 
quest, and trackless centuries are filled with her striving 
and the grandeur of her success and her failures. Through 
good and ill fortune alike she has never lost sight of that 
quest or forgotten the ideals which gave her strength. We end 
today a period of ill fortune and India discovers herself 
again. The achievement we celebrate today is but a step, an 
opening of opportunity, to the greater triumphs and achieve-
ments that awaibus. Are we brave enough and wise enough to 
grasp this opportunity and accept the challenge of the future? 
Freedom and power bring responsibility. The responsibility 
rests upon this Assembly, a sovereign body representing the 
sovereign people of India. Before the birth of freedom we have 
endured all the pains of labour and our hearts are heavy with 
the memory of this sorrow. Some of those pains continue even 
-240-
now. Nevertheless, the past is over and it is the future 
that beckons to us now. 
Peace has been said to be indivisible* so is freedom, 
so is prosperity now, and so also is disaster in this One 
World that can no longer be split into isolated fragments, 
« • • V 
I beg to move, Sir, 
" That it be resolved that; 
(1) After the last stroke of midnight, all members 
of the Constituent Assembly present on this occasion, do 
take the following pledge: 
'At this solemn moment when the people of India, 
through suffering and sacrifice, have secured freedom, I, «... 
a member of the Constituent Assembly of India, do dedicate 
myself in all humility to the service of India and her people 
to the end that this ancient land attain her rightfulpplace 
in the world and make her full and willing contribution to 
the promotion of world peace and the welfare of mankind'» 
(2) Members who are not present on this occasion do 
take the pledge (with such verbal changes as the President 
may prescribe) at the time they next attend a session of the 
Assembly. *' 
* Extract from tbe Speech delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru 
in the Constituent Assembly, August 14, 1947, on the 
eve of the attainment of Independence. 
